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This study examines the means by which the UK government sought to win the 
support of the media in advance of taking military action in two separate conflicts in 
which regime change was the main government agenda and to which there was 
substantial internal domestic opposition. This opposition led to the necessity of 
winning the support of the media in order to influence public support in the lead-up 
to direct military action and to retain that support during the latter period and up to 
the cessation of formal military activities. Areas including overt and covert 
censorship and propaganda are examined in order to determine if they played any 
part in UK government media agenda building in the military actions being studied. 
The two conflicts examined are the Invasion of the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt in 
1956 and the Iraq War of 2003, both of which are linked in that the military and 
political aims were regime change in the face of extensive international opposition, 
were without the fiat of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) and 
took place in the face of extensive domestic opposition. To overcome the third 
element required and effective media agenda building policy on behalf of the 
government in power. Previous academic work in this field has been weighted from 
the media’s point of view, whereas this study examines media agenda building as a 
part of government and military policy which in itself is an integral part of the act of 
war. The findings show the conflicts within a media wishing to retain traditional 
journalistic objectivity and freedom of expression during a time of conflict when 
there are domestic and patriotic pressures to support the troops in the field and, as 
a de facto result, support the political agenda The findings also reveal the problems, 
changes and shifts in government media handling policy carried out in order to 
retain or win media support for UK armed interventions in both conflicts named 
here.  
 
The methodology involved in the preparation of this dissertation involves a scrutiny 
of academic analysis of the events, investigation of primary source material on UK 
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government decision-making held at the National Archives, an investigation of 
contemporary diaries, autobiographies, interview recordings and memoirs of 
government and media personnel involved in both conflicts and, in the case of the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
 
Governments at war or planning for war need to garner support from those who 
elected them: they need to build an agenda which is calculated to win a majority 
within the country which supports the war aims and objectives. Elected politicians 
do have their own agenda, which may come from their personal political beliefs, 
their support for party policy or, simply the need to gain power. Non-elected media 
moguls have their agendas too – support for one political party, opposition to 
another, the need to profit from publication and, perhaps, the desire to force change 
in the political agenda of a party for personal or conglomerate gain.  
 
In terms of these “dynamics” it is intended to look at the construction of a political 
agenda mainly from the government point of view, in other words how the UK 
government planned its media-handling policy in time of conflict in order favourably 
to influence the media and win support for its war aims and to justify its taking 
military action. In both the cases studied there was substantial internal UK 
opposition to taking military action and each government had to put in place a 
media-handling mechanism to win support for its political and military agenda. 
Therefore this study sets out to assess the current literature on agenda setting and 
agenda building in order to consider and evaluate existing knowledge and ideas 
relevant to the dissertation title: 
 
Winning or losing media support for regime change: A comparative analysis of UK 
government media agenda building during the Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 conflicts. 
 
Although there has been much published on media agenda setting or agenda 
building, this study concentrates on how the UK government attempted  to win 
support during the above Middle East campaigns, be that support from the media, 
people within the UK, the international community or other stakeholders in these 
momentous events. In Chapter 2. This study will expand on the theme of agenda 
building and the nature of the material published. 
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Schlesinger makes the point that media sociology has largely focused on how 
media organizations, especially those producing news, have made use of sources 
of information.1 Kuhn, writing on the mediatisation of political leadership, says that 
with the modern tendency to personalise political debate political parties have 
become involved in a permanent campaign involving image projection and news 
management.2
 
 Taking these two points on the political-media interaction, this study 
will focus on government agenda building and how the UK government has 
structured its media handling campaign in order to attempt to favourably influence 
the print media, radio and television. In terms of a diagnostic framework, the study 
will be framed as agenda building rather than as agenda setting for reasons which 
will be examined, reasoned and explained in Chapter 2. 
This approach does not follow the “mediacentric” path as criticised by Schlesinger 
as an analysis of source behaviour either by interpreting what sources do by a 
reading of the media content or by deriving conclusions from accounts given by 
practitioners of journalism of their interactions with their sources.3
                                            
1 Schlesinger, Philip, ‘Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism’, in Ferguson, Marjorie (ed) Public 
Communication: The New Imperatives (London: Sage, 1993), p.62.  
 Instead, it seeks 
to achieve a more balanced approach by examining the processes used by UK 
governments in 1956 and 2003 in attempting to manage the news through the 
agenda building process. The source material includes declassified government 
documents, memoirs and other published material from UK government and 
military personnel involved in formulating media-handling policy in the conflicts as 
well as interviews carried out with key government players and media sources. This 
material therefore is hopefully balanced through reviewing published academic 
sources on media coverage of conflict, the accounts of media personnel involved in 
the actual conflict reporting and editing and taking additional oral evidence from 
BBC executives and reporters involved in the Iraq 2003 war. Through the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 3, this study will explore how the UK government 
2 Kuhn, Raymond, Politics and the Media in Britain ((Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),    
p.204. 
3 Ibid, p72. 
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attempted to influence and manipulate the media in order to further its 
military/political aims.  
 
There is, of course, the third part of the triangle, the public and other stakeholders 
both the UK government and the media were trying to influence. This study is 
government agenda focused and will try to break free of the perception that agenda 
creation is a process founded on the notion that media leaders believe that they are 
representing “the people” and may assemble the agenda they think people should 
consider, that is to say news and feature coverage which may well be designed to 
support their own political ambitions.  
 
Media coverage can bring about “dramatic shifts” in political and military decision-
making. For example, the coverage of a dead American airman being dragged 
through a warlord’s camp in Somalia in 1993 and the Serb mortar attacks on 
Sarajevo’s market on 28 August, 1995.4 In the Sarajevo attack 38 people were 
killed and the widely publicised incident gave the excuse for a change in tactics 
from a peacekeeping role to a more aggressive military stance, with NATO two 
days later launching the biggest and most sustained air attack in the alliance’s 46-
year-old history. For the first time in the four years of war in the Balkans, the West 
intervened with all the forces at its disposal to force an end to the conflict.5 General 
Sir Rupert Smith, then commanding the UN Protecting Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia later revealed that he had received recent authority to use all the forces 
available to him when the first opportunity arose.6
                                            
4 Taylor, Philip M., ‘War and the Media’, A keynote address delivered at a conference on military-
media relationships (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1995), p.1. Also in Bellamy, Christopher, 
Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace (London: Pimlico, 1997), p.11. On p.158 
Bellamy refers to the USA withdrawing its troop from Somalia saying “If the intervening forces are 
very sensitive to casualties it may be still possible to make them withdraw, even if they are 
immensely powerful.” Agguire refers to the realpolitik of the situation with President Clinton deciding 
through a new Prepared Presidential Directive (PPD25) that the US would only intervene in future  
only in situations that could be to its benefit and with a clear exit strategy(Agguire, Mariano, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention & US Hegemony: A Reconceptualization’, in Vanaik,Achin & Ali, Tariq 
(eds) Selling US Wars (Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucestershire: Arris Books, 2007), p.197. 
 The world-wide distribution of 
5 Bellamy, p.119. 
6 Smith, General Sir Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen 
Lane, 2005), pp364-365. 
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pictures and other news coverage of the mortar shelling and civilian casualties 
provided him with that opportunity. Smith thought deeply about how to handle the 
media; he saw them as an integral part of his military planning in winning support of 
the wider public through expressing and displaying the story.7
 
 This aspect will be 
examined in this dissertation, especially the broadcasting and publishing pictures of 
such incidents by the media and government in order to influence a change in 
policy. 
There is a wide range of well-established literature exploring the problems with the 
concept of shaping government policy. Weaver and Elliott refer to the “selective 
processes and news judgements of the journalists” having a significant part in this 
process.8 Similarly, Entman and Herbst also refer to the “shaping” of mass opinion 
through framing issues in particular ways with the media limiting certain types of 
information in their reporting in order to influence mass opinion.9 Robinson, in 
examining the alleged CNN effect (defined as the effect of dramatic real-time 
television imagery actually driving military policy10) and its reported influence of 
government agenda building, states that policy makers and elite groups do not rely 
primarily upon opinion polls as evidence of public opinion.11  Rather they rely on 
“perceived public opinion that in turn is largely formed by the media.12  Yet in their 
examination of the relationships between political and media institutions Himelboim 
and Limor  cite recent criticism of the economic and financial aspects of media 
organisations, viewing these as a threat to media freedom and disturbing the 
delicate balance between media, society and the state.13
                                            
7 Ibid, p.391 
 This again can have a 
negative impact on government agenda building through subjective reporting, 
8 Weaver. D, and Elliot. SM, ‘Who Sets the Agenda for the Media? A Study in Agenda Building,’ 
Journalism Quarterly (Vol 2, No 1 1985), p.94. 
9 Entman, Robert & Herbst, Susan, ‘Reframing Public Opinion as We Have Known It’, in Bennett, W. 
Lance & Entman, Robert M (eds) Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.207. 
10 Thussu, Daya Kishan & Freedman, Des (eds), War and the Media (London: Sage, 2003), p.104. 
 
12 Robinson, Piers, The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and interventions (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p.3. 
13 Himmelboim, Itai & Limor, Yehiel, ‘Media perception of freedom of the press: A comparative 
international analysis of 242 codes of ethics’, Journalism (Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008) pp.235-236. 
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weighed in favour of a media group’s vested interests which may run contrary to 
those of a democratically elected government.  
 
There is also the element of trust to consider – trust in the media and trust in what a 
government has to say. Bakir and Barlow quote a 2006 BBC/Reuters/Media Centre 
poll which reveals that 64 per cent of those polled in the UK disagree that the media 
reports all sides of a story and 43 per cent disagreeing that the media report news 
accurately.14 Institutions, too, are distrusted with numerous surveys over the past 
decade suggesting that industry officials, government officials and journalists rank 
lowest on the trust scale.15
 
 This element of “trust” will be examined in the empirical 
chapters, analysing government/media relationships and how these relationships 
could apply to agenda building and, in turn, winning public trust and support. 
In terms of winning public trust, the effect of public opinion on media content should 
be considered. Media analyst Roy Greenslade refers to the “myth” surrounding the 
1956 Suez conflict in which the minority of newspapers which opposed the war 
were said to have suffered “catastrophic sales losses from which they never 
recovered.”16 Greenslade reflects that examination of the evidence shows that 
there was, in fact, no lasting circulation loss in these newspapers, pointing towards 
a contention that these newspapers retained the trust of their readers.17
                                            
14 Bakir, Vian & Barlow, David, ‘The Age of Suspicion,’ in Bakir, Vian & Barlow, David M. (eds). 
Communication in the Age of Suspicion: Trust and the Media (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p.5. 
 During the 
2003 Iraq War public opinion may well have given majority backing to the coalition 
domestically in the USA and been evenly split for and against in the United 
Kingdom, but adverse public opinion abroad had little effect on the USA and UK 
media agendas. This will be reviewed in the empirical chapters but there is 
evidence from Kumar and others that the mainstream media have a long history of 
15 Ibid, p.4 
16 Greenslade, Roy, Press Gang:. How newspapers make profits from propaganda (London: 
Macmillan, 2003), p.130. 
17 Ibid. 
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supporting the efforts of their own governments during war.18  Outside the domestic 
arena the picture may be different and Hiebert quotes a poll carried out by Gallop 
International in the weeks leading up to the war. Forty countries were targeted; 
overall less than nine per cent supported a US- led war without UN approval and 
polls from 27 of the countries showed more than 80 per cent opposed it.19
 
 
Many studies examine the professional journalists’ claims to be the official 
interpreters of critical incidents through their objectivity and role as detached 
observers.20 Jailed fraudster and former “press baron” Conrad Black, who once 
controlled 600 newspapers throughout the world, said in a moment of refreshing 
honesty: “If the small guy’s guardian is the media, the small guy is in bigger trouble 
than I thought.”21 Add to this the 1998 statement of his chief executive officer who 
bluntly rejected the right of editors to control the editorial content of their 
publications saying: “The buck stops with the ownership. I am responsible for 
meeting payroll; therefore I will determine what the papers say, and how they are 
going to be run.”22 Hargreaves refers to the aphorism attributed to press baron Lord 
Northcliffe that “news is something somebody somewhere doesn’t want printed. All 
the rest is advertising.”23
 
  
This is a point Curran and Seaton also examine, taking issue with the interpretation 
of some historians that the press barons such as Northcliffe failed to persuade 
people to vote for their right-wing political projects as evidence that these 
proprietors exercised no significant political power. Curran and Seaton contend that 
the proprietors’ main impact lay in the way in which their newspapers selectively 
                                            
18 Kumar, Deepa, ‘Media, War and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 
2003 Iraq War’,Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies (Vol. 3, No.1 March 2006), p.48. 
19 Hiebert, Ray, ‘Public Relations and propaganda in framing the Iraq war: a preliminary review’, 
Public Relations Review (Vol. 29, Issue 3, September 2003), p.253. 
20 Wall, Melissa A. & Bicket, Douglas, ‘The “Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation”: US conservatives 
take aim at the British News media’, Journalism (Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008), p.125.” 
21 Klaehn, Jeffrey, ‘Behind the Invisible Curtain of Scholarly Criticism: Revisiting the propaganda 
model,’ Journalism Studies, (Vol.4. No.3, 2003) p.366. 
22 McMurty, John (1998) Unequal freedoms: the global market as an ethical system, (Toronto: 
Garamond Press,) p.199. 
23 Hargreaves, Ian, Journalism: Truth or dare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.178. 
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represented the world, strengthening the mainly conservative prejudices of their 
readers and reinforcing opposition, particularly within the middle class, to 
progressive change.24 How news is “selectively” presented is a key area of this 
study both from the media handling policy of successive UK governments and the 
reaction to that policy from the media. “Selective presentation” is also the subject of 
the Mowlana et al edited study of the 1991 Iraq War the theme of the essays 
contained in their collection which contains contributions from many countries in 
Europe, Asia and the Middle East, focusing on the triumph of image over reality and 
reason.25 Sainath, in his essay in this collection makes the point that opinion in 
India was mainly against the war, highlighted by an editorial in the Times of India 
the day fighting broke out. Titled Pax Americana it criticised the USA for pushing 
the world to a needless war that could have been prevented had Washington been 
serious about a peaceful settlement.26 Yet, in terms of “selective” presentation, 
Sainath points out that no Indian journalists received Saudi visas to cover the 
conflict, those already in the conflict area were subject to heavy censorship and 
journalists in India trying to put an objective face on their reports had to rely on 
footage, all from Western, and mainly supportive of the war, sources.27 This leads 
to a dilemma in the eyes of the viewer when voice-over conflicts with image and, 
with the power of the image, the voice over may be ignored.28
 
 Therefore, the image 
may prompt the viewer to accept the “good news”, that is to say the justification for 
the war, against the “bad news”, the voice-over which may have editorial criticism of 
justification for the conflict. There is an old press maxim that “one picture equals a 
thousand words”. 
Jonathan Powell, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff, also makes a point 
about “presentation”, drawing comparison with the Florentine writer and statesman 
Niccolo Machiavelli. Powell wrote: “Machiavelli did not have to deal with the British 
                                            
24 Curran, James & Seaton, Jean, Power without Responsibility: The press, broadcasting and new 
media in Britain (London: Routledge, 2003), p.47. 
25 Mowlanda, Hamid, Gerbner, George & Schiller, Herbert I. (eds), Triumph of the Image: The 
Media’s War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992). 
26 Sainath, P., ‘The New World Odour; The Indian Experience’, in Mowlana et al, p.70. 
27 Sainath, p.71. 
28 Gerbner, George, ‘Persian Gulf War: The Movie’, in Mowlana et al, p.246. 
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tabloid press or 24 hour news, but he was well aware of the importance of 
presentation. He advises a wise prince, even in the sixteenth century ‘that it is 
necessary, indeed, to put a good colour on this nature, and to be skilful in 
simulating and dissembling.’”29
 
 Presentation can be taken as having high 
importance in agenda building, whether making the maximum of “good news” to 
win support in in damage limitation when a government has to announce “bad 
news.” 
Concerning “bad news, in his research into the output of the Reuters news agency 
– print, TV and radio – during the 2003 Iraq war, Palmer quotes a senior Reuters 
editor that “bad news” is more attractive to the media than good news.30 Taking this 
point further Allan, in his examination of the “objective” nature of news reporting 
contends that while journalists may present a news account as objective and 
impartial, it may instead be understood to be providing an ideological construction 
of contending truth claims about reality.31 Allan points out that historically that in the 
years immediately following the First World War in Europe there arose a 
disillusionment with “official channels” of information and state propaganda 
campaigns leading to a desire by journalists for more “scientific” methods of 
reporting the facts, distinguishing “facts” from “values” if their newspapers were to 
be regarded as free arbiters of the truth.32
 
 
McNair in Images of the Enemy examines the language and visuals of TV news 
discourse which presented the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union 
as objective and impartial despite the fact that the versions shown were open to 
challenge from a range of credible sources.33
                                            
29 Powell, Jonathan, The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World 
(London:Vintage, 2011) p.189 
 That these versions may have been 
overly influenced by “official sources” is also a theme to be analysed in the two 
30 Palmer, Michael, ‘News: ephemera, data, artefacts and…quality control – Iraq now and then’, 
Journalism (Vol. 4, No. 4, 2003), p.473 
31 Allan, Stuart, News Culture (Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press, 2004), p.4. 
32 Ibid, p.22. 
33 McNair, Brian, ‘From Control to Chaos: Towards a New Sociology of Journalism’, Media, Culture & 
Society (Vol. 25, 2003), p.547. 
 17 
empirical chapters, examining the principle that both the UK government and the 
media have fairly exposed the public to competing ideas in order that they, the 
public, could determine truth by assessing diverse opinions in the true spirit of 




On the other hand rational discourse may have played no part in both the Eden and 
Blair governments’ attempts to win media support and thus that of the public the 
media were feeding. This dissertation will examine both Eden and Blair agenda-
building strategies to see what methods they employed to win favourable influence 
and to compare and contrast their failures and successes. It is hoped, by analysing 
these two case studies, that there will be an original contribution to academic 
research in, specifically, the field of government agenda building and that a road 
map may be laid out for future academic work when all the remaining government 
papers of the Suez Crisis are eventually released to the National Archives and are 
made available for researchers and similarly all the government papers of the Blair 
administration concerning Iraq 2003, none of which have yet been released. 
 
 
                                            
34 Tuchman, Gaye, Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Macmillan, 
1978), pp.165-166. 
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The cases of agenda building to be examined are those of the UK governments in 
power during the conflicts in Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003, focusing on government 
attempts to favourably influence the media into supporting government policy and 
military and political objectives. The similarities between these two events is that 
they were wars of attempted regime change, the United Kingdom was split on 
whether or not to support the government and neither  conflicts had  United Nations 
support. Therefore the governments in the UK in 1956 and 2003 had to seek 
effective ways to gain media and public support for their agenda. It is the analysis of 
these ways that forms the subject of the two case studies examined.  
 
The various theories on agenda building and agenda setting, as set out here in 
Section 2.2, have been studied with the intention of finding and developing a means 
of comparative analysis that could best serve the research purpose. Section 2.3 
looks at how a government may set out to form a media agenda building policy and 
analyses the various obstacles it may face in attempting to win support for its 
political agenda. Section 2.4 examines various means of political communication 
which impact on an agenda-building process and Section 2.5 comments on how a 
government may try to influence various stakeholder groups (publics) in its agenda-
building process. 
 
Section 2.6 reviews propaganda, public diplomacy and other means a government 
may employ to win support for its wartime policy objectives and how this may 
conflict with a media agenda-building policy. Section 2.7 continues this theme of 
government “control” and looks at manipulation concerns between the media and 
government. Section 2.8 examines subject of media dependency on official 
information release and the risks to the media of a dependency culture. Section 2.9 
follows up this line of research to highlight the pressures on objective reporting and 
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Section 2.10 reviews the debate over media influence and its perceived effect on 
public opinion.  The chapter ends with a Summary in 2.11. 
  
2.2. Agenda building as a tool for analysis 
 
Having now raised the subject of agenda building, it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning for the purposes of this study. Cobb and Elder define an agenda as a set 
of topics that receive attention from a person, organisation, the public at large, 
media or government officials.35 Taking this further in terms of the title of this 
dissertation, both authors go on to define an institutional, governmental or formal 




Manheim described agenda building as “the process by which issues emerge as 
legitimate concerns of the polity and its policymakers.37
 
 The use of the word 
“emerge” may unconsciously introduce a sense of passivity and reaction whereas 
proactivity and policy offensive may well be the main factors in agenda building, it 
could be contended. In this study the focus is on examining the UK government’s 
positive and proactive measures to court media support in time of conflict through 
agenda building with the accent on government activity whereas the majority or 
work in examining government/media interaction in this field has concentrated on 
the media side. It is hoped, therefore, to tease out some original findings from the 
research on how the UK government in two conflicts attempted to win media 
support for its political and military actions. 
On examining the literature on the two main approaches in this field - agenda 
setting and agenda building, much of the published literature appears to be 
mediacentric.  Rogers and Dearing describe agenda building as “a process through 
                                            
35 Cobb, R.W.& Elder, Charles. D., Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-
Building, John Hopkins University Press, (1972), p.20. 
36 Ibid, p.86. 
37 Manheim, J.B. “A Model of Agenda Dynamics,” Communication Yearbook, London (1987), p.499. 
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which the policy agendas of political elites are influenced by a variety of factors, 
including the media and public agendas.”38 Perloff states that news stories 
frequently set the agenda or influence people’s beliefs about what constitute the 
most important problems facing society.39 Manheim adds that it is useful to think 
less of agenda setting or agenda building per se than of a comprehensive system 
of interactive agendas. Such a system is made up of three distinct agendas, those 
of the media, the public and the policymakers. Each has its own characteristic 
internal dynamics, and each is linked to the others by one or more informational, 
behavioural, or institutional bridges.”40
 
 
The media can have its own agenda, often linked to the political or commercial 
prejudices of individual owners or proprietors. The former owner of the Daily 
Express Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) took over the publication in 1910 after 
a senior Conservative politician told the impoverished owner who wished to sell it 
“Max Aitken is enormously rich. He knows nothing about newspapers and is not 
interested in them. But he wants to have political power and will be glad of a 
newspaper that will back him.”41 Beaverbrook actually became a very hands-on 
proprietor, dictating editorial policy as did a later “press baron” Robert Maxwell, a 
Labour M.P. who bought the Daily Mirror group, relishing the role he thought his 
papers would bring him in politics.42
 
 These are extreme examples of media 
proprietors dictating the agenda, but in a more modern examination of the interplay 
between government and media Taylor underlines the proposition that in the 
modern information era the media have become participants in war, and are no 
longer simple observers.  
                                            
38 Rogers, E.M. &Dearing, J.W. “Agenda-Setting Research: Where has it been? Where is it going?” 
Communication Year Book 11, London (1998), p.556. In contrast, they describe agenda setting as “a 
process through which the mass media communicate the relative importance of various issues and 
events to the public.” This study focuses on agenda building as a more relevant tool. 
39 Perloff, Richard M.,The Dynamics of Persuasion (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003), p.309. 
40 Manheim.JB, ‘A Model of Agenda Dynamics,’ Communication Yearbook (London, 1987), p.499. 
41 Seymour-Ure, Colin, Prime Ministers and the Media: Issues of Power and Control (London: 
Oxford, 2003), p.106. 
42 Ibid, pp.106-107. 
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These are examples of media owners with their own political agenda. However this 
study is more concerned with how a government forms and builds up its own 
agenda in order to win support for its political and military policies. Although the 
chosen method of analysis here is “agenda building” the dissertation also looks at 
literature on agenda setting, defined by Dearing et al as the process of an on-going 
competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of the media 
professionals, the public and the policy elites.43 This suggests that agenda setting is 
in a constant state of flux and in a reactive/proactive symbiosis between these issue 
proponents. Graber distinguishes between agenda setting, which is the process of 
identifying and advocating social problems for inclusion on public and governmental 
agendas, and agenda building, or efforts to influence the interpretation and 
prioritising of these problems.44 It is this concept of “influencing” or attempting to 
influence which leads to looking at agenda building rather than agenda setting. 
Although Prime Ministers Sir Anthony Eden and Tony Blair operated in different 
media eras there is a commonality of intent in that both had to overcome substantial 
internal UK government and public doubts on the “right” of taking military action and 
regime change in order to win support for their political and military policies. Agenda 
building was crucial to this in terms of “winning support” and provides a common 
template in which to compare the actions of the two leaders. Agenda building may 
not have been called that in Admiral Lord Nelson’s time, but his flag signal to the 
British fleet before the Battle of Trafalgar “England expects every man will do his 
duty” was calculated to win the support of his sailors.45 Similarly Martin Luther’s 
speech at the Diet of Worms on 18 April 1521 in which he said: “Here stand I. I can 
do no other. God help me. Amen” clearly stated his position and was surely 
calculated to reinforce his own agenda of religious reform.46
                                            
43 Dearing, James W. & Rogers, Everett M, Agenda Setting, (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 1996), 
pp. 1-2.  
 As Thomson points out 
on his work on mass persuasion in history we do not know how many people were 
44 Smith, Jackie, McCarthy, John D., McPhail, Clark, Augustin, Boguslaw, “From Protest to Agenda 
Building: Description Bias in Media Coverage of Protest Events in Washington, D.C., Social Forces, 
June 2001, Vol. 79, Issue 4, p.1397. 
45 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) p.152. 
46 Jay, Anthony(ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) p.234. 
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influenced by figures such as Luther but we know that large number was and that 
attitudinal change was considerable.47
 
 
Weaver and Elliot postulate that the agenda-building process [in the case of this 
study that of the UK government] is more concerned with how issues originate, or 
how subjects of news coverage become issues, rather than the with the media-
audience relationship studied so often by agenda-setting researchers. Yet, in the 
case of positive government agenda building, the “origin” will lie in the policy 
initiative which will become an issue for the media because the government puts it 
on their agenda to involve the media and the public. Certainly, although a 
government may plan its policy agenda and its media/public communications 
strategy with care, yet variables can always take a hand and have a major influence 
on the subsequent media agenda. Here, the selective processes and news 
judgements of the journalists also play a significant part in shaping this agenda.48
 
  
In terms of how governments formulate an agenda, in particular in reference to the 
proposed area of study as outlined in the introduction, it was necessary to look for a 
template which would provide the better framework for comparisons – agenda 
setting or agenda building. In reflecting on which framework the UK government 
formulation of media policy during the lead-up and actual fighting during the Suez 
1956 and Iraq 2003 crises would sit more comfortably in order to make an 
intellectual and valid comparison, the answer, it is suggested, should be agenda 
building rather than agenda setting. The former, as it is hoped will be demonstrated, 
forms a more suitable tool for winning support for the UK government’s media 
                                            
47 Thomson, Oliver, Mass Persuasion in History (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1977), p.9. 
48 Weaver. D, and Elliot. SM, ‘Who Sets the Agenda for the Media? A Study in Agenda Building,’ 
Journalism Quarterly (Vol. 2, No 1 1985), p.94.  It is also worth considering the cost factor as outlined 
by Shaw (Shaw, Chris, ‘TV News: why more is less’, British Journalism Review {Vol. 14, No. 2, 
2003], p.63.  Writing of TV coverage of Iraq 2003, he states that the really expensive element of TV 
news is getting reporters and cameras to the scene of the stories and the pictures back to base. 
Thereafter it is relatively cheap to edit them into programmes, repacking and post producing to 
recycle them over and over again. As a result news gathering has become the main victim of cost 
cutting.  
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policy agenda through the key concept of “influencing” rather than merely 
“including” on that agenda.  
 
In terms of government agenda building in general, examined from the point of the 
government and not from the point of the media, Schlesinger makes the point that 
media sociology has largely focused on how media organizations, especially those 
producing news, have made use of sources of information, rather than looking at 
how the sources (in the case of this study, UK governments) have used their power 
to define and manage the flow of information - in other words, how they set about 
building their own agenda in the media through the provision and supply of that 
information on which the media may come to over rely on.49  Carlson makes the 
same point when he draws on a wide body of research (including Hall et al., 1978; 
Glasgow Media Group, 1976; Herman and Chomsky, 1988) in that media often 
have that over-reliance on official sources.50 In that context Corner quotes 
Habermas’ requirements made upon discourse that ‘participants must mean what 
they say’ adding that this rule might immediately render a good deal of political 
communication suspect.51 In this Corner may be specifically referring to 




Political communication, according to Gurevitch and Blumler, falls “lamentably 
short” when considering comparative communication analysis.53 They make the 
point that the literature on political parties is rich in analytical material but that there 
is no such tradition in comparative political communications. This includes 
politicians’ efforts to secure positive coverage.54
                                            
49 Blumler, p.62. 
 
50 Carlson, Matt, ‘Order versus access: news search engines and the challenge to traditional 
journalistic roles’, Media, Culture & Society (London: Sage, 2007), p.1017. 
51 Corner, John, ‘Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of ‘propaganda’, Media, culture 
and society (London: Sage, 2007), p.673. 
52 Ibid, p.673. 
53 Esser, Frank & Pfetsch, Barbara. ‘State of the Art of Comparative Political Communication 
Research’. On Esser & Pfetsch (eds), Comparing Political Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge 




On this subject of agenda building, Kuhn, in his 2007 study, says that political 
actors are constantly trying to shape the media agenda for their own partisan 
purposes, ‘a process known as agenda building.’ 55 McCoombs (2004), reflecting 
on the various factors affecting a media agenda, points to public relations and 
political campaigns intent on influencing the media agenda in order to then shape 
the public agenda.56   Taleb (2004) in his examination of media coverage of 
international conflicts speculates that it is more interesting to examine the influence 
of the political establishment on the media’s orientations rather than the other way 
around.57 Also in 2004. Sarikakis refers to the “dynamic relationship of the media 
industries and the state” in the United Kingdom and the indisputable importance of 
the role of the media in the political life of the country.58 She also refers to the 
complex relationship between the media and government, a relationship which is 
not always straightforward and poses the question as to why governments are so 
interested in the media.59
 
 This question will be tackled, within the framework of the  
empirical chapters. 
The weight of Sarikakis’ work focuses on the media side of the relationship from its 
historical development in the UK, through to the contemporary media system in 
Britain.60
                                            
55 Kuhn, p.26 
 This dissertation, while taking into account the historical development of 
the media between 1956 and 2003, will attempt to redress the perceived existing 
imbalance in research by focusing on government agenda building and will look at 
political/media communications links in time of conflict, for example in government 
media-handling policy, the allocation of reporter places with military units and how 
the government and military organise media briefings and the media’s response to 
these briefings. The cases to be examined are the UK governments in power during 
56 McCoombs, Maxwell, Setting the agenda: the mass media and public opinion (Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2004), pp.98-99. 
57 Taleb, B.A., The Bewildered Herd: Media Coverage of International Conflicts & Public Opinion 
(New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2004), p.2. 
58 Sarikakis, Katharine, British Media in a Global Era (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.37. 
59 Sarikakis, p.38. 
60 Ibid, p.2. 
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the Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 crises, in order to focus on government attempts to 
manipulate the media. Seymour-Ure, in his examination of British press and 
broadcasting since 1945 writes that at the end of the 1945 war there was probably 
a belief that the British government did not have media policies and that the 
perception was that a “free press” meant a press free from government control and 
shaped purely by market forces.61
 
  
Whether or not that still held in the second half of the 20th century is a fruitful area of 
study and impacts on research for this dissertation. In order to examine, therefore, 
any area of government control what follows here is a synthesis of academic 
approaches to the theory of government media agenda building in particular 
relating to the two areas of conflict defined in the dissertation title. 
 
2.3 Problematising the notion of agenda building 
 
In a more recent study than Schlesinger’s 1993 work, Thussu and Freedman 
(2003) confirm his observations. In referring to the role of the mainstream media in 
reporting conflict, they raise the point for discussion that in the eyes of many media 
professionals and liberal commentators the journalists are “impartial and 
independent monitors of military conduct able and willing to shrug off ideological 
and organizational restrictions to keep a watchful eye on the activities of military 
combatants”.62 In a similar vein Carlson refers to journalists grounding their work in 
a belief that they are providing impartial, objective presentations of reality to their 
readers, listeners or viewers.63 Chapman makes the observation that in their role as 
the fourth estate, newspapers acted as a watchdog on government and formed a 
crucial element in the process of shaping public opinion.64
                                            
61 Seymour-Ure, Colin, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
P.227. 
 Philo, pointing to 
substantial research work done by the Glasgow University Media Group refers to 
62 Thussu, Daya Kishan and Freedman, Des (eds), War and the Media (London: Sage, 2003), p.5. 
63 Carlson, Matt, ‘Order versus access: news search engines and the challenge to traditional 
journalistic roles’, Media, Culture & Society (Vol. 29, No. 6, 2007), p.1015. 
64 Chapman, Jane, Comparative Media History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.7. 
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the “illusion” of balance in news reporting and restates previous criticism of 
broadcasters’ claims to objectivity and impartiality when “the news was actually 
reproducing the assumptions of the powerful about what is important, necessary 
and possible within it”.65
 
  
This dissertation is an examination of this “illusion,” which is common to how in both 
Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 government media-handling policy was carried out, 
created a perception of media objectivity and impartiality which helped both 
governments to veil their intent of regime change. 
 
In contrast, Forgette and Morris (2006), in examining much of the recent empirical 
research into High-Conflict Television News and Public Opinion, say that the 
media’s negative influence on institutional trust has been overstated in many cases 
and they pose the question “Do cynical viewers merely choose to watch high 
conflict news, or does high conflict news create a more cynical public?”66 Their 
investigation relates specifically to the U.S. media, but some of the questions they 
pose on the interactions between politicians and the media can be directed at UK 
government/media relationships and conflicting agendas. Chapman, on the effect of 
television news, reflects that TV coverage clearly influences the public agenda for 
issues, giving as an example the coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 
Germany in 1986 when this coverage “clearly affected” public concern about the 
energy supply.67 Taleb, specifically writing on media coverage of conflicts, remarks 
that the media has become so integrated in daily human life that it is “practically 
unthinkable” that a society can imagine itself existing without it, but adds the caveat 
that although the media both informs and entertains, it lately (pre-2004) has 
become to do both at the same time.68
                                            
65 Philo, Greg, ‘Can discourse analysis successfully explain the content of media and journalistic 
practice?’, Journalism Studies (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2007), p.177. 
 This is a particularly pertinent observation 
66 Forgette, Richard & Morris, Jonathan S., ‘High-Conflict Television News and Public Opinion’, 
Political Research Quarterly (Vol. 59, No. 3, 2006), p.447. 
67 Chapman, p.245. 
68 Taleb, p.4. 
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with regard to television coverage of the 2003 Iraq conflict, which will be examined 
in the relevant empirical chapter. 
 
Examples of academic writing on government agenda building are, as Schlesinger 
contends, hard to find and it is hoped that this dissertation will, in some way, help to 
amend that situation. Zhang and Cameron’s analysis of the Chinese government’s 
attempts to counter opposition and win support in the USA is one of a few 
academic articles available.69 The public relations campaign commissioned by the 
Chinese government included a tour of Chinese culture in nine American cities, a 
China Disabled Peoples Arts Performing Troupe, the Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin meeting media groups and a visit to Hawaii by the North Sea Fleet of the 
Chinese Navy, all this calculated to “present a genuine, brand new image of China 
before the American people.”70
 
 However, the analysis by Zhang and Cameron 
read: “Negative coverage of China was found to be significantly more frequent than 
positive, balanced or neutral coverage.” 
Another example is Walters and Walters’ analysis of Democratic Party agenda 
building in the 1992 Presidential campaign, showing the organizers’ determination 
to be in the driving seat of their own campaign and not allow the media to run the 
agenda.71 An example of the failure of official agenda building can be seen in the 
reporting of civilian casualties caused in the 1991 Iraq War by American missiles 
when CNN’s Peter Arnett, reporting from Baghdad as the missiles landed, was 
accused in U.S. Congress of giving “a demented dictator a propaganda mouthpiece 
to over 100 nations” and, for reporting the same event, the BBC’s John Simpson 
was denounced in Parliament as working for “BBC Baghdad”.72
                                            
69 Zhang, Juyan & Cameron, Glenn, ‘China’s agenda building and image polishing in the US: 
assessing an international public relations campaign,’ Public Relations Review, Volume 29, Issue1 
(2002), pp.2-19. 
 In writing of this 
70 Zhang, Juyan & Cameron, Glenn, ‘China’s agenda building and image polishing in the US.: 
assessing an international public relations campaign’, Public Relations Review (Vol. 29, Issue 1, 
2002), p.14. 
71 Walters, T.N., Walters L.M., and Gray, Roger, ‘Agenda Building in the 1992 Presidential 
Campaign,’ Public Relations Review (Vol.22, Issue 1, 1996, pp9-24), 
72 Evans, Harold, ‘Propaganda versus Professionalism’, British Journalism Review (Vol.15, No.1, 
2004), p.36 
 28 
Harold Evans, a former Editor of the Sunday Times, was making the point that in 
time of war a government puts priority on the nurturing of the morale of armed 
forces and the people and resents it when the media report facts and incidents 
which can detract from this agenda building. Taleb, commenting on the role of 
media objectivity in an international crisis, says that each of the parties involved has 
its own interests, claims and beliefs but that domestic pressures (such as criticism 
of one’s own armed forces during military action) can promote public opposition to 
this media objective agenda.73
 
 It can also give advantage to the government 
agenda in terms of “spin” or weighing a story to the government advantage, a point 
to be examined in the empirical chapters. 
As previously outlined, Manheim defines agenda building as “the process by which 
issues emerge as legitimate concerns of the polity and its policymakers” and that 
such a system is made up of three distinct agendas – those of the media, the public 
and the policymakers.74 As noted in Section 2.2, “emerge” seems more reactive 
whereas proactivity and the positive pushing of policy may well be the main factors 
in agenda building, certainly as regards the UK Labour Party administration of Tony 
Blair (1997 to 2007). McNair points out that whether as a result of its policies, or 
their poor presentation, Labour remained in opposition for 18 years, an exile from 
power which forced them to professionalise their PR policy and become more 
proactive.75 New Labour’s more proactive policy in terms of media handling 
certainly came into play during the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999 when 
Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communications, visited 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels to reorganise the public relations handling of the 
conflict, drafting in specialist professional media advisers to brief the media and 
allow the generals to get on with military affairs.76
                                            
73 Taleb, B.A., The Bewildered Herd: Media Coverage of International Conflicts & Public Opinion 
(Lincoln, NE: iUniverse,2004), p98. 
 Moorcraft & Taylor refer to NATO 
losing the propaganda war to Serbia, Serbia publicising its civilian casualties from 
74 Manheim, J.B. “A Model of Agenda Dynamics,” Communication Yearbook, London (1987), p.499. 
75 McNair, Brian, ‘PR Must Die: spin, anti spin and political public relations in the UK, 1997-2004’, 
Journalism Studies (Vol.5, no.3, 2004), p.329. 
76 Campbell, Alastair, The Blair Years (London: Arrow Books, 2008), p.377. 
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NATO bombing to win external support.77 The extent of these casualties was 
untrue but under pressure “NATO’s media operation began to fold” until Campbell 
reorganised the system, drafting more experienced British Army media operations 
people into Kosovo to give better and more frequent briefings to the 2,700 plus 
media present in the area of operations.78
 
 This was a more proactive stance than 
NATO’s previous more reactive media agenda-building process. 
Taking the “proactive” analogy further, Cobb and Elder propose that issues which 
make their way on to the agenda of government decision makers may have won 
their position as a result of group conflict and the desire of these decision makers to 
“manage” such a conflict, whether it is as a result of internal government policy-
making pressures or external factors pressing on a government for either a change 
in policy or the adoption by the government of new policy. Hallahan quotes “political 
special interest theory” in that organisations exercise political power to seek 
favourable public policies to advance themselves.79 In other words, they seek to 
place their own policy objective or objectives on the government agenda as did 
Peter Mandelson and Philip Gould in reshaping the presentation, policy and 
objectives of the Labour Party to reach out to the middle ground of politics and 
away from the polarisation in which the Labour Party failed to adapt to change in a 
world of increasing globalisation.80
                                            
77 Moorcraft, Paul l. & Taylor, Philip M., Shooting the Messenger: The Political Impact of War 
Reporting (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2008), pp.136-137. 
 Blair’s Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell refers to 
the fact that the Labour Party learned bitter lessons about handling the media from 
its 18 years in Opposition. And, in the build-up to the 1997 General Election, sought 
78 Ibid. 
79 Hallahan, Kirk, “The dynamics of Issues Activation and Response,” Journal of Public Relations 
Research, Jan. 2001, Vol. 13, Issue 1, p.27. Also, Salisbury, Robert H., ‘Interest Representation: The 
Dominance of Institutions’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 
64-76. Salisbury here refers to the dominant position of corporations and other powerful lobby groups 
in Washington D.C. However, these interest groups can also exist within a government, contesting 
views struggling to put their views on the government agenda. As Philip Gould, a long-standing 
political adviser to Tony Blair, points out it took the Labour Party 14 years, three elections and three 
party leaders to win power through the agenda of New Labour and the “special interest” of that 
internal reforming group. Gould, Philip, The Unfinished Revolution: How Modernisers saved the 
Labour Party (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1998), p.xii. 
80 Gould, pp394-397. 
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On this theme of seeking to dominate the middle ground, Philo refers to a speech 
made by Tony Blair in 2002 in which Blair underlined the need to “redistribute 
power, wealth and opportunity to the many, not the few”. It was a speech which on 
the surface would appeal to many people, but as Philo points out in his analysis, 
Blair and New Labour had already rejected any suggestion of increasing income of 
property taxes “to dent the wealth of the super-rich” and, on TV news the speech 
was attributed to the need for Blair to gather support in his own party for the coming 
war with Iraq.82
 
 That contention does fall in with the proactive communications 
policy of New Labour and there are further comparisons in the chapter on Iraq 2003 
to show how these proactive presentation and media handling techniques were 
adapted to media agenda building in time of conflict. 
To place an item on the agenda of a government is a primary step on the way to 
defining a policy, whether that policy is a strategic one, to be enshrined in 
legislation, or whether it is a tactical or reactive one, utilising current legislation or 
governmental powers. Strategy, in terms of media handling in the New Labour 
government, meant planning ahead – one month, three months, one year etc. – 
placing intended announcements and policy launches on a grid of events, tight 
control of this by Alastair Campbell’s team at Number 10, daily meetings at 0830 
every weekday at No.10 by departmental heads of communication or their 
deputies.83
                                            
81 Powell, pp.190-191. 
 An item may make the government agenda as a consequence of 
82 Philo, p.186. Blair’s speech reintroduced a word previously banned by New Labour “redistribution”. 
The TV report to which Philo refers commented that Blair had spent the past few weeks “preaching a 
war and backing America” that it made many Labour members nervous about Blair’s commitment to 
conflict. Blair made the “redistribution of wealth” speech ahead of the party conference which, Philo 
comments, might be seen as rhetoric designed simply to increase his support in the Labour Party. 
83 Campbell, Alastair, The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq (London: Hutchinson, 2012)p.167. 
The author of this dissertation, as an Assistant Director of Communications at the Home Office, 
regularly attended these 0830 morning meetings. Strategic media handling planning was tightly 
centralised and proactive. Under the previous administration, for whom as a career civil servant  the 
author also worked, the various departments and ministries had more flexibility but media planning 
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internal discussion and conflict, for example in the UK from an annual party 
conference or party executive decision leading to a pre-election manifesto 
commitment, as with Labour in the 1997 election and subsequent elections. It can 
also force its way on the agenda through outside organisations, as Hallahan has 
proposed in the political “special interest” theory. 
 
There is some relevance here to Carr’s view that the business of any politician is to 
consider not merely what is morally or theoretically desirable, but also the forces 
which exist in the world, and how they can be directed or manipulated to probably 
partial realisations of the end in view.84 Studies, for example of the Westminster-
Whitehall lobby system bring up the question of UK government agenda building, 
the reliance of the media on that “exclusive” source material and the questions of 
official secrecy, censorship and propaganda in terms of (government) source/media 
relationships. Jones makes the point that political journalism is highly competitive 
and that some correspondents feel the need to demonstrate that they have better 
contact than others by, during a broadcast, using terms such as “Downing Street 
insiders are insisting” or “ministers believe.” Yet, as a former BBC political 
correspondent, he admits that he may only have talked to no more than a minister’s 
junior aide or a press officer.85  Herman and Chomsky raise such a spectre with 
their contention that the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
“powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of 
interest”.86
 
 Whilst the lobby system may benefit both sides in terms of gain from the 
political media interface, this study will look at the area of government agenda 
building in time of conflict to see if there has been a similar “dependency” built up in 
Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003.  
                                                                                                                                  
had a less strategic aspect and was more reactive and tactical, responding to events rather than 
creating them. 
84 Carr, E.H., What is History? (London: Penguin, 1990), p.128. 
85 Jones, Nicholas, ‘Reporting politics’, in Chapman, Jane &Kinsey, Marie (eds), 
BroadcastJournalism: A critical introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p.174 
86 Herman, Edward S. & Chomsky, Noam, Manufacturing consent: the Political Economy of the Mass 
Media (New York, Pantheon, 1988), p.19. 
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Agenda building for a government and positively influencing the media is a vital part 
of gaining support for any policy. It is a positive approach, a proactive one and must 
be strategic in terms of  not only how to win support from  those with no strong 
views, but also how to retain and strengthen existing support, diminish opposition or 
at least bring as much of that opposition into a state of neutrality or non-alignment 
and thus reduce any conflict. Above all, it should take note of previous best 
practice, success or lack of success, what worked and did not work. Perloff cites 
the use of evidence in successful persuasion in order to substantiate the claims for 
the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of that policy, that evidence consisting of 
factual assertions, quantitative information (such as statistics) eyewitness 




Bakir gives a good example of “independent endorsement” in quoting the dispute 
between oil giant Shell and environmental campaigner Greenpeace over 
environmental pollution involved in the disposal of the North Sea oil rig Brent Spar. 
It was the first of the oil rigs to be disposed of since drilling began in the 1970s and 
the controversy centred on Shell’s decision to dump the rig in a deep trench in the 
North East Atlantic. Greenpeace objected and focused media attention on the issue 
by direct action, boarding the rig in April 30th 1995 and remaining there until 20th 
June the same year. Shell cancelled the plan for deep-sea disposal and one of the 
key points in the Greenpeace campaign to win public, support was cultivating 
credibility not only from its own scientific advisers but also government scientists.88
 
  
This matter of “independent endorsement”, the agenda-building advantage of 
getting someone else to put your case for you and its use by the UK government 
will be raised in the Conclusions chapter. 
                                            
87 Perloff, Richard M., The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 21st Century 
(London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003), p.180. 
88 Bakir, Vian, ‘Risk Communication, Television News and the Trust Generation: The Utility of Ethos’, 
in Bakir & Barlow, p.138. 
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Such government agenda building involves favourably influencing the media into 
supporting government policy and, hopefully, although not exclusively, through 
them the general public. 89
 
 This positive influencing was the intention of both Eden 
and Blair, albeit that they operated in vastly different media eras and it is how they 
manipulated and succeeded, or did not succeed, which makes a valid historical 
comparison of government agenda building in two different conflicts and how a 
planned government agenda could possibly turn around, or alienate media support. 
A clear case of reversing the political support policy of a major newspaper group 
occurred in the 1997 UK General Election when News Corporation media proprietor 
Rupert Murdoch switched support from the Conservative Party to the Labour Party, 
giving Labour support from one-third of the national press circulation from the top 
selling tabloid Sun to the well-established newspaper of record The Times.90 This 
was the result of an elaborate courtship stemming from July 1995 when New 
Labour leader Tony Blair addressed News Corporation executives and gave his 
commitment to an open and free economy.91 Himelboim and Limur make the point 
that nowadays media owners’ financial interests endanger freedom of the press 
more than political institutions do, which may add weight to the argument vis-à-vis 
Murdoch’s switch of support from the Conservatives to New Labour.92
                                            
89 Any government information campaign could include direct advertising and marketing to reach the 
general public as well as through media methods such as offering interviews and arranging press 
conferences. 
 This support 
continued through to taking the government side in the military intervention leading 
90 Curran, James, ‘The press in an age of globalisation’, in Curran, James & Seaton, Jean (eds), 
Power without Responsibility: The press, broadcasting and new media in Britain (London: Routledge, 
2003), p.74. Also in Greenslade, Roy, Press Gang: How newspapers make profits from propaganda 
(London: Pan Macmillan, 2004), p.661. 
91 Ibid. Blair also changed Labour’s stand on monopoly controls of media in 1996, opposing the then 
Conservative government’s policy of blocking large press groups from buying ITV or Channel 5 on 
the grounds that “it treat[s] newspaper groups unfairly in their access to broadcasting markets.” REF 
This supported Murdoch’s ambitions and won his eventual support in the 1997 General Election. 
REF 
92 Himelboim & Limur, p.236. Also Harrington, Stephen, ‘Popular news in the 21st century’, 
Journalism (Vol. 9, No 3, 2008), p.270. Harrington cites contentions that media outlets have turned 
away from their original message of quality journalism and are focussing instead on circulation or 
ratings figures to therefore increase profits for investors.  
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to the Iraq 2003 conflict, key support.93  McChesney, although his study is US-
based, contends that governments need the active support of the public for the war 
effort, not only to pay for it but to provide the soldiers willing to die for the war. He is 
blunt in his assessment that the US Government had needed to lie to win support 
for its aims in past conflicts – World War 1, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq 1991.94 
Another interesting study by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, particularly pertinent to new 
technology and the media’s use of it, concludes that modification of the Cold War 
Strategy of “maximizing openness” should be developed into a more nuanced 
strategy “that weaves skilfully between openness and more proprietary 
approaches.”95
 
 This, written at the halfway point between the Iraq 1991 and 2003 
Wars, is a shrewd assessment of future government agenda building needs within 
the context of new technology and the effects this may have on official censorship 
or control. It points the need for a more subtle approach as will be examined in both 
the Iraq and  Conclusions chapters. 
2.4. Aspects of political communication: the political/media interface 
 
Kriesi notes that the media increasingly constitute the crucial channel for conveying 
politics, providing information but at the same time becoming actors in the political 
process, mobilising public consensus for a particular issue.96
                                            
93 Bromley, Michael, ‘The battlefield is the media’, in Allan, Stuart & Zelizer, Barbie (eds), Reporting 
War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 2004), p.227. Also Greenslade, p.671, which refers 
to the Murdoch Sun giving Tony Blair “full-hearted support.” 
 Therefore, it is vital for 
any government to make use of the media to intervene in that process and 
influence public opinion or, the converse in terms of looking at media reporting of 
events and responding to perhaps adverse reporting, to alter policy and favourably 
influence public perception. It is not a new concept  since Habermas quotes Britain 
in the late 17th century as a model case for what he calls the development of the 
94 McChesney, Robert, ‘The US news media and World War III’, Journalism (Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002), 
p.15. 
95 Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David, ‘Implications for Grand Strategy’, in Arquila & Ronfeldt (eds) In 
Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica CA, RAND, 1997), 
p.433. 
96 Kriesi, Hanspeter, ‘ Mobilizing Public Opinion in “Audience Democracies”’, in Esser & Pfetsch, 
p.194. 
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public sphere, in other words forces endeavouring to influence the decisions of 
state authority - the growth of the modern Parliament and structures of society such 
as the new manufacturing industries along with the elimination of the institution of 
censorship, the latter particularly marking a new stage of development of the “public 
sphere” in terms of the ability of the press to more easily present rational-critical 
arguments “with whose aid political decisions could be brought before the new 
forum of the public”.97 Nevertheless, Habermas notes that with the development of 
the new media of the twentieth century – film, radio and television - the publicist 
nature of the media could be so threatening that in some countries the 
establishment of these media was under government direction or government 
control.98 Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany are examples of this approach 
although, as will be highlighted in the Suez chapter here, attempts were made to 
control the BBC by the Eden government.99
 
 
There is a wide spectrum of literature on political communication, a concept defined 
by Manheim as “encompassing the creation, distribution, control, use, processing 
and effects of information as a political resource, whether by governments, 
organisations, groups or individuals”.100
                                            
97 Habermas, Jurgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (London: Polity Press, 
2003), pp.57-59. 
 Included in this political communication 
field are works on propaganda, a term originating with the Catholic Church in the 
17th century and referring to the propagation or “spreading” of faith but which has 
now come to suggest the subjective use of political information in terms of “news 
98 Habermas,  p.187 
99 Bullock points out one distinct difference in Stalin’s and Hitler’s propaganda methods in that unable 
to reach the Russian people through the poorly developed media of mass communications, Stalin 
relied heavily on oral agitation and propaganda by the individual Party member for example 
individual exhortation in the factories, mines and collective farms. In contrast in Germany with its 
much more advanced economic development and a higher cultural level, the Nazis were able to 
make much more use of indirect methods which allowed the propaganda method to  be concealed 
and conveyed through a variety of other activities.[ Bullock, Alan, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives 
(London: Fontana Press, 1993), p.429.] 
100 Manheim, Jarol, ‘Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy’, in Negrine, Ralph & 
Stanyer, James (eds), The Political Communication Reader (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 
p.78. 
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management” by governments.101 This is different from the original meaning of the 
word, coined in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV, in order to fight against the growing 
spread of Protestantism, created The Office for the Propagation of the Faith 
(Congregatio de Propaganda Fide) which, according to Bernays in his study of 
“Propaganda” dealt in the opposite of deception by defining Catholic faith and 
doctrine to encourage belief. This was far from the modern conception as denoting 
lies, half-truths, selective history “or any of the other tricks we associate with 
propaganda.102 Jowett and O’Donnell differentiate “propaganda” from “persuasion” 
by defining propaganda as “a form of communication that attempts to achieve a 
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist whereas persuasion is 
interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of the persuader and persuadee.103
 
 
One can take the 1622 meaning of “propaganda” as more of “persuasion” in 2011 
since in the original sense it would have involved an interaction between priest and 
parishioner or convert in order to cement their faith in Catholicism. Nevertheless the 
word “propaganda” has taken on a modern connotation which diverges from the 
original definition, a connotation to be examined in terms of UK government media 
management techniques. 
In this “management” of the media, it is also necessary also to review material on 
psychological warfare (Psyops) which in the UK military system has been renamed 
as “Information Support” and includes methods such as radio broadcasts and 
information leaflet drops targeted at enemy opinion in order to save lives on both 
sides, according to UK military official doctrine.104
                                            
101 Hammond, Philip, ‘Reporting “Humanitarian Warfare: propaganda, moralism and NATO’s Kosovo 
War’, Journalism Studies (Vol1, No.3, 2000), p.367. 
 Similarly, researchers in the 
political communications field need to examine material on public diplomacy, an 
information strategy designed to inform, engage and influence foreign publics, the 
difference from formal diplomacy being that formal diplomacy is a government-to-
government relationship and public diplomacy can be a way of one government 
102 Bernays, Edward, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 2005), p.11. 
103 Jowett, Garth S. & O’Donnell, Victoria, Propaganda and Persuasion (California, Sage, 1999), p.1. 
104 Miller, David, ‘The Propaganda Machine’, in Miller, David & Thomas, Mark (eds), Tell me lies: 
Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p.92. 
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trying to get around the formal links with another by speaking directly to the public 
of that country to provide an interpretation of its own values and policies.105 In this 
context Nye raises the concept of “Soft power”, a means of setting the agenda and 




In terms of government agenda building any government may make use of some, 
or all, of the above methods of political communication. Yet it is a government’s use 
of various methods of “political communication”, which may include all of the above 
methods mentioned, which leads journalists to resist politicians’ efforts at 
manipulation and assert their own independence.107  Vincent Campbell, 
commenting on McNair’s observations on the perceived shift in journalistic attitudes 
away from deference (as in Eden’s time) to a more adversarial position (a more 
common media stance during Blair’s premiership), reflects that critics of this 
journalistic move to a more adversarial stance claim that there has been a shift from 
“healthy scepticism” to “a corrosively cynical and hyper-adversarial position” in 
which politics is seen as a degraded profession.108
 
 Thus a detailed examination of 
the agendas of both government and media may expose a conflict of agendas and, 
indeed, as a prime requisite of this study may show how a UK government attempts 
to resolve such a conflict and win media support for its regime-changing aims in 
Suez 1956 and Iraq 2001. 
Elements also covered include how the media interacted with the military to gather 
the information needed for their reports. For example, an interview with Mark Laity, 
the BBC’s correspondent in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in the 1991 Iraq War but a NATO 
spokesman in Iraq 2003, demonstrates both sides of the agenda, media and 
                                            
105 Seib, Philip, Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.126. 
106 Nye, Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Public 
Affairs, 2004), p.5. 
107 Swanson, David. I., ‘Transnational Trends in Political Communication’, in Esser & Pfetsch, p.51. 
108 Campbell, Vincent, Political Communication and the “Chaos Paradigm (Paper presented at the 
Political Studies Association annual conference, Bath University, 11th-13th April, 2007), p.9. 
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government.109  Laity, who can comment on both the media and politico/military 
sides of the fence, also reflected on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of facilities 
provided by the military or government in Iraq 1991 to gather that information and 
also responded to questions on media suspicions of possible censorship which, in 
the media’s view, may have prevented factual and objective reporting of conflict. 
Other sources such as Sylvester and Huffman, Miller, Stauber and Rampton were 




On this aspect of propaganda, there may be times when the media actively co-
operate with political or military authorities and in Media Access and the Military, 
Baroody examines this point when, due to “national emergency”, the media may act 
as cheerleaders for a particular side, boosting or lowering morale among the 
troops.111  She was specifically looking at the media/military relations and 
interactions concerning US military and government during the 1991 Gulf conflict, 
whereas this study mainly looks at the relationships between the media and UK 
authorities in Iraq 2003. Yet in her methodology and approach there are similarities 
in that the author of this study and Baroody are both examining these relationships 
in which reporters see their jobs as interpreters of events while some military 
authorities may ideally see journalists as conveyors on information without bias or 
opinion.112
                                            
109 Mark Laity is now Chief Spokesman for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and 
his comments were made in an interview with the author of this dissertation on August 14th, 2007. 
 Edwards and Cromwell, in their critique of media/UK government 
interaction in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War look at this “cheerleader” angle, 
110  Sylvester, Judith & Huffman, Susan, Reporting from the Front: the Media and the Military (New 
York: Roman & Littlefield, 2005); Miller, Laura, Stauber, John & Rampton, Sheldon. ‘War is Sell’, in 
Miller, David (ed) Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004). 
Commenting on “objectivity” in reporting during recent world conflicts, including Iraq 2003, Allan and 
Zelizer highlight the possible areas of concern when the media may appear to be in the military’s 
pockets, breaking down the autonomy which journalism in wartime likes to assume it functions. They 
discuss the problems of partisan reporting and conflicts with impartiality and the tensions, 
contradictions and contingencies that shape a journalist’s role in wartime. [Allan, Stuart & Zelizer, 
Barbie, Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.6-13.]. 
111 Baroody, Judith Raine, Media Access and the Military (Oxford: University Press of America, 
1998), p.vii. 
112 Ibid, p.vii. 
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examining media reaction to the March 18, 2003, speech in the Commons by Prime 
Minister Tony Blair stating the reasons why Saddam Hussein had to be confronted 
and outlining the reasons for taking military action against the Iraqi dictator. They 
refer to the Mirror editorial of the following day “not questioning” Blair’s belief in the 
rightness of military action although restating the newspaper’s opposition to the 
war.113 Edwards and Cromwell say that Blair received similar praise across the 
spectrum of the UK media, despite their contention that the speech was “packed full 
of lies and deceptions that could have easily been exposed by journalists”.114 
Halliday, in his study of media reporting in the 1990-1991 Gulf War comments that 
every modern war has involved disputes on the media coverage of that war, 
disputes that explicitly or implicitly reflect on to broader concerns about the role of 
the media, and war, in a democratic society.115 He raised the aspects of possible 
conflict between government and the media in terms of the media’s concern with 
the near, immediate communication of news to the public and the state’s 
occupation with security on military matters and with the “broader, political impact 
that news may have on public opinion”.116
 
 All these contentions will be examined in 
the relevant empirical chapters, comparing and contrasting the agenda-building 
actions of the Eden and Blair administrations. 
2.5. Mechanics of agenda building 
 
It is intended that this study will show the changes and development of UK 
government media agenda building, both nationally and internationally, in the Suez 
1956 debacle and the more successful, from the UK government’s point of view, 
Iraq 2003 conflict.  Certainly, a media plan is important, but it is only a part of 
agenda building which can have a wider communications remit to include such 
                                            
113 Edwards, David & Cromwell, David. ‘Mass Deception: How the Media Helped the Government 
Deceive the People’, in Miller, David (ed), Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the 
Attack on Iraq (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p.210. 
114 Ibid, p.211 
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factors as direct marketing and advertising, arranging public events and personal 
meetings between a government principal and influential groups such as media 
chiefs. 
 
The two conflicts examined are linked in that they are Middle East-based and are 
wars of intervention and attempted regime change, in the case of Suez 1956 the 
invasion of a sovereign state, Egypt, by Britain, France and Israel. This conflict had 
no United Nations support, unlike the Iraq 1991 war in which a coalition of 34 
nations, including Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia took action following a 
United Nations resolution. Similarly, as in the case of Suez 1956, the Iraq 2003 
conflict had no UN mandate to invade a sovereign state and the lack of such a 
mandate posed problems for the UK government in its attempts to win both national 
and international support for what was, in effect, a regime-change policy. Shaw 
refers to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in August 1956 working to avoid any 
involvement of the United Nations in the UK’s military planning against Egypt for 
fear the UN might interfere and stop any attempt to retake the Suez Canal.117 
Similarly, in the lead-up to the Iraq 2003 conflict Prime Minister Tony Blair would 
have been happy to have had a UNSCR to legitimise the use of military force but as 
his Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said “we do not regard it as essential”.118 Neither 
did the American government, as Alastair Campbell reveals in his diary entry of 22 
July 2002, referring to talks between C, the head of UK’s Secret Intelligence 
Service, George Tenet, Director of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency and 
Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser.119
 
 
The Suez Crisis can be regarded as an attempt by Prime Minister Anthony Eden to 
regain the British sense of empire and its place as one of the great powers, a 
position certainly lost during the Second World War. Yet there are counter 
arguments that perhaps in the case of Suez, as will be examined in the relevant 
empirical chapter, that the real reason was economic in terms of Eden wishing to 
                                            
117 Shaw, Tony, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media (London: I B Tauris, 1956), p.41. 
118 Curtis, Mark, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World (London: Vintage, 2003), pp.9-10. 
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preserve the oil supply lifeline to the Middle East in the face of Egyptian 
nationalisation. Similarly, the 2003 Iraq war could be framed in a similar way with 
the USA and UK desiring to preserve the same economic hydro-carbon lifeline but 
using “perception management” or agenda building to hide that point in favour of 
the “good versus evil” argument which relies on media support for the political 
military policy, lost in the Vietnam War.120
 
   
Edelman remarks that leaders must create an impression that they are acting 
decisively whether or not it is actually the case. They must use symbols and 
language to give the impression that they are effectively coping with problems. The 
usage of phrases like “was in consultation with” or “will meet with government 
leaders today” gives the impression to followers and possible ancillary groups that 
the leadership is making progress in getting their issue before the proper 
authorities.121 Edelman was writing on the activities of pressure groups outside 
government, but this can be equally turned around to reflect the agenda-building 
activities of a government in power. This would be a proactive government 
gathering stakeholder support, seeking independent endorsement of policy and 
putting in place damage limitation techniques at the planning stage, all part of its 
own agenda to support a policy initiative. Lance Price, deputy to Tony Blair’s 
Director of Communications Alastair Campbell in the late 1990s, refers to the 
advantage of independent endorsement (in term of gaining votes) in the weeks 
before the UK 2001 May General Election. The party had to show it had policies 
that would reach out to the non-traditional constituencies of support such as small 
businesses and self-employed.122
 
 Support and independent endorsement, it is 
suggested, are even more necessary in a wartime situation where not only does a 
government seek public backing for policies, but also for its stance in putting the 
lives of its citizens serving in the military at risk. 
                                            
120 Klare, Michael, Blood and Oil: How America’s thirst for petrol is killing us (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 2004), pp.3-4. Klare cites the January 23, 1980 declaration by President Carter which 
designated the secure flow of Persian Gulf oil as a “vital interest” of the United States. 
121 Edelman, p.58. 
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As stated previously, Rogers and Dearing describe agenda building, as a process 
through which the policy agendas of political elites are influenced by a variety of 
factors, including the media agendas and public agendas. However, in the hands of 
a UK government determined to drive through its policy agenda (and certainly one 
which faces crucial and immediate policy decisions involving serious military 
implications) agenda building can, and must, be redefined in a more positive light. 
War acts as a catalyst and can shorten the time for decision, for example decisions 
awaiting reference to a full Parliamentary debate or even a weekly Cabinet meeting 
may be hastened. Such key decisions may then fall to a small Cabinet group which 
is in the driving seat with key political figures sitting on it – Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister of Defence, plus military chiefs of 
staff - which can take rapid decisions and bypass full Cabinet.123
 
  
Political actors are not simply concerned with influencing what people think about; 
they also hope to shape how people think in terms of social problems and their 
solutions. Thus protesters are ultimately interested in shaping the agenda-building 
process by helping define how issues are interpreted in the mass media.124 The 
same goes for government agenda-building and which is not just the prerogative of 
protest groups as shown by the fact that in 1999, just before the NATO bombing 
campaign against Yugoslavia was launched, NATO quadrupled the size of its 
media operation (as previously mentioned). The UK government’s Director of 
Communications Alastair Campbell was tasked with mobilising British and 
international public opinion in favour of the bombing campaign against Serbia on 
“humanitarian grounds,” i.e., to stop “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo.125
                                            
123 Dickie, John, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (London: I.B Tauris, 2004), 
p.132. The Blair War Cabinet of 2003 also included his Director of Communications, Alastair 
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 Campbell 
refers to this in his diary as saying that the military campaign had to be founded on 
simple concepts, as did any supporting media campaign. His media strategy and 
124 Smith, Jackie, McCarthy, John D, McPhail, Clark, Augustyn, Boguslaw, “From Protest to Agenda 
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the enhancement of the NATO media operation was accepted by the NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solena and Director of Communications Jamie Shea.126
 
 
No government engaged in agenda building will totally neglect to influence a wide 
range of publics, including the media opposed to government policy. The Labour 
Party, in the run up to the 2001 General election made great efforts to woo 
opposing media, for example the influential Paul Dacre, editor-in-chief of 
Associated Newspapers (Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday).127  Winning the agenda 
battle is particularly important for a government in the run up to a general election 
and the prospect of not continuing in office. No opportunity may be lost by an 
agenda-building politician who may seek get himself on a light chat show or other 
entertainment programme where he may not be challenged as he would be, say, 
on a current affairs programme.128 Jonathan Powell refers to the Blair government’s 
opening up of the “quasi-Masonic” Lobby system where the previous exclusive  
access to government given to these Parliamentary correspondents was changed 
to a much more open system of briefing to which non Parliamentary journalists and 
even foreign journalists were invited to briefings at No, 10. This, says Powell, was 
an attempt to bring the Lobby correspondents into line and “abandon their more 
juvenile lines of questioning” to support government agenda building.129
 
 
Agenda building seeks support from a myriad of publics, and policy organisations 
across the political spectrum have learned to use communication technologies to 
target the smallest audiences likely to be helpful to their political aims and to deliver 
information. This information is typically publicised to mobilise and demobilise 
segments of the public to serve narrow strategic objectives often masking the 
identity or intent of the communicator in the process.130
                                            
126 Campbell, Alastair, The Blair Years (London: Arrow Books, 2007), p.377 
 Whilst appreciating this 
contention, one can reflect that such information is used in a tactical manner rather 
127 Lloyd, p.94. 
128 Dahlgren, Peter, Television in the Public Sphere: Citizenship, Democracy and the Media (Sage, 
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129 Powell, p.196. 
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than strategic, as underlined by Philip Gould, one of the creators of New Labour 
and its communications structure.131
 
 Gould, a Labour Party political consultant and 
former adviser to Tony Blair, defines strategy as the heart of any campaign with 
messages, events and logistics planned out on a grid in order to drive forward the 
political agenda through sustained media appearances, photo opportunities and 
press conferences. A grid entry may define the tactics to handle a single event, 
such as naming who the spokesman is to be, when an announcement is to be 
made and which media are to be specifically targeted in order to achieve a specific 
aim. However, all of the specific aims, and the tactics used to achieve these aims, 
come under the overall umbrella of the strategic media plan. Tactics may be short-
term; strategy is long term.  
This lack of an agenda building communications strategy failed, as stated in a 
damning August 2003 report by Cardiff University law professors Campbell and Lee 
which labelled the government’s handling of the 2001 foot and mouth outbreak as 
“panic response” and blatant incompetence.”132 Alastair Campbell confirms this in 
his diary when he quotes Tony Blair as referring to the fact that the foot and mouth 
handling was problematic before No.10 stepped in and “gripped” it and brought in 
the Army, installing a more strategic approach operationally and in media handling 
terms.133
 
 This problem of a tactical rather than a strategic response in both the 
Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 chapters, will be examined in the empirical chapters and 
will attempt to fill in gaps which may exist in existing research or to enhance existing 
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2.6. Agenda-building tools 
 
An examination of government-media relationships within the scope of this study 
must take into account the possible influences of other methods of government 
information handling which come into the total equation. Several methods of 
exerting government influence in terms of information flow to a target audience 
include Propaganda, Psychological Operations, and Public Diplomacy – all of which 
may contain implications of improper use of government information resources or, 
to put it bluntly, lies. In order to clarify and prevent misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation, it may be useful to look at accepted definitions of all of these 
terms gleaned from an in-depth examination of published material. 
 
Sir Robert Marett, a Foreign Office diplomat who worked on propaganda during two 
World Wars, spelled out his three rules for success: 
 
• Have the right friends in the right places. Personal contacts are all important, 
e.g., editors. 
• Provide services which fill a need – provide features, raw material for articles 
for nominal fee or none. 
• Whenever possible do not conduct the propaganda yourself but get a 
national of the country to do it for you.134
 
 
Marett, on the whole, is referring to “white propaganda” which is the selective 
presentation of factual material and the omission of material which could undermine 
its credibility. On the other hand “black propaganda”, can include all types of 
creative deceit and depends on the receiver’s willingness to accept the credibility of 
the source: “grey” propaganda is somewhere between the two as the source may 
not be correctly identified and the accuracy of the information is uncertain.135
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Propaganda is not necessarily brainwashing or the introduction of new ideas, 
attitudes and beliefs but rather a resonance strategy, the discovery of culturally 
shared beliefs and the deliberate reinforcement and ultimately aggrandisement of 
these beliefs.136
 
 This definition will be returned to in the Iraq chapter, with reference 
to the “embedded media” strategy. 
Compare propaganda with “psyops” – “planned psychological activities in peace 
and war directed at enemy, friendly and neutral countries in order to influence 
attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military 
objectives.”137 This would include leaflet dropping to influence and lower morale of 
both enemy combatants and civilians and also the setting up of radio stations in 
theatre by the invading powers to do the same. Former research fellow at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs Mark Curtis quotes a UK Ministry of Defence 
document published in 2001, freely available on the web, as a definition of 
psyops.138
 
 It reads: 
“Public support will be vital to the conduct of military interventions.” In future “more 
effort will be required to ensure that such public debate is properly informed.”139
 
  
Again, this is proactive agenda building, positive mechanisms used to win support 
for a policy agenda. War, after all, is an extension of policy as 19th century Prussian 
military strategist Karl Von Clausewitz wrote.140
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139 Curtis, Mark, ‘Psychological Warfare Against the Public: Iraq and Beyond,’ in Miller (ed), p.70 
 47 
 
A third term used in government agenda building, officially in the US, but not 
officially in the UK (where the term “media operations” is used in a military support 
sense)  is “public diplomacy”. 141 The US government defines this as what it does to 
officially influence and persuade international audiences through “the cultural, 
educational and informational programmes, citizen exchanges or broadcasts used 
to promote the national interests of the United States through understanding, 
informing and influencing foreign audiences.”142 Zaharna refers to the terms 
propaganda and public diplomacy as being interchangeable quoting US 
ambassador Richard Holbrooke as his source.143 In use in the Iraq 2003 conflict 
was the concept of Information Dominance, described by Miller as bringing 
information into line with all other military concepts as an element of combat power 
by building up and protecting friendly information and degrading information 
received by your adversary.144
 
 
So, propaganda, psyops, public diplomacy (media operations) and information 
dominance all can be said to be tools in government agenda building, although in 
evidence to the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence in 2003, Air 
                                                                                                                                  
140 Von Clausewitz, Karl, Vom Kriege (Paret, Peter & Howard, Michael, trans, Princeton University 
Press, 1984), p.80. 
141 Tatham, Steve, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public 
Opinion (London: Hurst & Company, 2006). Tatham makes the distinction, underlining the US 
military system of specialization in Public Affairs as a career path, whereas in the UK military the 
equivalent, Media Operations, is usually a secondment for no more than three or four years before 
returning to a source specialisation and strictly military career path. The author of this dissertation, 
having been a British Army media operations officer, and having worked alongside US Army Public 
Affairs Officers, can confirm this.  
142 Snow, p.54. 
143 Zaharna, R. S., ‘From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,’ in Kamalipour, 
Yahya R., & Snow, Nancy (eds), War, Media and Propaganda (Maryland, USA: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004), p.223. Zahama points out that the word “propaganda” entered American popular 
parlance as a negative term, tied to Nazi propaganda and Communist propaganda. With coercion as 
the goal information control and deception are key factors to effective propaganda. However, public 
diplomacy, Zaharna points out, is “open public communication in a global communication arena” with 
the audience free or not to accept the message. To gain trust public diplomacy must be absolutely 
credible if a government wants to get across its message. The terms propaganda and public 
diplomacy on this definition are therefore NOT interchangeable. This also applies to the UK synonym 
for public diplomacy (media operations). 
144 Miller, David, ‘Information Dominance: The Philosophy of Total Propaganda Control’, in Snow et 
al, pp. 7-10. 
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Vice Marshal Michael Heath said that apart from “where we would try and lie or 
dissuade or persuade military commanders, the entire art of Information Operations 
is based on truth”.145 Yet, while no experienced government press officer will “lie” to 
the media (since being found out lying once, destroys one’s credibility for all time), 
there could be an omission of facts given to the media which may well be construed 
as a propaganda ploy. This aspect is examined in Chapters on the 2003 Iraq War 
and Conclusions to determine how the UK military systems carried out media 
minding and media briefing, looking at the differences and touching on the technical 
aspects of official control of information to the media and media onward 
transmission of that information.  Thussu and Freedman say that much of the 
literature analysing media reporting of international conflict is built round the 
concern of whether the media accurately and objectively reported events.146 
Conversely there must be concern as to whether the military used non-legitimate 
(or legitimate) means to restrict or reshape the coverage.147 What we have here is 
a classic conflict in the world of journalism in which journalists feel they have the 
integrity to test claims from official sources in the public interest yet, as Hargreaves 




This examination will take into account the contention that while military press 
officers working to brief the media insist that they will not deceive the same media, 
the doctrinal relationship between their work and other elements of information 
operations  (such as psyops) inevitably creates suspicions.149
                                            
145 Palmer, Jerry, ‘Media Performance and War Efforts’, European Journal of Communication (Vol. 
20, No. 3, 2005, pp.379-386), p.379. 
 Whether these 
146 Yet academic and writer on broadcasting Stuart Hall maintains that objectivity is an “operational 
fiction” since all filming and editing is a manipulation of all data – selectively perceived, interpreted, 
signified. Editing brings in value judgement and viewpoint. Hall, Stuart, ‘Media Power: The Double 
Bind’, Journal of Communication (Autumn, 1974.), p.23. 
147 Thussu and Freedman, p.97. 
148 Hargreaves, pp.186-7. 
149 Thussu and Freedman, p.90. Allan and Zellizer refer to reporters in Iraq 2003 being pressurized 
into not giving criticism or dissent of US government policy as a part of a military “disinformation” 
policy. However, this criticism is exclusively of the US military authorities and not the British. Allan, 
Stuart & Zelizer, Barbie, Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (Oxford: Routledge, 2004), p.9. 
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suspicions are justified will be examined in more detail in the empirical chapters on 
each of the two conflicts. 
 
2.7. Media control and manipulation concerns by government in war-time conflict. 
 
In the first case study of this dissertation, the Suez conflict of 1956, what is 
described is the media agenda-building policy of Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden 
and his relationship with The Times, which as Shaw writes, Eden regarded as “his 
own personal tool rather than an independent-minded newspaper”.150 The Suez 
empirical chapter will examine whether or not this view contributed to the success 
of Eden’s agenda-building policy. Kelly and Gorst also refer to “black propaganda” 
by the UK government in the lead-up to military intervention in Egypt including radio 
broadcasts by the UK to seek to drive a wedge between Egypt and other Arab 
states, in particular Saudi Arabia.151
 
 
Manipulation of the media in time of war is not a new concept. For example, 
Napoleon Bonaparte used the state-controlled newspaper Moniteur to plant 
disinformation abroad and on April 4, 1798, it carried an announcement that 
“General Bonaparte will be leaving for Brest within the next ten days to take 
command of the Army of England”.152 In fact Bonaparte was off to take command 
of French forces to invade Egypt and the Moniteur report was believed in England 
to the effect that the British Admiralty, in the words of Napoleon himself, moved 
ships to allow his Egyptian invasion force to safely capture Malta on the way to 
Egypt.153
                                            
150 Shaw, Tony, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion During the Suez 
Crisis (London: I.B Tauris, 1996), p.69.  
 Much earlier, McNair remarks that “Moses, it might be said, spun for God 
151 Thornhill, Michael T., ‘Trevelyan, Ambassador to Egypt’, in Kelly, Saul & Gorst, Anthony, 
Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, 200), p.15. 
152 Schom, Alan, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p.78. 
153 De Chair, Somerset, Napoleon on Napoleon: An Autobiography of the Emperor (London: Cassell, 
1992), p.113.  Jowett & O’Donnell also refer to Napoleon’s propaganda technique of planting pro-
French items in foreign language newspapers on the continent and also his production of a 
newspaper purporting to be British, the Argus of London, allegedly edited by an Englishman but 
which was actually printed in Paris by the French Foreign Office [Jowett, Garth S. & O’Donnell, 
Victoria, Propaganda and Persuasion Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1999)p.88.] 
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himself when he communicated the contents of the Ten Commandments to the 
children of Israel”.154  However, worshiping the Golden Calf apart, it may be worth 
considering Taylor’s contention that there may be self-delusion in Western liberal 
democracies that propaganda was something that only the enemy engaged in.155 
Sir Anthony Eden’s press secretary during the Suez Crisis, William Clark, 
reluctantly admitted that propaganda was a part of government policy when he 
said: “I fear the government (under both parties) did manage the news of our 
foreign policy so that the public got a smug and insular view of it.156
 
 
Taking the contention of political manipulation further, Hindell, writing on the 
relationships between media and the making of foreign policy says: “The processes 
can be viewed as two concentric circles. On the inner circle, the policy maker takes 
action which is then reported by the media which, in turn, is read/seen and 
absorbed by the policy maker. On the outer circle, events, including government 
actions, are reported in such a way that section of the public react, feeding their 
responses back to the policy makers via their elected representatives.”157 The UK 
and U.S. government media agenda-building exercise in Iraq 1991 and 2003 
included the accreditation of media who only then, after that accreditation and 
vetting, had access to filming troop movements and interviews with senior 
commanders. This gave the military a strong element of control over what was 
produced by the media, the converse of the CNN effect.158
                                            
154 McNair, Brian, ‘PR Must Die: spin, anti-spin and political public relations in the UK, 1997-2004’, 
Journalism Studies (Vol5, No.3, 2004), p.327. 
 Anderson, commenting 
on the officially approved Mobile Reporting Teams (MRTs) in the 1991 Iraq War, 
where journalists were tightly controlled and watched over by military media 
155 Taylor, Philip M., ‘ Through a Glass Darkly? Psychological Climate and Psychological Warfare of 
the Cold War’, [Source] 
156 Clark, William, ‘Cabinet Secrecy, Collective Responsibility and the British Public’s Right to Know’, 
in Franck, Thomas M. & Weisband, Edward (eds), Secrecy and Foreign Policy (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), pp.207-8. 
157 Hindell, Keith ‘The Influence of the Media on Foreign Policy,’ International Relations (Vol.XII, 
No.4, April 1995), pp.73-74. 
158 The CNN Effect has been defined as the effect of dramatic real-time television imagery actually 
driving military policy *(Thussu et al p.104) 
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“minders”, refers to the MRT system as ”perhaps the most sophisticated system 
ever of controlling news of a war.”159
 
  
However, Anderson, a BBC reporter, wrote this in 1991 and in comparing the MRT 
system of 1991 with the “embedded reporter” arrangement on the 2003 conflict, this 
study will see if this contention still holds. To this effect the review of literature is key 
to teasing out all the possible UK government means of manipulating the media, in 
particular through the government’s agenda being wittingly or unwittingly accepted 
by the media. 
 
In the planning of media coverage of the battlefield in Iraq 2003, the lessons of the 
Vietnam War may have been learned. The American public reacted adversely to 
the violence portrayed by television and Chapman quotes the example of television 
news coverage of civil disturbances at home and of carnage abroad, undermining 
the status of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the effect that he did not seek another 
term in office.160 Zayani and Ayish, in their study of Arab satellite television and 
crisis reporting in 2003 underline the fact that in a fast developing war zone the 
media tend to take “rather sensational and dramatic approaches” to the situation 
and they alarmingly (their words) tend to exaggerate and dramatise images of war-
front events that “are likely to bear on public opinion in negative ways.”161  Similarly, 
in his analysis of news values in terms of coverage of terrorism or political violence 
(in other words, war), Nossek says that in this context to qualify as newsworthy an 




These case studies quoted here raise an interesting point, but what if these images 
acted in the opposite way to win public support? For example, Taylor, in his study of 
                                            
159 Anderson, Steve, ‘Hi mate, where’s the fighting?’ British Journalism Review (Vol. 2, No. 12, 1991, 
pp.12-16), p.12. 
160 Chapman, p.231. 
161 Zayani, Mohamed & Ayish, Muhammad I., ‘Arab Satellite Television and Crisis Reporting,’ 
International Communication Gazette (Vol. 6, Nos. 5-6, 2006, pp.473-497). p.473. 
162 Nossek, Hillel, ‘Our News and their News: The Role of National Identity in the Coverage of 
Foreign News’, Journalism (Vol. 5, No.3, 2004), p.354. 
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the 1991 Iraq War, examines the degree to which the flow of information in a war 
zone was controlled by the military and political authorities who wished to see the 
media adopt a particular perspective on what was actually happening.163
 
  
How government information reaches the media and the element of official control 
of that material needs to be at the forefront of our minds. Certainly, in a system of 
checks and balances, both newspapers and broadcasters back in the UK had 
resident “experts” who would analyse and comment on the “front line” reports. 
Mostly, these were retired senior military officers who had credibility and who could 
speak with knowledge about military strategy and tactics. However, without the up-
to-date power to influence events and to influence policy, and access to up-to-date 
intelligence, retired generals and admirals may well have been out of touch in terms 
of any agenda building they were helping to create on behalf of their media 
paymasters -  a media agenda which may have been in conflict with the 
government agenda.  This is in direct contrast with their successors in command 
(and the politicians who commanded them) who had their hands firmly on the levers 




Indeed, in a study which analysed the way in which television news organisations 
selected and used expert sources to interpret the 1991 Gulf War, Steele concluded 
that “experts framed the conflict in a narrowly technical and logistical interpretive 
context” and failed to place events in a broader, historical, economic or social 
context.165 Making another point on media coverage of conflict Hall points out that 
in TV news “Objectivity, like impartiality, is an operational fiction”. His view is that 
editing is a manipulation of raw data and is selectively perceived and interpreted.166
 
  
                                            
163 Taylor, Philip M , War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), pp.vii-viii. 
164 This point will be gone into in succeeding chapters. 
165 Steele, Janet E., ‘Experts and the Operational Bias of Television News: The Case of the Persian 
Gulf War,’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly (Vol.72, Issue 4, 1995, pp,799-812), 
p.809. 
166 Hall, Stuart, ‘Media Power: The Double Bind’, Journal of Communication (Autumn 1974), p.23. 
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The “CNN effect” is news coverage live and recorded - driving government policy, 
but Seib claims that many scholars overstate the impact of coverage with reporting 
of news driving the formation of government policy which he, Seib argues is an 
overestimation of media power.167 He also makes the point that the purposeful 
dissemination of false information, for government-related policy purposes, can lead 
to the media accepting and publishing such disinformation. The media requirement 
for speed may outweigh the concern for verification.168
 
 Therefore, this “raw data” 
provided by a government source may well lead to a media interpretation 
supportive to government policy - the reverse of the CNN effect. 
Writing in The Media at War, Carruthers states that “most agree that television 
coverage of foreign events has some impact on policy-making.”  The dispute is over 
when, why and to what degree.  More forcefully Livingston states that “despite 
numerous symposia, books, articles and research fellowships devoted to 
unravelling the CNN effect, success at clarifying has been minimal.”169
 
 
In effect, Livingston is perhaps reversing the thought on the CNN effect, turning it 
around the other way, with government influencing media, rather than media 
influencing a government agenda. Palmer makes the point that modern theories of 
propaganda concentrate on the ways in which governments influence the 
communications process by intervening in the relationship between the journalist 
and the event the journalist reports.170 With government control of information in a 
wartime situation, it is the government that has the most influence in terms of 
provision of material to the media leading to what can be described as “perception 
management” in order to hold the domestic front and maintain support, a battle the 
Americans had lost during the Vietnam War.171
                                            
167 Seib, Philip, Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.13. 
 Moreover, in a conflict situation 
168 Ibid., p.14. 
169 Carruthers, S.L. The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), p.23. 
170 Palmer, p.382. 
171 Calabrese, Andrew, ‘Casus Belli: Media and the Justification of the Iraq War’, Television & New 
Media (Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2005, pp153-175), pp.159-160. 
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influence where for security and logistics reasons the government/military 
authorities have great control of access to the battle area there may perceived to 
arise a “dependency culture” with the media relying to a great extent on official 
release of news and access to the battle area.  
 
2.8. Relationships between government and media and  dependency culture 
 
Bro, in his examination of past norms in news reporting with those of the 21st 
century, cites examples of the modern demand for a more “active” journalism, that 
is to say a reporter who often attempts to prompt people to take action rather than 
to simply learn about a new problem. The latter he defines as “passive news 
reporters” who are primarily intent on simply disseminating news stories (relying 
often on official sources).172 This “dependency culture” was not confined to UK and 
US media, for example in their analysis of Danish media coverage of the 2003 
conflict, Kristensen and Orsten conclude that their own national media were too 
reliant on sources within their national government, the coalition and the military.173 
Yet there is a contrary argument as proposed by Zayani and Ayish who highlight 
the “media orientation” of the coverage of conflict in the Middle East with 
sensational and dramatic approaches to individual events, personalities and issues 
at the expense of seeing the big picture and objective analysis.174 Indeed, in terms 
of expertise and “objective analysis” the foreign correspondent of any media outlet 
is a key figure, but in their examination of this field of expertise Hamilton and Jenner 
reflect on the “chronic decline” of the elite foreign correspondents coupled with the 
proliferation of alternate sources of news.175
                                            
172 Bro, Peter, ‘Normative navigation in the news media’, Journalism (Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008), pp.312-
313 
  Economic pressures have cut down 
on the numbers of media foreign bureaux in many countries and this can, and does, 
173 Kristensen, Nete Norgaard & Orsten, Mark, ‘Danish media at war’, Journalism (Vol. 8, No. 3, 
2007, pp323-343), p.323. Also in McChesney, p.17, where he contends that news tends to have an 
establishment bias through the fact that reporters often rely on “official sources.” 
174 Zayani & Ayish, p.474. 
175 Hamilton John Maxwell & Jenner, Eric, ‘Redefining foreign correspondence’, Journalism (Vol. 5, 
No. 3, 2004), p.302. 
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A British Army divisional commander in the Iraq 1991 conflict, General Rupert 
Smith, highlights this “dependency culture” when referring to the build-up to the first 
Iraq war. Smith understood that the journalists (pressured by their news editors at 
home) needed to fill space with words and pictures. Smith noted: “I used this 
understanding in the Gulf in 1990 when considering my method for conducting 
operations against the Iraqis. I realised the need to make particular arrangements 
for what I called ‘presentation’ in order to ensure the continuing support of our 
people and allies, to impart to the enemy a specific impression we wanted him to 
have and for my command to feel it was well represented.”177
 
  
On this type of approach, Fishman postulates, with some merit, that the reporter-
official connection makes news an important tool of government and other 
established authorities. If in a wartime situation the government/military control 
access to the actual field of conflict (such as embedded reporters in Iraq 2003) and 
also control the briefings behind the lines, then the chances are that government 
sources will get a healthy per cent of favourable words and pictures into its national, 
and perhaps international, media, television in particular.178 The embedded reporter 
system, in which selected reporters were given unprecedented access to the front 
line in Iraq 2003, stemmed from the 1991 Gulf War when reporters complained they 
were denied access to the battlefields of Kuwait when allied troops were busy 
routing Saddam Hussein’s army.179
                                            
176 Ibid, p.304. Hamilton & Jenner put the annual salary and support costs of maintaining a 
newspaper foreign correspondent at well over $250,000., with networks paying easily over double 
that and with a production team accompanying the reporter raising that amount even higher.  
  In contrast to journalists in 1991, those 
177 Smith, General Sir Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London: 
Allen Lane (2005),p.245.  
178 In the Iraq 2003 a key feature of the media coverage was the “embedding” of news teams with 
military front-line units. This meant that unlike Iraq 1991, news teams could sent back via satellite 
action as it was happening rather than relying on military news teams. These “embedded” news 
teams lived with the troops and were part of their unit. 
179 Beck, Sara & Downing, Malcolm (eds), The Battle for Iraq (London: BBC, 2003), p.p.16 and BBC 
News Online, How ‘embedded’ reporters are handling the war, 25 March, 2003. 
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embedded reporters in 2003 ate and slept alongside the soldiers and, through 
satellite reporting, brought live action from the battle to the front rooms of the world. 
Their reporting was restricted to comments on general troop strength and casualty 
figures and broad information about previous combat actions. Official “minders” 
were with them at all times. This dissertation looks at this both through examining 
primary source material from reporters who covered the conflicts and also through 
interviews, taking into account the desire of any professional journalist to actually 
witness events on which he or she was reporting but, also the limits which may 
have been imposed – political, military, economic and technological, all of which 
may have curtailed the media coverage in drastic ways.180
 
. 
Compared to newspaper reporters, television reporters have less autonomy in the 
selection of stories, but there is a greater likelihood that television reporters’ stories 
will appear as the reporters have prepared them, especially if they are a live 
broadcast.181
 
 Newspaper reporters deal mainly in words and still pictures and are 
not involved in the technical and time consuming constrictions of TV – filming, 
transmitting video via satellite, editing, scripting and so on. 
Fishman’s contention is also supported by Banz who comments that when sources 
and reporters have interacted for an extended period or where sources have great 
power over reporters, the interaction between sources and reporters may become 
routine as a non-conflict reaction. This is often the case when reporters on beats 
build long-term relationships – e.g., the police reporter “goes native” or the political 
reporter becomes a political actor.182
                                            
180 Allan, Stuart & Zelizer, Barbie (eds), Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 
2004), p.5. For example, the editors in their Introduction highlight the dilemma faced by a journalist 
when their own citizenship, or even patriotism, may call into question his or her perceptions of how 
best to conduct oneself as a reporter. 
 Even more so it may well apply to a greater 
181 Ibid, p.36 
182 Bantz. C, ‘News organisations: Conflict as a Crafted Cultural Norm’, in Berkowitz (ed). Also 
Schudson, M., ‘The Sociology of News Production’, in Bennett, W. Lance & Entman, Robert M. 
(eds), Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy ( Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p.13. Schudson states unequivocally that the reporter-official connection makes news an 
important tool of government and other established authorities.  
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extent in a wartime situation as will be outlined from primary source material in this 
dissertation’s empirical chapters.  
 
Smith, McCarthy, McPhail and Augustyn, in an agenda-building study looking at 
media coverage of protest movements in Washington D.C,  also refer to 
government/reporter relationships and comment that editors favour reporters who 
are generalists rather than specialists as generalists are cheaper to hire, easier to 
control and more reliant on official sources of information for their stories.183
 
 This 
makes news gathering cheaper and the story turnover on a news desk faster; it 
may also make it easier for a government to build a favourable agenda in a time of 
conflict when dealing with general reporters rather than defence or political 
specialist correspondents, a point of view reviewed in the analytical section. 
Hargreaves makes a similar point when he writes that one senior public relations 
executive revealed that the journalists he dealt with tended mainly to be young and 
not experienced and were stretched by the number of deadlines they were running 
against.184 He adds that thinly-resourced newspapers and broadcast newsrooms 
become dependent on intermediaries such as government information officers, 
often reproducing gratefully whatever ready-made material comes their way, 
reflecting “the quickly sub-edited press release, or even the non-edited version, can 
be inspected any day in thousands of publications.”185
                                            
183 Smith. Jackie, McCarthy. John D, McPhail. Clark, Augustyn. Boguslaw, ‘From Protest to Agenda 
Building: Description Bias in Media Coverage of Protest Events in Washington D.C., Social Forces, 
Vol. 79 Issue 4 (June 2001), p.1401. 
 With newspaper, TV and 
radio news bulletins now prepared on computer no double-keyboarding is involved 
in quickly cutting and pasting a government press release into the bulletin, with the 
pressures of deadlines allowing (as Hargreaves comments) more of the 
government point-of-view in than may be healthy. This, in essence, is the media 
acting as an information gatekeeper, yet not opening and shutting the gate to select 
184 Hargreaves, p.181. 
185 Ibid, p.182. 
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sources for publication but negligently leaving it wide open (or at least partly 
ajar).186
 
   
2.9. The pressures on objective reporting 
 
This then brings into question the objectivity of the journalist and whether lack of 
resources and deadline pressures, combined with the ease of access to 
government information may affect that “gate-keeping” role. Herman and Chomsky 
put forward the assertion that the elite domination of the media and the 
marginalisation of dissidents occurs so naturally that the media are able to convince 
themselves that they are operating objectively and on the basis of professional 
news values.187 Robertson writes that reporters may, lazily, tend to use the same 
sources as each other or go back unthinkingly to those they have used before.188 
Perloff, in his study The Dynamics of Persuasion, examines the conflicts between 
authority and credibility underlining that they are not the same, defining credibility as 
a psychological or interpersonal communication construct.  He postulates that 
authorities frequently influence others through compliance with individuals, in the 
case of this study, journalists, agreeing or publishing the authority view in order to 
gain specific rewards (access to further information or sources).189
                                            
186 McQuail, Denis, McQuail’s Reader in Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage, 2002), p.500. 
In connection with the “gatekeeper” role of the media, that is selection of what is to be published, 
McQuail refers to the “unwitting bias” arising from the media relying on official authoritative sources. 
White (1950) applied this theory of information flowing through “gate areas” where decisions are 
made in his study of the actions of a telegraph wire editor who had the authority to discard or pass 
material for publication. Further work was done by Hirsch (1977) and Shoemaker (1991), the latter 
pointing out that “gatekeeping in the media is not a simple concept with the flow of news involving 
several social and institutional factors, including sources, advertisers, interest groups and 
government.. 
 Golan, in his 
study of  inter-media agenda setting makes the point that understanding what 
factors shape the media’s international news agenda is important, considering the 
potential effect of news coverage on public perceptions of national and international 
187 Herman, Edward S. & Chomsky, Noam, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1988), p.1. 
188 Robertson, p.476. 




 Understanding and analysing what role a government plays in shaping 
these factors is a key part of this dissertation.  
The Glasgow Media Group, in a series of analyses of the media, take the view that 
“government” ideas positively pushed forward via the media are not “unwelcome 
propaganda”.  Ideology, in the group’s view, is not some set of alien ideas imposed, 
propaganda-like upon willing and unwilling hearers; rather it is a representation of 
sets of events or facts that constantly favours the perceptual framework of one 
group, which could be the “official source.”  This source may have built up a long-
standing relationship with the “beat” or specialist reporter who on a daily basis taps 
that system for information which that reporter needs to carry out the job and 
compete in the pages, on the air or on the screen to win space for his or her 
speciality, be it defence, politics, environment or any such area demanding some 
level of expertise and familiarity. Rodriguez refers to a reporter “losing favour” with 
an editor if he or she misses a story or an angle of a story other media competitors 
have published and, in the case of government sources these sources can put 
pressure on a reporter who has not “toed the line” by not returning phone calls of 
granting other news facilities such as interviews.191
 
 
So, here are different examples of how government news reaches the media – 
Hargreaves referring to less experienced journalists and the pressure of deadlines, 
the Glasgow Media Group pointing to the long-standing relationships with the 
government “source”, Rodriguez revealing to the internal pressure within the media 
to outbid competitors, but at the possible price of allowing the government source to 
exert unwarranted pressure on reporters and Perloff hinting at compliance for future 
gain.192
                                            
190 Golan, Guy, ‘Inter Media Agenda Setting and Global News Coverage’, Journalism Studies (Vol. 7, 
No. 2, 2006), p.330. 
 These are all elements which need to be examined and particular 
191 Rodriguez, America, ‘Control Mechanisms of National Newsmaking’, in Downing, John, 
Mohammadi, Ali and Sreberny-Mohammadi (eds), Questioning the Media London: Sage, 1995), 
p.135. 
192 Perloff (pp.159-160) states that you can be an authority without credibility – Saddam Hussein was 
a supreme authority but privately many of his citizens did not find him credible. Credibility, Perloff 
proposes, is a communication variable and part of a two-way interaction between the communicator 
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consideration needs to be made of the point made by Swanson in reference to 
politicians making use of strategies to manipulate journalists in order to gain 
favourable coverage thought to be necessary for political success.193
 
  
Taking all of the points above there is, in certain cases, an accepted benefit for both 
sides, media and government. For example specialist reporters, such as UK 
national media defence correspondents, do get privileged briefings but with the quid 
pro quo of accepting the rules that the briefings are “unattributable” and not naming 
sources.194 Chris Bellamy, the Independent’s defence correspondent during the 
1991 Gulf War, writes that he was “quite happy” to accept these restrictions but if so 
it may be that the general public loses out in terms of “collusion” between 
government and media. Cockerell et al propose so in their book on Whitehall news 
“manipulation” when talking about Lobby correspondents who, they say, “are 
players in a sophisticated game of private briefings, official steers and all manner of 
guidance from civil servants whose instincts are not towards public disclosure”.195 
Jerome Delay, the Associated Press Photographer of the Year 2003, and a front-
line journalist in the Iraq 2003 War, puts the position of the lobby journalist more 
succinctly describing lobby journalists as ones who rely on what other people tell 
them rather than get the story first hand.196
 
 This aspect and the relationships 
between media and government sources will be examined in the empirical 
chapters. 
Yet, bearing in mind the above criticism, the fact is that internal competition is fierce 
within a media organisation and a specialist has to deliver on a regular basis else 
the news editor becomes disenchanted with the reporter’s performance. 
                                                                                                                                  
and message recipients. It is not a fixed point and earned by who you are or what you represent; it is 
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Government media experts can, and do, take advantage of that internal competition 
to place advantageous and supportive stories, an example of proactive and 
sometimes aggressive, agenda building, and also deny stories to “non-co-operative 
media which were then fed to their rivals to “teach them a lesson.”197
 
  
News talk occurs within a cultural framework which stresses its balance and 
impartiality. Yet, despite this, detailed analysis reveals that it consistently maintains 
and supports a cultural framework within which viewpoints favourable to the status 
quo are given preferred and privileged readings.198
 
 This dependency culture, in 
which the reporter relies more than he or she should on official sources and may 
therefore run short of critical analysis, will be examined in detail in this study.  
 
2.10. The debate over media influence and its perceived effect on public opinion 
 
Hammond makes a case that war and intervention since the Cold War have been 
driven by attempts on the part of Western leaders to recapture a sense of purpose 
and meaning.199 The Vietnam War, with all its negative images of being a “bloody, 
dirty and messy affair” led to what Konstantinidou describes as “perception 
management” in succeeding conflicts, including the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq 1991 
and Iraq 2003 campaigns.200 She looks at the two-fold nature of perception 
management which is founded on the exaltation of the technical supremacy of the 
West, identified with ideas of humanity and moral superiority in opposition to that of 
a dark, inhumane and morally inferior enemy – good versus evil.201
 
  
These differing points aside, Hammond does reflect that in the post-modern world 
from the 1990s onwards a more cooperative relationship developed between the 
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Western media and military compared with the overall pattern from Vietnam to the 
1991 Iraq War.202
 
 In this Review of Literature many primary and secondary sources 
– government, military, academic and media – have been examined in order to test 
this contention within the confines of the dissertation’s supplementary research 
questions.  
Arguably the media, in particular, have great ability to shape mass opinion through 
framing issues in particular ways, limiting certain types of information in their 
reporting on public affairs. Hiebert points out that in this era of globalisation with 
satellite TV and the Internet people are less likely to accept a government’s point of 
view because they have greater access to a larger variety of media. In referring to 
the Iraq 2003 War, he underlines that this was not only the case in his own country, 
USA, where more liberal views were challenging the Bush administration’s, 
especially though the internet, but also in Arab states where the coverage of Al-
Jazeera had a profound effect on Arab public opinion.203
 
 Moorcraft and Taylor, in 
their examination of the political impact of war reporting, underline this pointing out 
that although the BBC sent 200 of its people to the region, CNN fielded the same 
and the three major American networks of ABC, NBC and CBS sent some five 
hundred staff members to Kuwait, there were also the new regional media players 
in Al-Arabiya, Abu Dhabi TV and Al-Jazeera. 
Therefore, we come into the realm of what Best, Chmielewski and Krueger describe 
as “selective exposure”.204
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invading Iraq in 2003 turned to foreign news sources, diverging from the audience 
which supported the Bush policies and reporting of these policies in the media, 
accounts which conformed to their own political perceptions and other 
predispositions. Those opposed to the Bush policies, however, turned to foreign 
news sources since they had become psychologically uncomfortable with their own 
predispositions and turned to sources which more conformed to their own 
feelings.205  Vincent Campbell refers to a significant shift in the US media patterns 
post 9/11 with a move away from criticism of the American media for being hyper-
critical of government towards a “largely deferential, uncritical, conservative” 
treatment of national politics, particularly with regard to US foreign policy and the 
2003 war on Iraq.206 This policy is owner-driven, a policy dictated from a higher 
than editor level, such as the Murdoch-owned Fox empire.207
 
 
So, there can be a deliberate lack of journalistic objectivity at the owner/editor level 
which is planned and part of media group policy agenda supportive of a 
government stand and more subjective than objective. Yet there may be an 
unconscious barrier to objectivity at the lower, reporter, level for example the 2003 
concept of embedded reporters, that is to say media who lived, ate, slept and 
moved with UK and US units during the lead-up to the war and the war itself and 
became part of these units. The whole concept of embedded reporting is analysed 
in the chapter on the Iraq 2003 war to examine who benefited most from the 
arrangement – government or media - and quotes cases of embedded reporters 
who later reflected that journalistic objectivity may have been compromised. 
However, in looking at a whole range of literature on embedded reporting – much of 
it first hand from media who participated in the programme – it may be worth taking 
the view of John Donvan, one of the non-embedded or unilateral reporters. He 
questions the effect of the “embedded” arrangement on objectivity and on ethical 
grounds in that he felt embedded journalists fell in love with “the glitz and glamour 
and whiz-bang of embedded reporting” which puts so much emphasis on the action 
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that it led to the public forget they were seeing only a tiny slice of the war and not 
the war itself.208
 
 This point is also examined in the Iraq 2003 chapter through 
personal interviews, primary source accounts and other analysis. 
Since 1996 Nik Gowing has been a main programme anchor for BBC World 24 and 
his reports were also featured on BBC One and BBC New 24’s bulletins during the 
Iraq 2003 conflict. He refers to the “proliferation of images” which was broadcast in 
“instantaneous real time” in the 2003 war, often before the official machinery of 
government or the military structure even knew anything had happened.209
 
 This is a 
particularly interesting point which will raised into in this dissertation’s Iraq 2003 
chapter with reference to the “embedded journalist” process where the argument 
will be presented that “image”, that is to say real-time television pictures broadcast 
from the front line without any apparent military censorship, may have captured 
public perception to the detriment of journalistic analysis. The result may well have 
aided UK government media agenda building rather than promoting objective 
media analysis. 
In 1956, Eden did not have the proliferation of TV images to deal with but in his era, 
as Kyle notes in his book on the Suez affair, he was an avid scanner of the 
newspaper clippings and reacted to them (often in anger) to try and force them into 
supporting his own agenda.210
 
 
We now have decades of research, arguably often contradictory and inconclusive, 
that demonstrate how media influence mass opinion, but it is important to keep in 
mind that mass opinion can be swayed because it is – at base and in the main – 
unstable and superficial.211
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commercial gain, although there is an opposite view to this. Enzenberger 
speculates that with the development of the modern media (such as the internet, it 
could be proposed), for the first time in history the media make it possible for the 
participation of the masses with the practical means of expression being in the 
hands of the masses themselves.212 Baudrillard poses the question “Do the media 
neutralize meaning and produce informed or uninformed masses, or is it the 
masses that victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages 
that the media produce without responding to them?”213
 
 
Both Enzenberger and Baudrillard raise an intriguing point on this opposite view of 
mass media-mass opinion interaction, a point of view which is worth keeping in 
mind while concentrating on the government-media interface and interaction, which 
is the subject of this study. In this context, Hargreaves voices his consent and those 
of other concerned journalists when he writes that the greater concentration of 
corporate ownership of the news media is “cutting budgets and undermining 
journalistic integrity, giving advertisers and sponsors unwarranted influence over 
news agendas.214 Rupert Murdoch, with his massive international media interests, 
urges an increase in cross-media ownership since it increases investment and is, 
therefore, “a force for diversity”.215  By investment, he means profit and that could 
favour advertisers at the expense of editorial objectivity as happened at the launch 
of Murdoch’s Sky Television in 1989 when his own newspapers gave a 
disproportionate coverage to the launch, only the journalists on one of his 
newspapers – The Times – making a formal protest which, the same paper’s 
independent directors refused to investigate.216
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Roger Bolton also casts doubts about the integrity of media organizations whom he 
postulates may not report themselves as freely as they report other groups.217
 
  
Nevertheless, the idea that the mass media play a pivotal part in the nexus of 
power relations in society is by now largely accepted by most communications 
researchers, irrespective of theoretical differences.218 Entman and Herbst point out 
that activated public opinion provides a better and more productive target for 
agenda building. These are the opinions of engaged, informed and organized 
citizens – those who can be mobilised during campaign periods and between 
elections as well. Political science tells us who these citizens are: party loyalists, 
local community activists, interest group spokespersons, opinion leaders and others 
who play close attention to the political realm. Policymakers have long heeded 
activated public opinion because it is the public opinion that matters most often in 
day-to-day policy making.219 Unlike mass opinion which is most likely to be swayed 
by the mass media, highly-educated and engaged citizens are often most resistant 
to messages that run counter to their belief systems. It was this group, activated 
public opinion, which was the main target of the Clinton camp in the 1992 
Presidential election. Clinton was campaigning as an agent of change, an agenda 
which identified more closely with the registered voters since his campaign 
managers had recognized this and had highlighted the issues this group was 
concerned about – jobs, the economy and reforming health care. The campaign  
managers enjoyed success by issuing press releases to match the issue agenda of 
registered voters, winning the support of this activated public opinion group.220
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yet another episode of Arab defeat and humiliation.”221  This apparent lapse in UK 
agenda building will be reviewed in this dissertation’s empirical chapters, a lapse 
which is underlined by one of the UK Ministry of Defence’s press officers Lieutenant 
Commander Steve Tatham who claims that the campaign to win over the Arab 
media failed and that it never even got off the drawing board, a view examined in 





Agenda building, being the proactive tool that it is, does not ignore potential 
support, including latent public opinion, which can be reactivated after a policy 
debate has progressed. Entman and Herbst make the point that the most 
successful leaders are those who can use experience and political instinct to sense 
latent opinion – who understand the dynamics of public opinion beneath the 




Yet we must consider that agenda building by a government makes use of all areas 
of potential support, not exclusively through the media, although the media is a 
prime target to get over any policy initiatives and through the media to the various 
publics, for example in reactivating or mobilising latent public opinion. In an analysis 
of elite perceptions of public opinion Kull and Ramsay conclude that “most 
commonly, policy practitioners seemed to feel that they could get a sense of public 
attitudes by reading standard news reporting.” 224
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 That could be extended to 24-
hour TV reporting and from the 1991 Iraq War emerged the so-called CNN Effect in 
which the introduction of new technology such as satellite transmission brought a 
new immediacy to news coverage. New technologies appeared to reduce the 
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scope for calm deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to 
whatever issue journalists focused on.225 On the other hand as Savigny and 
Marsden note in a case study of the Iraq 2003 War we do not witness events 
directly but rely on different media forms to provide us with information about events 
as they took place in the fields of war.226 In this case, referring to journalists 
“embedded” with troops in the field (a concept which will be examined in detail in a 
later chapter) this compromised their ability to be objective and the televising of the 
war, fundamentally disconnecting the machinery of warfare from the bloody 
consequences of its use.227
 
 Both these examples are how the media can influence 
and shape reaction to the war, be it government or public. 
During the review of literature this study has looked at the dynamics of the 
relationships between the media and the government in both the conflicts examined 
and has tried to tease out the essential elements of media/government 
relationships which would be a guide and convincing evidence in validating the 
main research question on the respective UK governments’ approach towards 
agenda building in order to win media, and thus media-coverage influence on the 
UK public. Commenting on  a later conflict, the current one in Afghanistan, McNally 
refers to the fact that in this conflict the “failings of the Ministry of Defence” in terms 
lack of equipment support for the troops on the ground, such as helicopter support, 
can be credited to the media.228
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hopefully, a new insight into government agenda building in both conflicts and lay a 
path for future research into this field. 
 
Certainly there are vast differences in the media structure of the two periods being 
examined, as el-Nawawy and Powers expound when they write on the rise of 
mass-mediated conflict, remarking that the end of the 20th century witnessed 
dramatic changes in the structure, scope and depth of the media across the 
globe.229 The scope of the literature examined has taken this difference fully into 
account, examining each government’s attempts at constructing an agenda-building 
strategy within its own time framework, and further analysis will expand on this in 
the empirical chapters and in Conclusions. It can be argued that military assets 
alone now longer govern the outcome of international conflict with success or failure 
increasingly dependent on controlling the flow of information and the associated 
‘hearts and minds’ of a country’s people.230
 
 
It may follow then that for a government to build a successful agenda to win hearts 
and minds, does it have to convince the media and thus the public that the war is a 
‘just war’? In other words is it pursuing an ‘ethical foreign policy’? Again, in the 
literature review this aspect has been examined, as Bully expounds, no matter how 
“ethical” or “right” a foreign policy which results in military intervention is, it produces 
suffering and death.231
 
 With today’s instant media, suffering and death, such as the 
television pictures of the March 2011 tsunami in Japan, reach a worldwide 
audience, but in a conflict situation where there is a strong element of government 
control of the media the public access may be restricted to what the government of 
the day allows or persuades the media to release. The review of the relevant 
literature has examined this aspect and will expand on it in the empirical chapters 
and conclusions. 
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In the literature review there has been an intention to provide the background to 
and justification for the research carried out. There has also been an evaluation of 
primary and other research work, opinion, biographies and factual accounts in order 
to create a framework of questions which need to be challenged in order to justify 
the title of the dissertation and answer the research questions. From this body of 
research the intention here is to guide this study towards areas which are ripe for 
development and open to original research and thought in the hope that it can 
contribute original material to the field of government agenda building. 
 
As set out earlier in this Review of Literature, Schlesinger says that media sociology 
has largely focused on how media organizations have made use of sources of 
information, rather than looking at how the sources have used their power to define 
and manage the flow of information - in other words, how they set about building 
their own agenda in the media through the provision and supply of that information 
on which the media may come to over rely on.232
 
  
The aim of this study is not to refute or disparage in any way previous literature on 
agenda building from the media’s perspective. Instead, it aims to restore a balance 
in the research work by shifting the focus towards the area Schlesinger touches 
upon, that of the government agenda building through the use of the media.   
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This dissertation is a comparative case study split into two separate case studies 
with the linking theme being an examination of UK government media agenda-
building in time of conflict and attempted regime change. It will examine the media 
agenda-building actions of the UK governments in power during the Suez crisis of 
1956 and the Iraq war of  2003, focusing on government attempts to manage the 
media. The two conflicts have been picked since they both took place in the Middle 
East and both were military actions dedicated to regime change without the 
international sanction of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), 
differing from the Iraq War of 1991 which had a UNSCR issued and gave legality to 
military action.233
 
 There is also the opportunity to study and compare the media-
handling strategy, policy and actions in two eras where the media profiles were 
completely different, the UK in 1956 had only one BBC TV channel and a fledgling 
ITV, compared to the satellite age of 2003 and the multiplicity of worldwide 
channels.  
Each of these two separate cases is examined through methodological tools 
comprising: 
 
• Research of government or other archives (Detailed in the following Section 
3.3).  
• Examination of biographical, autobiographical and academic material on 
each of the conflicts. 
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• Interviews with government, military and media personnel involved in each 
of the conflicts, drawing on material gained through the above research 
• Assessment through comparing and analysing the results of the interviews, 
using the process of Triangulation (detailed in Section 3.4) which Burnham 
et al note is increasingly used as a methodology in policy-based studies 




Here is set down the methodology employed to analyse UK government media 
agenda building in the two conflicts – Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 – and to examine 
how the UK governments during those periods sought to win support through 
influencing the media and, through them, the people. This chapter will contrast the 
various methodologies considered and will explain the choice of a case-study 
methodology which, it is contended, is context-sensitive, objective and evidence-
led. 
 
In gathering information various methods have been employed: in-depth personal 
interviews with government officials and media involved in both the Iraq conflicts, 
archival research in the National Archives to examine declassified government 
documents, archival research in the Bodleian Library and other libraries to examine 
the memoirs, correspondence and diaries of politicians and military personnel 
involved in the Suez 1956 conflict; secondary analysis of books, memoirs and 
articles of media personnel, politicians and military figures involved in the Iraq 
conflict; and academic books and articles analysing the conflicts and commenting 
on the interaction between the media and UK government and military in time of 
conflict. More specifically, two UK governments’ attempts at agenda building were 
examined in order to analyse how they attempted to win media support for their 
political/military objectives in time of conflict and substantial internal dissention to 
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any military action and also to observe the media’s reaction to each government’s 
media-handling policy.  
 
In a case-study approach Rathbun recommends intensive, in-depth interviews 
which can help to establish motivations and preferences with people who have lived 
through the events being examined.235
 
 In addition what was used was a system of 
Triangulation in the analysis, seeking at least three confirmations to determine, for 
example, whether a statement from an interviewee could be seen as: 
• Subjective or objective, 
• Factual or alleged, 
• Truth or an opinion.236
 
  
Colleagues working in the same field may disagree with the findings and 
interpretive analysis, but can respect the methodology used, a methodology, which 
if replicated by them should, more or less, come up with the same raw data if not 
the same analytical conclusions. As Ma and Norwich state, the purpose of 
triangulation is to “increase the validity of a study by seeking the degree of 




3.2. Doing archival research 
 
This study has examined substantial primary source material, be it declassified 
records in the National Archives, Kew, or existing interviews with key personnel 
who took part in the Suez 1956 affair, held at the Kings College Library, London. 
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These Suez interviews were examined not only through transcripts, but also 
through listening to tape recordings of the interviews carried out by the authors of 
the Suez Oral History Project.238 Declassified material with regard to Iraq 2003 is, of 
course, unavailable under the 30-year rule and examination of declassified 
government records in 2033 are anxiously awaited by researchers. However 
access to government records was granted though the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office permission. In addition, through the Ministry of Defence, interview access 
was given to Civil Service and Army media handling staff who took part in both the 
Iraq 1991 and 2003 conflicts. Colleagues who follow this case study approach in 
the future when Iraq 2003 government records become available may record the 
changing status of the case selected here when new evidence appears giving new 
insights.239 Research, after all, is about discovery, not simply the verification or 
falsification of static hypotheses but a perfect research design cannot be 
constructed without a specific hypothesis.240
 
 
A three-case study may become a two-case study, which is exactly what happened 
in this dissertation.241
 
 Originally included in this dissertation’s research was a case 
study of the 1991 Iraq War but this was later rejected on the grounds that this 
conflict, unlike Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003, had a UNHCR mandate for military action 
and the military forces involved against Iraq included Arab nations as well as 
Western forces. 
In the two-case study research which remained great emphasis was placed on the 
examination of primary sources without excluding other texts such as academic 
biographies and analytical papers. Hopkin notes that qualitative research of a 
smaller number of cases is often regarded as a methodologically ‘soft’ option 
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inherently less rigorous than quantitative analysis.242 However, he contends that 
there is no a priori reason to regard case-orientated, qualitative-comparative 
research as methodologically ‘soft’, and indeed this approach can provide a far 
more rigorous and sophisticated response to some types of research questions. 
This case-study methodology sits well with this dissertation, it is proposed, since it 
involves precise examination of secondary and primary source material. In 
secondary texts such as academic biographies and analytical papers the 
knowledge gained is inevitably filtered through the interpretation of the author but 
researching primary source documents (such as government records held at the 
National Archives) enables one to step more directly into the past.243
 
 Other primary 
source documents examined include: 
• Books and articles written by journalists who have covered the two conflicts 
which are the subject of this study 
• Memoirs, diaries and personal correspondence of government officials and 
former Ministers held at a variety of academic locations including the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, University of Southampton and Kings College, 
University of London (a full list of sources is set out in the Bibliography).244
• Library sources, including the U.S. Presidential Libraries at Abilene (Dwight 
D. Eisenhower) and New York (Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
 
 
It should be noted here that the U.S. government policy often declassifies material 
before the 30-year limit which is UK government policy and cross-checking with US 
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sources on matters of mutual UK-USA foreign and intelligence policy can reveal 
information still held back on this side of the Atlantic. In the case of the UK, 
government-employed historians produced Documents on British Foreign Policy 
which may cover particular - and more important - issues in defence of the UK’s 
conduct of foreign policy. However, it must be borne in mind that these contain 
selected documents and the full set of official papers must be consulted at the 
National Archives where some may still be held back because of government 
secrecy restrictions.245 This is still the case with the Suez Crisis of 1956 where 
some documents are still classified “secret” and remain a “live study” and analysis 
and research elsewhere can only speculate what is contained.246  Rathbun notes 
that in all of the above areas examined a good scholar will read not only the 
qualitative work in his or her field, but also the quantitative, the latter being a source 
of hypotheses and an indication of what is yet to be explored.247
 
 
Johnson-Cartree and Copeland make the point that the flow and control of 
information is at the root of power and for that reason the management of 
information is a carefully-guarded domain within organisational structures and a 
heavily-analysed process.248
 
 At the National Archives records of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the special Suez Committee of selected Cabinet Ministers and 
military chiefs formed to head the policy with regard to Suez, the Cabinet Office, 
Ministry of Defence and other military groups such as the Chiefs of Staff were all 
examined. In each case the methodology employed involved cross-checking and 
confirming information which was noted down in the minutes of one, compared with 
the minutes of another as was also done with the autobiographies, personal papers 
and diaries of those government and military leaders who were involved in these 
events along with academic works of analysis. 
                                            
245 Young, John W., ‘Diplomatic Documents’, (in Catterall & Jones), p.10.  
246 Easton, Geoff, Learning from Case Studies (London: Prentice-Hall International, 1982), p.3. Also, 
historians can apply for access to still classified documents as has been done successfully for the 
Suez Crisis chapter in this dissertation. 
247 Rathbun, p.696. 
248 Johnson-Cartree and Copeland, p.183. 
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In dealing with UK government agenda-building there may be an overlapping of 
what can be described as media-handling by some, and what might be construed 
as propaganda by others. However, in terms of the use of propaganda, as well as 
intelligence and defence matters and the question of how a state defends its case 
and manipulates opinion in its favour, UK governments are selective about what 
they place in the National Archives, necessitating a search for other sources.249 
These sources can include the personal papers of a political figure since those 
relating to their private family lives can offer otherwise inaccessible insights into the 
hidden sides of public lives.250
 
 Nevertheless, these must be viewed with caution 
since political figures may be, several years after the events examined, selective in 
their memories therefore cross checking, triangulation, is a constant need for the 
researcher. 
Such documentary sources, as outlined above, are the raw material of the historian 
whose interpretation of the past is conducted through a careful sifting of many 
documents of varying kinds.251  In perusing such documentation, analysing and 
comparing, questions were prepared for the primary source interviews planned. At 
this stage the evidence gathered was not taken at face value since each piece of 
evidence needed to be judged critically and dispassionately.252
 
 
As a final point on this section, when examining official documents at the National 
Archives, the absence of items from a political agenda can reveal a lot about the 
distribution of power in society. A truly adequate account of decision-making should 
take into account “non-decision making”. Continuity is as important as shifts of 
policy.253
                                            
249 Young, p.12. 
 Similarly, looking at the seniority of government and military personnel 
attending a meeting normally attended by more junior officials, then examining the 
minutes of the meeting which do not seem to merit the more senior attendance, one 
250 Brivati, Brian, ‘Private Papers’, (in Catterall & Jones), p.20. 
251 Jones, p.5. 
252 Ibid, p.6. 
253 Greenaway, J., Smith, S., & Street, J., Deciding Factors in British Politics: A case-studies 
approach (London: Routledge, 1992), p.12. 
 78 
can extrapolate that some content has been held back on “national security” 
grounds. This gives a clue to look elsewhere for the missing content – the personal 
papers, diaries and letters of those who attended the meeting in question.254
 
 
Burnham et al underline the great opportunities for political scientists to develop 
novel accounts and interpretations of significant events through the examination of 
archival sources and the workings of the state as revealed in these sources but 
add, as a caveat, that other sources of information may usefully compliment this 
approach and detail the limitations of documentary records.255
 
  
3.3. Towards a case study approach 
 
On the subject of multiple methods, in employing a methodology which was best 
suited to this research several schools were reviewed, including Positivism, 
Interpretivism, Pluralism and Case Studies. It is not proposed to go through each in 
detail here but this study will concentrate on what can be seen as a way of working 
which produces and validates the data unearthed. For that a system was needed 
which was flexible enough to cope with the three main disciplinary themes being 
dealt with – media, politics and contemporary history – and which would be 
evidence-led. Therefore, what was adopted was a means of data collection from 
the various disciplines through a methodology involved the examination of official 
records, evaluation with empirical evidence and semi-structured one-to-one 
interviews. Much use was made of the JSTOR database since political science is 
increasingly making use of databases that are available on the internet.256
                                            
254 Campbell, J.T., Failures in Foreign Office intelligence gathering, assessment and analysis: Tito-
Stalin split 1948 (MA dissertation, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2002). 
  Case 
study research is richly descriptive because it is grounded in deep and varied 
sources of information employing quotes from key participants, anecdotes and 
255 Burnham et al, p.208 
256 Box-Steffensmeier et al, Political Science Methodology in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Science, p.16  
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narratives composed from original and primary source interviews.257 It involves 
collecting and analysing information from multiple sources and, in addition creates 
opportunities for the researcher to explore additional questions through the act of 
investigating a topic in detail through using multiple sources of information.258
 
 
Research for this dissertation employed the same principles as investigating the 
natural world with only admissible evidence as “facts” through personal observation 
which Deacon et al regard as “over-simplified”.259  Yet in the methodology “facts” 
were interpreted as “information” which has to be sifted and analysed with the idea 
that the more sources consulted the more likely it is that omissions will show up and 
that discrepancies in dates, times, places and the people involved can be 
resolved.260 As Ellis and Bochner state: “The major way in which we detect 
distortion and correct for it, is by comparing an informant’s account with the 
accounts given by other informants.”261 Brannen makes a broad spectrum 
contention in comparing qualitative and quantitative approaches to research, often 
seen as fundamentally different paradigms but in the practical evaluation of policy in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, and increasingly in Europe,   there is a 
whole industry devoted to the utilisation of both methods.262 However researchers 
in comparative politics and related fields, such as in this study, often seek to identify 
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This study, therefore, takes the above points as the foundation for a good working 
case-study template, drawing from several research traditions in terms of reflexivity.  
Hamel et al reflect that the case study has been roundly criticised for its reliance on 
common sense. However, no such complaints were made about the fact that the 
set of empirical materials from which all such sociological studies proceed include, 
to various extents, meanings social actors assign to their own social 
experiences.264 These “meanings” have been extracted in the one-to-one 
interviews carried out but they should also emerge in autobiographical accounts 
and other written material researched.265  Rathbun observes that in the case study 
methodology the examination of archives and memoirs might provide some insight 
into these factors, such as how key individuals were thinking about events and their 
motivation, but interviewing is unique in that it allows the interviewer to ask the 
questions that he or she wants answered. Memoirs and secondary accounts would 
be more indirectly established than in interviewing.266
 
 
Certainly in terms of the one-to-one interviews carried out for this dissertation, both 
the ones carried out by the author for the Iraq 2003 chapter, and those recorded for 
the Suez Oral History Project, these interviews preserve the perspective of the 
individual in order to capture and preserve their spoken judgements and 
recollections.267 The interviews were supplemented by news reports, official 
documents, personal writings and literary works since a case study considers 
materials of different origins.268 Burnham et al stress that reflection on method is 
one of the hallmarks of the discipline separating the academic study of politics from 
political journalism and that method is intrinsically linked to research findings such 
as interviews, analysis of documents and archives.269
 
 
                                            
264 Hamel, J., Dufour, S., & Fortin, D., Case Study Methods (London: Sage, 1993), p.31. 
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As with Hamel, Yin defends the case study and criticises its “stereotype” as a weak 
sibling among social science methods, although he warns that case study methods 
will be challenged from “rational (and irrational) perspectives” and that the insights 
gained from case studies may be underappreciated.270 It can only be stressed that 
this study is not employing a purely social science methodology but, as outlined 
above, a case study model more suited to an interdisciplinary project. Yin remarks 
that there is a striking paradox in that if a case study method has serious 
weaknesses, why do investigators continue to use it, including many distinguished 




In the selected case studies, Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003, it is intended to make a 
comparative study of cases which are as different as possible in terms of the 
independent variables – the limited media in 1956 compared to the more electronic 
media in 2003, the different governments (Conservative 1956 and Labour 2003), a 
still UK colonial power in 1956 and a no-longer world dominant country in 2003. 
However, the commonality of the cases examined is the dependent or “intervening” 
variable, that of a government attempting to win media support and, hopefully public 
support, for attempted regime change. The case study methodology here means 
that any observed differences between the cases with respect to the dependent 
variable can be associated with the only variable or variables that makes the cases 
different: the independent variable.272
 
 
3.4. The use of personal experience by a researcher 
 
A researcher who is not able to stand back from the specialist knowledge s/he has 
acquired, and whose perspective becomes indistinguishable from that of the host 
culture, may face analytical problems.273
                                            
270 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2003), p.xiii. 
 Yet, there is surely an advantage in being 
271 Ibid 
272 Burnham et al, p.75. 
273 Coffey, Amanda (1999), The Ethnographic Self (London: Sage, 1999), p.23. 
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totally familiar with the host culture/cultures; in the case of this dissertation the host 
cultures being examined are government information handling, involving both 
military and Civil Service personnel, and the media that this government information 
machine are trying to influence.  
 
In the carrying out of productive fieldwork interviews, familiarity with the different 
systems – government and media – can aid the one-to-one interactions and 
relationships developed in the interviews. Coffey remarks that it is impossible to 
undertake fieldwork without entering into the interactions with significant others. 
Moreover, she observes that it is wrong to assume that the input and output of 
these interactions will be one-way. We should not even think about undertaking 




Inside knowledge of both government information handling and journalistic practice 
gives one a distinct advantage in the conduct of such one-to-one interviews. 
Indeed, Mykhalovskiy argues that personal experience present in the text can be a 
source of insightful analysis and that autobiographical writing reacts against the 
insularity of intellectual, academic or disciplinary writing.275 An author’s personal 
experience within the text is a useful tool in extracting primary source material 
during fieldwork interviews, and also in challenging published accounts or analysis 
where not only personal experience rejects the accuracy of such accounts, but 
such rejection is confirmed through triangulation, a concept raised in the 
Introduction and to be outlined in greater detail in the next section. Rubin makes the 
point that interviewees are more likely to commit sins of omission rather than 
commission, avoiding deliberate falsehoods and attempting to steer the 
conversation to other aspects of the subject.276
                                            
274 Hammersley, p.133. 
 “Inside knowledge” of the field being 
investigated in an interview, and the intensive research carried out before the 
275 Mykhalovskiy, E. (1997) ‘Reconsidering “table talk”: critical thoughts on the relationship between 
sociology, autobiography and self indulgence’, in R. Herz (ed), Reflexivity and voice. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage), p.133. 
276 Rubin, p.694. 
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interview stage – memoirs, archives, secondary source analysis -  it is suggested, 
can help detect any omission and steer the interview in the direction of extracting 
primary source material. 
 
3.5 Interdisciplinary model and triangulation 
 
Green postulates that in this type of research questions will be raised about the role 
of the media in the processes of social conflict and historical change, 
metacommunication promoting a critical awareness of the ends of mass 
communication in society.277
 
 This study, of course, is mainly government-orientated 
in terms of media agenda building, but reflexivity is key to extracting opinions on the 
success or otherwise of this agenda building by examining and re-examining the 
data collected, particularly in terms of what material emerges from the primary 
source one-to-one interviews. Material from initial interviews certainly provided 
questions for those following later and these questions may have prompted 
different answers in an interview than those given by the same subject in previous 
autobiographical or other written material. “Insider” knowledge of the field not only 
helps one frame the questions in advance of the interview but also to change or 
adapt questions in the interview itself without reference to a written brief taking into 
account the following points as safeguards and cross checking data: 
• Do we have the complete picture? 
• Can we follow the actual sequence of how data was collected, processed 
and displayed for specific conclusion drawing? 
• Is there a record of the study’s methods and procedures detailed enough to 
be followed as an “audit trail”? 
                                            
277 Green Michael, ‘Media, education and communities’, in Jensen & Jankowski, p.225. 
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• Has the researcher been explicit and as self-aware as possible about 
personal assumptions, values and biases, affective states – and how they 
may have come into play during the study?278
• Were competing hypotheses or rival conclusions really considered and do 





Consideration of reflexivity was therefore important for this study’s research, in 
terms of being aware of the ways in which the products of research are affected by 
the personnel and the process of actually doing that research.  This reflexivity and 
interaction at fieldwork interview level is key to the study’s methodology. 
 
The one-to-one interview structure employed in this case-sturdy research is 
described in Section 3.6. These interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 
format which is more conducive to extracting qualitative information. Key to this is 
the process of triangulation in order to compare omissions and biases in the varying 
accounts – oral, autobiographical, biographical or historical analysis - in order to 
build up the most accurate account possible, resolving any contradictions in dates, 
times, places and intent.280 Savigny and Marsden also propose that reflexivity is a 
key component in analysis in political science research since politics is broadly 
defined and characterised by “grey areas” and multiple comparisons of 
data/information are essential.281 Here, multiple data-collection methods may be 
used as a check on observational findings.282
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interview formula in 27 interviews with working journalists conducted in Australia 
between 2002-2004 as part of an examination into the workings of defamation law. 
He selected his subjects because of their extensive experience, knowledge and 
roles as senior editorial staff and journalists and the main focus of the interviews 
was on the participants’ perceptions and experiences of the impact of defamation 
law on news production.283 Similarly, in the semi-structured interviews carried out 
for this dissertation, the interviewees selected were journalists mainly experienced 
in the coverage of war and government and military press officers with in-depth 
experience of media handling. Nevertheless in analysing the data collected from 
interviews there was a need to be constantly aware of the necessity of examining 
and re-examine the data collected in order that objectivity was retained in the 
analysis. Interviewees may unconsciously change their perceptions on past events 
through the passage of time and these perceptions must be cross-checked against 
written records, archival material where available and material from other 
interviewees.284 On this theme, Bentley reflects that identity, orality and memory 
each evolve essence over time and lay down strata rather like a geological 
formation in which a world of ‘before’ and ‘after’ leaves its trace.285 It is these 
“traces”, changing opinions, words, reflections and views, expressed orally or in 
writing and separated by time, which have been analysed in this study, compared 
and contrasted in the way a geologist would in order to gain accurate data. Again, 
this cross checking of data from the different streams of research can help to detect 
missing data, a common problem in political science.286
 
 
Just as a surveyor takes measurements from a number of vantage points to fix the 
“true” position of a particular point on the ground, so researchers check the full 
range of available sources to build up the most accurate and comprehensive 
account possible. The idea is that the more sources consulted the more likely it is 
that omissions will show up and that discrepancies in dates, times, places and the 
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people involved can be resolved.287 Triangulation enables analysis which is both 
more complex and meaningful; this approach is seen as relevant to the area of 
study where government sources are trying to influence media sources (and vice 
versa) and both can come up with a diametrically opposed interpretation on the 
same set of facts – dissonant data. This contradictory information may seem to be 
a barrier to coherent analysis, but both Perlesz and Lindsay stress that instead of 
fearing or discounting such data, the data can actually provide fertile ground for 
analysis.288 Indeed such information can, as will be demonstrated in the analytical 
section in terms of embedded journalists in the Iraq 2003 War289. Some journalists 
saw this as exciting broadcasting, while others viewed it as collusion with the 
military which produced “action entertainment” at the expense of proper analysis 
and questioning of military and political motive.290
 
  
Here dissonance reveals fruitful new ground for further analysis and opens up the 
way to new theoretical insights not only through a triangulation of data, but through 
methodological triangulation, a research strategy in which different methods are 
employed for data gathering and analysis around a single object of study.291 In the 
case of this study, the single object is the examination of UK government media 
policy and the multiple methods employed for data gathering – examination of 
existing oral history records, analysis of biographical, autobiographical, historical 
and political literature and one-to-one primary source interviews – all of which may 
help uncover “unexpected dimensions of the area of enquiry”.292
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The analysis of biographical and autobiographical accounts, written and oral 
accounts from media and government sources involved in the two conflicts being 
studied, form a substantial part of this study’s research. Bentley points out the 
potential of oral history in terms of memory, language and narrative in fields such as 
international relations or diplomatic history.293
 
  
3.6. The conduct of interviews 
 
In terms of primary sources from the media one-to-one interviews were carried out 
with journalists and military and government staff who took part in both the Iraq 
Wars, following up various autobiographical sources from the media which provided 
material which could then be investigated further during the one-to-one fieldwork 
interview process.  
 
It is worth noting that some of the interviewees had experience in more than one of 
the fields being examined – history, media, military and government – which made 
them of possible greater interview potential and data production, which is why they 
were chosen. For example: 
 
• Lieutenant Commander Steve Tatham, media adviser to British forces in 
Iraq 2003, but also an author and speaker on Middle East affairs 
• Mark Laity – former BBC Defence Correspondent and now Head of 
Communications at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Mons, 
Belgium. 
• Colonel David McDine, a former journalist, a civilian spokesman for the 
Ministry of Defence and a Territorial Army press officer. 
 
In addition journalists who had covered the Iraq 2003 War were interviewed, 
drawing on their own reporting of the war through books and articles published by 
them post-war in order to research what approaches they took to reporting, how 
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they reacted with the military and Ministry of Defence media relations officers and if 
they felt that they were free to report objectively and without censorship. This 
invaluable research enabled the framing of questions to be asked in the face-to-
face interviews. The four BBC journalists interviewed were Jeremy Bowen, 
currently the BBC’s Middle East Editor, Carolyn Wyatt, BBC Defence Editor, 
Richard Sambrook, Director of News and Current Affairs during the Iraq 2003 
conflict and Ben Brown, an experienced war correspondent who had, with Bowen 
covered the first Iraq War in 1991. Both Bowen and Brown had faced the 
censorship imposed in Iraq 1991 in which media were not allowed up in the front 
line and only taken on escorted trips to units away from front-line action, causing 
much media resentment.294 Action footage was provided by military media teams 
under the direction of Colonel David McDine, a former journalist, Ministry of 
Defence media relations officer and a member of the Territorial Army Media 
Operations Group [(MOG(V)] based at the Allied Press and Information Centre 
(APIC) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and away from the Kuwaiti border. The choice of 
these journalists, all of whom needed military approval to get a Saudi visa to enter 
the country, was to either stay in the military briefing centre in various hotels where 
skilled officers made announcements on matters they wanted the people to know 
and then fielded awkward questions on matters they preferred to keep secret, or 
pack up and go home.295
 
 It was this “censorship” and the comparisons with the 
embedded reporting system in Iraq 2003, when media were allowed up in the front 
line where the action was, which enabled the framing of questions to be asked, for 
example: 
• Did you see the embedded reporter system as an improvement on the 1991 
Iraq war “censorship”? 
• Did you believe you had the freedom to report objectively? 
• Were you aware of any hidden government agenda to manipulate your 
reporting? 
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Similarly the same questions were asked of the military and NATO media relations 
staff - Colonel Paul Brook (who helped design the media-handling strategy for the 
Iraq 2003 conflict), Lieutenant-Colonel Angus Taverner, Lieutenant Commander 
Steve Tatham and Mark Laity, seeking to tease out any hidden government and 
military agenda in their media handling policy. The result of these interviews is set 
out in the Iraq 2003 empirical chapter and the Conclusions chapter. 
 
Certainly answers to these concrete questions, such as the temporal sequence of 
particular actions, are often useful in reconstructing events but follow up questions 
may allow the interviewee to reflect more abstractly about the underlying causes 
and motivation behind his actions (or those of others involved in the events being 
examined).296
 
 In addition, contemporary newspaper or other media accounts or 
archives can often provide the facts about what happened on a particular day and 
provide the material for framing additional interview questions. 
In terms of interviews, Mykhalovskiy remarks that it is impossible to undertake 
fieldwork without entering into the interactions with significant others. Moreover, it is 
wrong to assume that the input and output of these interactions will be one-way. 
We should not even think about undertaking qualitative fieldwork without being 
prepared to become part of the interactions of the setting.297 This is a point also 
picked up by Davies in that all researchers are to some degree connected to, and 
part of, the object of their research and depending on the extent and nature of these 
connections; questions arise as to whether the results of the research are artefacts 
of the researcher’s presence and inevitable influence on the research process.298
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  It 
again is a matter of being objective and of cross-checking on detail, contention and 
recollection of events which may have been altered by time, or conscious or 
unconscious reflection in the mind of an interviewee seeking to establish a place in 
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history.  Atkinson et al refer to people justifying the legitimate past by explaining 
their actions at a later time.299  Johnson-Cartee and Copeland note that face-to-




In most cases fieldwork becomes reliant upon one-to-one interactions and relations 
and these relationships do not just happen. Productive relationships in term of 
extracting quality material from an interviewee are certainly the outcome of advance 
negotiation between the researcher and the actors in the field in order to set out the 
ground rules. Qualitative research is by its very nature interpersonal and intimate. 
Fieldwork relies upon the establishing and building of relationships with significant 
others in the field. It is these relationships which give research its intensity, its 
quality and insight into the everyday social world.301
 
 
In advance of each interview each interviewee was sent the current draft of the 
empirical chapter which was to be the subject of the interview. This gave them the 
opportunity to prepare for the interview, but also it had the advantage of putting 
them at their ease. The most common method in journalistic interviewing, the semi-
structured one, was used, albeit with the firm foundation of the extensive research 
leading up to the interview. The method involves: 
 
• Research work on the subject of the interview including reading newspaper 
cuttings on him/her, articles or books written by him/her; 
• Material written by others on the subject of the interview, which will often 
take the opposing view to the interviewee, in order to prompt a response 
which can open up new and fruitful areas of discussion on the subject, which 
had not perhaps previously emerged in preliminary research work; 
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• Seeking verification through triangulation of contentions which had emerged 
from previous research work and interviews.302
 
 
It was agreed that all interviews were “on the record” but each interviewee would 
have the opportunity to amend their remarks when sent the written text of the 
interview. Burnham et al refer to a technique particularly used by political scientists, 
elite interviewing in which researchers need to decide who they are going to see, 
how they are going to access their interview targets, the best way to conduct an 
interview and how they should analyse the results.303 The semi-structured 
interview, as outlined above, takes these points into account abandons concern 
with standardisation and control and seeks to promote an active, open-ended 
dialogue.304 In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer controls the discussion by 
referring to an interview guide that sets out the issues to be covered during the 
exchange - conversations with a purpose - but within that conversation is free to 
react to what the interviewee is saying and, sometimes, nudge him or her 
unwittingly on to a line of response which may not, in fact be included in the original 
agreed terms of reference for the interview.305 Reflexivity is crucial in this type of 
interview; a more structured interview style could distort the evidence in that the 
construction and selection of the questions lead to the failure to ask follow-up 
questions which can extract additional information.306 Crucial, too, is the process of 
building a harmonious relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee, 
creating a basic sense of trust that allows a free flow of information and indeed, 
from both points of view positive feelings and enjoyment about the process.307
                                            
302 “The major way in which we detect distortion and correct for it, is by comparing an informant’s 
account with the accounts given by other informants”, Dean, J.F., & Whyte, W.F., ‘How Do You 
Know if the Informant is Telling the Truth?’ Human Organisation (vol. 17 date), p.111. 
 
Rathbun makes the point that archives or memoirs may provide some insight into 
303 Burnham et al, p.231. 
304 Deacon et al, p.65. 
305 Ibid, p.65. 
306 Catterall, Peter, ‘Oral History’, in Catterall, Peter & Jones, Harriet (eds) Understanding Documents 
and Sources (Oxford, Heinemann, 1994), p.26. 
307 Spradley, James P., The Ethnographic Interview (USA: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1979), 
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the events being examined but interviewing is unique in that it allows the interviewer 
to ask the questions he or she wants answered.308
 
 
Wilson notes that face-to-face interviews in a free format are conducted, 
approximately, like natural conversations between two people. They are often 
tape-recorded in full for later analysis; although the interviewer may take 
continuous and contemporaneous notes, this is difficult to do while concentrating 
on the management of the interview. Note-taking can also be more obtrusive 
than tape recording, while the use of recording technology is no barrier to 
qualitative research if supported by traditional data sources (already mentioned in 
the penultimate paragraph of Section 2).309 Although ‘naturalistic’, interviews 
such as these are managed to a large extent by the interviewer, who sets the 
agenda of questions, probes more deeply into issues of interest with 
supplementary questions and records the answers and the discussion.310 This 
data collection via an “unstructured” interview, naturalistic in its approach, is not 
as unstructured as it seems despite the superficial appearances. Semi-structured 
interviews minimalise procedural activity and allow the freer exploitation of 
respondents’ meanings and beliefs.311
 
 Personal reactivity comes into this method 
much more than it does with a highly structured interview, so there is a trade-off 
and attention must be paid to the objectives of the research and evaluated in this 
light. 
Coffey remarks that it is difficult to conceive of effective fieldwork without paying 
attention to the relationships and interactions that help to characterise it. She adds 
that we cannot escape the necessity of developing rapport and a level of intimacy 
during the pursuit of prolonged fieldwork.312
                                            
308 Rathbun, p.691 
 To this end, eye contact in an interview 
309 Miles & Huberman,p.5. 
310   Wilson, M. ‘Asking Questions,’ in Data Collection and Analysis, Sapsford, R. & Jupp, V. (eds), 
(London: Sage, 1996) pp.94-95.. 
311 Ibid, p.119. 
312 Coffey, p.39. Also Spradley, p.79. Spradley refers to the rapport process as proceeding through 
the following stages – apprehension, exploration, rapport, cooperation and participation. My 
methodology cuts out the first two since I had already talked to the interviewees, they had already 
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is important to convey messages of agreement, sympathy, interest and the 
requisite human emotions to encourage the subject to reveal more relevant data. 
For this reason in the research for the Iraq Chapter in this dissertation primary 
source interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed, using the same 
methodology used by Lucas and Gorst in their primary source interviews for the 
Suez Oral History Project, primary source material drawn on for the purpose of the 
Suez Chapter. On a technical point the Iraq chapter interviews were digitally 
recorded. 
 
There is no methodological need for us to “believe” narrative accounts such as 
those derived from interviews, any more than we are enjoined to reject them out of 
hand. Equally, there is no methodological justification to believe in narrative as a 
form in itself. We are not justified in identifying narratives as providing privileged 
kinds of insight and what is at stake is the proper analytic stance to be adopted 
toward them.313 That analytic stance comes after the interview stage when we can 
triangulate with other interview material or written primary or secondary sources for 
validation purposes. Vromen makes the essential point on this type of qualitative 
research that the researcher must approach it with empathic neutrality since, as 
most qualitative researchers believe complete objectivity is impossible and the 
researcher’s agenda should be to understand the complex field being researched, 
while also attempting to be non-judgemental.314
 
 
Burnham et al make the observation that there is not, in the study of politics, a very 
large literature on elite interviewing and guidance on how it should be carried out 
and that the key guideline must not be to base any piece of work entirely on elite 
interviewing, this being consistent with the principle of triangulation which entails 
                                                                                                                                  
seen the draft chapter on the conflict about which they are being interviewed and had freely offered 
their cooperation. In most of the cases I have previously worked with the interviewees and the 
rapport had already been built up. 
313 Ibid, p.140. 
314 Vromen, Ariadne, ‘Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches’, in Marsh & Stoker. 
P.256 
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using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena.315
 
 
Hopefully the methodology used in this study may have made some contribution to 
the use of elite interviewing in future academic research. 
3.7. Summary 
 
The case-study methodology used in this study was one designed to cope with the 
three main fields being examined – media, politics and contemporary history - in 
order to produce a qualitative data-gathering system which was flexible, objective, 
qualitative and evidence-led. Case studies were created and composed of data 
gathered through archival research, examination of autobiographical, biographical 
and academic material, one-to-one interviews, all subject to final analysis. 
 
Triangulation was employed as a key method of data collection and analysis. 
Interviews (elite interviews) were conducted with named media, military and 
government personnel on a one-to-one basis and were semi-structured in format, 
again to encourage more reflexivity and interaction. Preparatory research – 
government archives, autobiographical, biographical, works of academic analysis, 
private papers - gave material for each interview as well as providing comparative 
data in their own right. Earlier interviews provided additional material for those later 
in sequence and for further research work taking in newly-published material for 
which there had been already set up a key-word search pro forma in over 80 
academic electronic databases, covering publications in relevant fields including, 
history, media communications, political science, sociology, Middle East affairs and 
defence studies. This search pattern dropped the references into an email box on a 
daily basis to allow the monitoring and investigation of new publications. 
 
The challenge of this methodology as defined was to compare two different 
historical periods but to contribute an original focus on existing research and to 
complement that research. The challenges were to: 
                                            
315 Burnham et al, p.232. 
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• Compare the media profile in 1956, with mainly one BBC TV channel, with 
that of the more instant media multi-channel TV approach of 2003 
• Compare the printed media of 1956, with that of 2003 when the Murdoch 
empire crossed the boundaries of written and electronic media 
• Compare the approaches of the Eden and Blair governments on how they 
attempted to agenda build and to win media support for government policy 
and to retain that support 
• Build on existing academic research and make an original contribution to 
enhance existing academic analytical literature. 
 
Governments constantly seek to influence media, and through them their 
readership/listenership/viewership in order to win support for government policy and 
the government agenda. McCombs make the observation that the influence of the 
mass media on their public (the same public the government is trying to influence) 
comes from the news stories and the advertising content of the mass media.316
 
  
The study here seeks to show the differences between Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 
and to give a new insight into how Iraq 2003 was more successful in winning 
media, and public, support, for the government agenda. It seeks to determine that 
the Blair government may have learned from past government agenda building 
such as Suez 1956, in order to build up support for its agenda during a period 
leading up to regime change and the regime change itself with the key point being 
that the media in the main bought into the UK government agenda at the time 
without realising that they were being manipulated. 
 
It is hoped to demonstrate the proof of this, or at least leave an audit trail for future 
historians and political scientists, which will confirm this dissertation’s firm 
contention that this manipulation by the Blair government was planned and simply 
did not happen by accident.  When more evidence is available, particularly from 
                                            
316 McCoombs, p.77. 
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declassified government documentation to be deposited at the National Archive in 































4. The Suez Crisis 1956 
 
4.1. Background to the invasion of the Suez Canal Zone   
 
This chapter is the first of two case studies in which the research question, stated 
here is examined: 
 
How did the UK government plan its agenda-building strategy in order to attempt to 
win the support of the media in two conflicts – Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003? 
 
The case studies involved are the conflicts of Suez 1956 and Iraq 2003 and in 
examining each this study will make a comparative analysis of the UK 
government’s media agenda building strategy and policy in order to come to 
conclusions through examination of primary and secondary source material.  
 
Turning to the first case study, Suez 1956, it is hard to realise in 2009 how much of 
a threat figure the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser appeared to many 
Western, and especially British eyes. The Suez Canal, opened in 1869, became a 
key route to and from British India and, taking advantage of Egypt’s near 
bankruptcy in its drive for modernisation, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli 
bailed the country out by buying Egypt’s shares in the Canal in November 1885, 
taking over the controlling interest.317 William Gladstone, then out of office, 
described Disraeli’s action as “a showy and dangerous example of forward 
diplomacy, carrying in its train over-extended future entanglement”.318  This soon 
proved true bringing rising nationalism in Egypt, resentment of Britain’s growing 
intervention in Egyptian affairs and the increasing internal financial problems 
(shortages and arrears of pay in the public services and heavy taxation).319
                                            
317 Khedive Ismail, the ruler of Egypt, was in deep financial trouble and sold his 44 per cent holding 
for £4m, borrowed by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli from the bankers Rothschild to avoid going to 
Parliament where he would have encountered opposition. [Turner, Barry, Suez 1956: The Inside 
Story of the First Oil War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006), p.24.] 
 These 
318 Jenkins, Roy Gladstone (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.502. 
319 P Woodward, Nasser ( Harlow, Essex 1992).  
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factors led Egypt’s Minister of War Arabi Pasha to organise a nationalist revolt in 
1882, seizing Alexandria and endangering free passage of the Suez Canal.320
 
  The 
revolt was put down by a British force under General Sir Garnet Wolseley. 
Under the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, it was agreed that the Canal 
“shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of 
commerce or war, without distinction of flag.”321  With the proclamation of a British 
protectorate in December 1914, the United Kingdom assumed all powers conferred 
on Turkey by the Convention and in 1936 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance 
authorised the British Government to station forces on Egyptian territory. The British 
military base which spread over the Canal Zone was the largest in the world at the 
time, comprising 11 air bases and 16 army camps. However, in October 1951 the 
Egyptian Parliament rejected the Treaty of 1936 which allowed those bases and in 
October 1954 the UK signed an agreement with Egypt to withdraw all British troops 
from Egypt within 18 months.322 Come the Suez Crisis and Nasser’s nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal in July 1956, it was hard for the British Government to change a 
policy which had gone back almost 80 years. After exercising power for so long at 
all levels of Egyptian life the British community there could see no reasons to 
change its ways.323 Neither could the British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden who 
believed that Egyptians lacked the skill to run the Canal properly.324
 
 
In a debate in the House of Commons on 27 July 1956, Prime Minister Eden said: 
“The unilateral decision of the Egyptian Government to expropriate the Suez Canal 
Company, without notice and in breach of the Concession Agreements, affects the 
rights and interests of many nations. Her Majesty's Government are consulting 
other Governments immediately concerned, with regard to the serious situation 
                                            
320 J Pollock, Kitchener: The Road to Omdurman (London, 1998), p.49. 
321 Mathews, R.O., ‘The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in Peaceful Settlement’, International 
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thus created. The consultations will cover both the effect of this arbitrary action 




The events surrounding the Suez Crisis of 1956 could be perceived as marking the 
death of the old imperialist order as represented by the colonial powers of Britain 
and France. Both were still economically weakened by two world wars; both had 
suffered shrinking colonial empires and both had been eclipsed in terms of world 
power and influence by the United States of America which used a more “informal 




More than 56 years later the Suez fiasco of 1956 still leaves a deep scar on the 
British political psyche, and has been described as “the greatest professional 
trauma faced by the British Civil Service before or since 1957”.327 Indeed, as 
Ashton also remarks, the Suez events seem to have left a far deeper mark on 
ourselves than on the Arabs.328 The Egyptian leader, Colonel Nasser, who had led 
a coup in 1952 to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy, aspired to a free and 
independent republican Egypt with full control of the Suez Canal which was, at the 
time of his coup, still in the hands and military control of the United Kingdom. His 
book The Philosophy of the Revolution also spread his Arab nationalism philosophy 
to the rest of the Middle East and to Muslims beyond “enabling them and their 
brothers in faith to wield power wisely and without limit”.329
 
 
Britain, with a 40 per cent share in the Suez Canal and with her vital oil supplies 
                                            
325 Hansard, House of Commons Debate 27 July 1956 vol 557 cc777-80, p.777 
326 Landes, D. S., ‘Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism’, Journal of Economic 
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travelling though that narrow maritime jugular, was the Canal’s largest user, 
owning one-third of the ships that passed through it in 1955 and regarding 
freedom of passage through the Canal as her right.330 The intervention which led 
to the October 1956 Franco-British-Israeli invasion of the Canal Zone, and the 
strategy which underpinned it, lay in the perception of Colonel Nasser as Britain’s 
principal enemy in that vital region. Nasser was well aware of the effects on the 
West of cutting off oil, when, in his book he noted that whereas the average 
output of an American oil well per day was 11 barrels, the average in the Arab 
regions was 4,000 barrels, a potent economic weapon.331  Nasser consistently 
used the phrase “Arab oil for the Arabs” in his speeches meaning that the oil 




The double economic and political threat of a possible adversary controlling the 
Suez Canal and the transport of essential oil from the Middle East oilfields, plus 
Nasser having his own international agenda in Middle East spheres of influence 
regarded as previously British and French, could not be ignored by the old 
colonial imperialist powers. Nor could they be ignored by Israel since Nasser’s 
opposition to the new Israeli state was clearly on record. He had described 
Israel’s creation as a “result of imperialism”, maintaining that if Palestine had not 
been under the British mandate Zionism would never have been able to muster 
enough support to realise a national home there.333
 
  
France, in common with the United Kingdom, was still economically weakened by 
the effects of the Second World War. At the same time she was facing severe 
internal pressure in her empire from the independence movement in Algeria and 
saw danger to her own interests in a powerful Arab nationalist movement based 
in Egypt. This was a threat to France’s own directly controlled colonies and the 
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political domination over them which France exercised.334  Nasser’s pan-Arab 
policy led him into supporting the Algerian independence movement with arms 
and training to such an effect that in 1954 the French offered to stop arms deals 
to Israel in exchange for Nasser’s withdrawal of aid to the Algerian rebels.335 
Again oil was a potent reason for France hanging on to Algeria with the 
exploration and expectation of future oil discoveries in the Sahara.336
 
  In both 
Britain and France’s case prestige was also important and perceived loss of 
prestige was an important ingredient in the French and British reaction to the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal.  
However, this “loss of prestige” was not balanced by good intelligence in order to 
come to a well-founded decision on political and/or military action. This 
intelligence would reach Eden through the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 
based at the Cabinet Office and the filter through which information from the 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), other UK military intelligence sources, and 
radio surveillance from the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) 
at Cheltenham and its outstation in Cyprus and Foreign Office-gathered 
information from embassies throughout the Middle East. Former JIC chairman Sir 
Percy Cradock notes that by 1956 Eden had come to see Nasser as 
irredeemable. Cradock adds: “He (Eden) regarded himself as an authority on the 
area and he was already falling into the dangerous practice of selecting the 
pieces of intelligence that fitted his preconceptions and neglecting the 
Committee’s more balanced overall view.”337
 
  
Cradock confirms that the intelligence machine was being used selectively by 
Eden in disregard of the policy approved by the Cabinet, namely no confrontation 
with Nasser but a long-term isolation.338
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claims that Eden only wanted to hear information which suited his own 
conclusions.339 A further complication lay in the fact that there was no assurance 
that a member agency would provide the JIC with relevant information and that 
the Foreign Office knew of all the actions of M16 since MI6, believing that the 
Foreign Office was “soft” on Nasser, was pursuing its own agenda. That agenda 
included feeding in to Eden information from an agent said to be in Nasser’s 
inner circle that Nasser was supported by the Soviet Union and wished to spread 
his power base throughout the Middle East.340
 
  
On 29th October, 1956, Israeli forces invaded Egyptian territory in the Sinai 
Desert and advanced toward the Suez Canal. The British and French 
governments issued an ultimatum that both sets of forces should withdraw to a 
line 10 miles from the Canal, an ultimatum rejected by Egypt which had 
nationalized the Canal on July 26th that year and regarded it as being part of 
sovereign Egyptian territory. British planes bombed Egyptian airfields on Oct 31st 
as part of hostilities which had been building up since the Egyptian 
nationalization. The British/French/Israeli action gave the Soviet government the 
distraction it needed to crush a revolt in Hungary while the world’s eyes were 
elsewhere. The day before, on October 30th, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and 
senior colleagues in the Soviet Politburo had decided to set aside military action 
over Hungary for fear of international outrage. The next day, with the world’s 
attention firmly focussed on the invasion of Egypt, the Politburo decision was 
reversed and Khrushchev ordered the Soviet Army back into Hungary to crush 
the rebellion. By November 5th the uprising was over and the Soviet leader was 
able to turn his attention to threaten to use force to aid Egypt as well as to 
continue to put diplomatic pressure on Britain, France and Israel through the UN, 
forming an unlikely alliance with the USA. 341
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4.2. Eden and the media in the lead up to military action over Suez 
According to Eden in his own memoirs, in the lead-up to the actual military action 
“public opinion in our own country held steadier than appeared from press 
reports.342 Eden’s biographer Thorpe wrote that The Times, declared that 
Nasser’s seizure of the Canal was “a breach of undertakings which Egypt has 
freely given and renewed in recent years, (27th July, 1956, edition).  Thorpe also 
wrote that newspapers not normally supportive of the Conservatives agreed. “No 
more Hitlers”, declared the Daily Herald. “There is no room for appeasement”. 
The News Chronicle assured it readers that ‘The British Government will be fully 
justified in taking retaliatory action.’ (Both 28th July, 1956, editions).343
 
 
In the House of Commons Conservative M.P. Julian Amery said: “Is my Right 
Hon. Friend aware that he will have the overwhelming support of public opinion in 
this country on whatever steps he decides to take, however grave, to repair this 
injury to our honour and interests?”344 Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell 
added his support: “On this side of the House, we deeply deplore this 
highhanded and totally unjustifiable step by the Egyptian Government. Has the 
Prime Minister in mind to refer this matter to the Security Council? Has he yet 
come to any decision on that point? In view of the seizure of the property of the 
Suez Canal Company and the vague statement about future compensation, will 




Eden certainly welcomed this support in the House, but as for newspaper support in 
the long term he looked to the Daily Telegraph as an indicator of support for his 
policies. According to Frederick Bishop, his Principal Private Secretary during the 
Suez Crisis, Eden “paid far too much attention” to that newspaper “since it is 
                                            
342 Eden, Sir Anthony, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London, 1960), p.455. 
343 Thorpe, D.R., Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden (London: Chatto & Windus, 2003), 
p.490. 
344 Hansard, 27 July 1956 vol 557 cc777-80, p.779 
345 Ibid, pp.777-778. 
 104 
supposed to reflect the opinions of the bulk of the Conservative Party and there 
were, therefore, further implications behind it.”346
 
 Bishop, recorded his comments 
for the Suez Oral History Project along with other political and military personages 
involved in government decision making in the Suez Crisis. These interviews, both 
through the original tapes and the transcripts, are vital primary source material 
drawn on in the preparation of this dissertation. 
By “further implications” Bishop may have meant that Eden looked to the Daily 
Telegraph as a political barometer indicating the level of internal support, at the 
same time failing to fully analyse other national and international publications to 
properly gauge external endorsement or opposition. Both The Times and the Daily 
Telegraph would have enabled Eden to target activated public opinion in seeking 
support for his political agenda, in other words those most likely to win him that 
support – party loyalists, local community activists, interest group spokesperson 
opinion leaders and others who pay close attention to the political realm. As 
Entman and Herbst stress it is this activated public opinion that matters most in 
day-to-day policy making.347 In effect, Eden’s task should have been less difficult to 
win these supportive elements in the community since the British national 
newspaper system provides more support for right-of-centre politicians than it does 
for these in the centre and left with, at the time of Suez, the Guardian and the Daily 
Mirror were among the few national newspapers on the left while the Daily 
Telegraph, The Times, Daily Mail and Daily Express were on the right.348
 
 
In handling the media, the key government figure should have been William Clark 
Eden’s Press Secretary.  In 1955, when he succeeded Sir Winston Churchill as 
Prime Minister, Eden had sounded out Clark, then diplomatic correspondent of the 
Observer, who also had experience of the Commonwealth and had won a place in 
broadcasting history as the first man to interview a Cabinet Minister on television. 
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A year later Clark’s diary entry shows disillusion creeping in. On April 6th, 1956, he 
notes: “Eden’s greatest lack is serenity and the air of being a rather safe father 
figure. The insecurity of Eden is the cause of his insecurity. He still does not feel 
sure of himself. He is hurt and upset outwardly by personal attacks. Several times 
when papers have attacked him he has sent for the editor or proprietor, over my 
strong protests. The result has been to let him know he was moved by their 
words”.350 Clark further asserts that there was no “big design” in terms of being 
ahead of events and, by implication, no real public relations strategy with a narrow 
fire-fighting role obscuring the big picture. He feared that the result of the 
mishandling of the Egyptian situation would “result in some terrible humiliation when 
the war begins”.351 Clark was not the only one who thought Eden failed to see the 
“big picture” and to think strategically rather tactically. Foreign Office Under 
Secretary for Middle East Affairs in 1956, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, remarked in his 
diary that Eden “cannot bear long-term thoughts and wants only to discuss this 
morning’s telegrams.352 Historian Anthony Adamthwaite also underlines Eden’s 
distrust of planning by pointing out that unlike the more strategic Foreign Secretary 
in the previous Attlee Labour administration, Ernest Bevin, Eden was a “tactician, 
not a strategist”. The evidence for this, says Adamthwaite, lies in Eden’s neglect of 
the Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, a think tank for the coordination of 
foreign and defence policies.353 Eden allowed this group to wither away as a vital 
policy advisory group, neglecting forward planning and strategy in policy as he did 
in public relations.354
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Secretary Sir Norman Brook who later confided to a senior Foreign Office colleague 
Evelyn Shuckburgh in November 1956 that the whole Suez affair had been a folly, 




The doubt on the part of Clark, and others, on Eden’s political inability to see that 
big picture could lie with the question of the role played, and the influence exerted 
(or not exerted), by Eden’s advisers in the formulation and execution of policy.356 
Clark also related a meeting he had on 13th August, 1956, with Richard Powell, 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence (MoD). A “very depressed” Powell, 
the most senior MoD civil servant, said the present military plans would end up in a 
massive invasion of Egypt “which would turn world opinion against us”.357 Clark’s 
frustrations would eventually lead to his resignation. Even Eden’s own First Sea 
Lord, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the professional head of the Royal Navy, 
expressed his severe doubts at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee on 21st 
August 1956 and said he “felt very real danger that Operation Musketeer (the 
military plan for the invasion of the Suez Canal) would cause serious and continuing 
disorders in the Middle East.”358 He was in disagreement with Field Marshall Sir 
Gerald Templar who as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) represented the Army on 
that committee. Mountbatten, as a member of the Royal Family, tended to treat 
other service chiefs as his underlings, and was distrusted as devious by Templar 
who said to him: “If you swallowed a nail you would shit a corkscrew”.359
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out to do, but would make them worse.360 Templar saw Nasser as a communist 
threat and went as far as to call Mountbatten “yellow” at a chiefs of staff meeting.361
 
 
In terms of the “big picture” and the rest of the world’s perception of British actions 
over Suez world’s perception, the warning signs were already being flagged up 
within Eden’s own government. In the personal papers of Sir Walter Monckton, 
Eden’s Minister of Defence, is a letter dated 5th September, 1956, from his 
colleague Harold Watkinson, the Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, in which 
he writes to Monckton: “I am in no doubt that we could knock Nasser down quickly, 
but that leaves unanswered the much larger question of how do we then hold our 
position and keep the Canal open if world opinion turns against us?”362 Barely three 
weeks later Monckton, in a letter to Eden, promised he would not leave the Cabinet 
during the crisis. He said “the burden of the MoD is too much”, adding “I cannot go 
on coping with this extremely tricky and arduous department.”363
 
 Eden reshuffled 
him to Paymaster General on October 19 and therefore prevented a possible 
defection. 
In the age before spin doctors Eden was not very political in the sense of knowing 
how to lead and manipulate public opinion compared with Tony Blair and the 
government agenda-building system run by his Director of Communications Alastair 
Campbell. Yet Eden was very concerned that government policy should be 
presented positively, and relied on Clark to arrange matters for him.  When their 
agendas diverged, Clark proved counter-productive but Eden foresaw this and tried 
to proselytise on his own behalf. He came from that class and generation which 
believed The Times to be the principal newspaper of record.364
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Shawcross (Attorney General) clearly resented the imbalance on the national 
newspapers who in the main supported the Conservative Party.365 Shawcross in 
1946 attacked “the campaign of calumny and misrepresentation which the Tory 
Party and Tory stooge press” had directed at the Labour administration.366 The 
same year, after Parliament set up a Royal Commission on the Press, the Press 
Council was forced on the industry as a measure of regulation, one of the verdicts 
of the Commission in its report being that members “were distressed by their 
partisanship” and also, with a few exceptions, “failing to provide the electorate with 
adequate materials for sound political judgement”.367
 
  
Eden, unlike Atlee and other Labour politicians, could be assured of support from 
most of the right-wing controlled media. To Eden, The Times was a respectable 
version of Pravda and was often regarded abroad as such.368  Eden then turned 
from trusting his own press secretary and made direct approaches to editors, such 
as Arthur Christiansen of the Daily Express and Iverach McDonald, foreign editor of 
the Times. Indeed, McDonald, in the absence of the Times Editor Sir William Haley, 
wrote several sympathetic and supportive editorials on Eden’s Suez policy.369
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newspaper families, they were more prone than profit-seeking conglomerates to 
indulge in the sort of ideological crusade in which Eden was indulging.370
 
 
Turning to broadcasting and the BBC, Eden’s relationship was an uncomfortable 
one, despite the fact that the chairman of governors of the BBC was his former 
colleague and senior civil servant Sir Alexander Cadogan.371 Severe differences 
arose between Eden and what he called “these Communists at the BBC” over the 
demand of the Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, on the right to reply to 
Prime Ministerial broadcasts given at key points during the Suez Crisis.372 Eden 
was shocked to learn that he could not simply address the nation at will about the 
Suez crisis but had to be invited to make a ministerial broadcast. That broadcast 
was likely to involve the offer of a “right to reply to the Leader of the Opposition, 
much to Eden’s chagrin.373 Eden had, when he first became Prime Minister 
succeeding Sir Winston Churchill in 1955, felt comfortable with television. Suave 
and good looking he was a quarter of a century younger than Churchill and 
attached, as he said, “first importance” to TV as a medium and by then a third of the 
population in the UK had television sets.374 However, according to the BBC’s 
current Political Editor Nick Robinson the “first importance” was to propaganda 
broadcasts since in his previous role as Foreign Secretary he had demanded the 
right to make a ministerial broadcast with no reply from the Opposition and was 
furious when the BBC had instead offered him the chance to be questioned on the 
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Although Clarke was more aware than was Eden of their political incompatibility, he 
had accepted the post of Press and Public Relations adviser. He loved the world of 
the powerful and influential, and saw his appointment as an entrée.376 Yet others 
take a different view of Clark and Turner in his history of the Suez affair says that 
Clark’s job was to show that while any government is entitled to put the most 
favourable slant on its management of events, there had to be some give and take 
in dealings with the press.377 This view, says Turner, was incomprehensible to 
Eden and others in government such as the Commonwealth Secretary (and later 
Prime Minister) Sir Alec Douglas-Home.378 But it was not long before Eden became 
disenchanted. He consulted Clark about how best to present his reshuffles (Eden 
was worrying about where to place his Conservative party rival and Deputy Prime 
Minister R. A. Butler after the autumn Budget) and Clark interpreted this as carte 
blanche to offer his opinions freely on all manner of subjects. He was particularly 
free on giving policy advice on America and the Commonwealth, both of which he 
knew well from his journalist days. Eden thought this was not Clark’s function; in 
essence, claims Thorpe, he regarded him as a dubious, albeit necessary, part of 
the public relations industry.379 Eden has airbrushed Clark out of his life in his own 
memoirs although one of his other biographers Robert Rhodes James refers to 
Clark as “a journalist of great charm and good humour, of unswerving honesty and 
with a strong internationalist outlook”.380
 
 Both the latter qualities were to put him at 
odds with Eden as the Suez Crisis grew. 
 
4.3. Eden’s approach to influencing the media: tactical rather than strategic 
 
When Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on 26th July, 1956 the UK media 
reacted against the move, right across the newspaper spectrum, with one 
exception. Eden’s biographer Thorpe, to whom all his personal papers had been 
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made available by his widow Lady Eden, wrote:  
 
“The Press, which had been obsessed with the Wimbledon tennis championships 
all week, now turned its attentions to Nasser. The headlines were largely 
unequivocal, the one exception to the otherwise universal condemnation in Egypt 
coming from the Manchester Guardian. The Labour-supporting Daily Mirror even 
dubbed the Egyptian leader ‘Grabber Nasser’.381 The Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph made immediate comparisons of Nasser with Hitler and both these 
papers, along with the third Conservative supporting newspaper, the Daily Express, 




Public opinion, according to Thorpe, was perceived by Eden as initially firmly in 
support of action against Nasser and the press reflected these feelings including 
newspapers not normally supportive of the Conservatives. “No more Adolf Hitlers”, 
declared the Daily Herald adding, “There is no room for appeasement”. The News 
Chronicle assured its readers that:  “The British Government will be fully justified in 
taking retaliatory action”.383 The press, in an overwhelming majority in July, was in 
favour of a strong government response to Nasser, with only a small majority 
advising caution.384 However, as the crisis progressed and military action came into 
the frame, four newspapers opposed that action – the Daily Mirror, Daily Herald, 
News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian, although the last named was the 
only one to consistently oppose military action from the start.385
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the Times being particularly aggressive in supporting an invasion of Egypt to 
reclaim the Suez Canal.386
 
 
On July 27th Eden formed an ad hoc Cabinet committee, to be known as the 
Egypt Committee, to handle all aspects of the seizure and the UK’s plans to react 
to it. This was chaired by Eden and included as its regular members Lord 
Salisbury (Lord President of the Council), Harold Macmillan (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
(Commonwealth Secretary) and Walter Monckton (Minister of Defence).387 
However, in terms of relationships with the media and building a government 
agenda to win favourable media support, Eden was in a quandary since by this 
time he had lost faith in his own press adviser William Clark.388 He was reminded 
of the powerful media criticism which had eventually bought down Neville 
Chamberlain early in the Second World War and led to Churchill becoming Prime 
Minister.389 Determined not to go the way of Chamberlain, from whose own 
government Eden himself had resigned in 1938 in opposition to Chamberlain’s 
appeasement policies over Hitler and Mussolini, he himself gave confidential 
briefings to influential editors such as Sir William Haley (Times), his foreign editor 
Iverach McDonald and Arthur Christiansen (Daily Express). He met the latter on 
the afternoon of 27th July and on the same day Christiansen wrote to his 
proprietor Lord Beaverbrook, then in the south of France, “I came away 
impressed with his (Eden’s) firmness of purpose”.390
 
 
Although all three of the Conservative Party-supporting papers, Daily Telegraph, 
Daily Mail and Daily Express pressed for action against Nasser, they laced their 
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calls for action with criticism of Eden for making the agreement with Nasser to 
abandon the Suez military bases two years before.391 Eden had to convince their 
proprietors, all autocratic press barons with a shared interest in maintaining the 
world status of Britain and her empire that he would act decisively. With the Daily 
Express he did that through the editor Arthur Christiansen by giving him a 
personal briefing stressing that he would act to regain control of Suez but that the 
government needed time to prepare its plans and he needed that confidence 
respected. Christiansen relayed this to his proprietor Lord Beaverbrook whose 
support was won.392 Shaw’s research reveals that Eden also met the editor of the 
Daily Mail, Arthur Wareham, on July 31st, 1956. No record of that conversation 
was kept but Shaw notes that “Whatever it was it certainly paid off for the Mail 
overnight shifted its ground significantly”.393 The Mail, together with its sister 
paper the Evening Standard, had been one of Eden’s most persistent critics up to 
the end of July, Shaw adds, but the confidential talk with Eden may have 
persuaded them that negotiation with Nasser was not appeasement and Eden 
may have convinced the Mail of his firmness of purpose.394  This firmness of 
purpose could have had the firm foundation of Cabinet agreement since on 27th 
July, 1956, the Cabinet had met and Eden had posed the question to his 
colleagues “whether they were prepared in the last resort to pursue their 
objective by the threat or even the use of force”.395 Thorpe notes in his biography 
of Eden that at this meeting that ministers wished the military chiefs of staff to 




In terms of the Daily Telegraph, winning that traditional Tory paper over was 
more difficult in view of its hostility to Eden, noted by William Clark as being due 
to the wife of the proprietor, Lady Pamela Berry’s resentment of being avoided by 
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the Edens at social functions.397  Sir Frederick Bishop, Eden’s PPS at the time of 
Suez, later noted the Daily Telegraph’s opposition to Eden since the newspaper, 
although pro-Tory, had been anti Eden over his giving up of the Suez bases and 
had even called for his resignation in a campaign of January 1956. Come 
Nasser’s action in nationalising the Suez Canal Eden realised he had to win as 
much media support to retake the Canal and, at a meeting with the chiefs of staff 
on 31 July 1956 he said: "Every effort should be made to encourage Nasser to 
put himself further in the wrong." At the same time public opinion in this country 
and the world should be prepared to support any action we might eventually 
take.398 Bishop later remarked that anybody who knew really knew Eden said he 
paid far too much attention to what the Daily Telegraph wrote.399 Eden, therefore, 
was conscious of the Telegraph’s position in reflecting the opinions of the bulk of 
the Conservative Party.400 He tackled this problem by sending two of the senior 
members of the Egypt committee, R.A. Butler and Lord Salisbury to see the 
newspaper’s proprietor Lord Berry on 27th July, 1956. They gave Berry “secret 
and unattributable information” about the government’s determination to take a 
tough stand which had the effect of assuring Berry that Eden would pursue an 
imperialist line the newspaper was calling for. As a result the Telegraph dropped 
criticism of Eden’s “appeasement” and lent its support to him.401
 
 
In terms of television Eden made his first Suez Crisis broadcast to the nation on 
Aug 8th 1956 but again fell out with his press secretary William Clark who had not 
checked the arrangements. Eden found himself in “cramped, crowded conditions” 
provided by the BBC.402 Conscious of his image, the Prime Minister would have 
preferred to have broadcast from more congenial and statesmanlike 
surroundings at 10 Downing Street.403
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broadcast in front of a crowd of 100,000 people in one of Cairo’s main squares 
and a good deal of his strength both inside and outside of Egypt depended on 
propaganda and mass persuasion.404 Turner makes the point that although he 
was not a natural demagogue Nasser had quickly learned the art of holding and 
manipulating an audience with dramatic pauses, the “gut-rending” appeal to the 
deepest emotions in particularly towards the evils of imperialism.405 Kyle 
emphasises that he no longer talked in the stiff formal Arabic that he had formerly 
used, but in the Arabic of the streets in order to bring himself closer to his 
audience, speaking the way they spoke.406 In the square the 100,000 plus 
audience had gathered at dusk after prayers and strategically-placed 
cheerleaders led the frenzied welcome when Nasser eventually appeared.407
 
 
Eden’s bad start with the BBC was to develop into a more severe rift later in the 
crisis after he had heard a contribution on the Light Programme, on 15th August 
from Salah Salem, one of the original free officers who had taken part in the coup 
which overturned the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. The programme was 
entitled ‘Special survey of the Suez Crisis’ and Eden wrote to the chairman of the 
BBC governors Sir Alexander Cadogan in protest saying that the broadcast had 
given “a deplorable uncertain and hesitant and misleading” picture of British 
public opinion.” It is interesting that this harassment of the BBC also occurred in 
Iraq 2003 when Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communications Alastair 
Campbell criticised the BBC for not supporting the military action against Saddam 
Hussein, an area to be covered later in this dissertation, but pointing out to a 
commonality of approach by both prime ministers in attempting to coerce the 
BBC to support the government agenda. 
 
Eden went on to tell Cadogan many people would judge the strength and 
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determination of Britain by what they heard on the BBC.408 The BBC’s stance 
was to allow balanced political broadcasting, so much so that early in August 
1956, the corporation refused to allow visiting Australian Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies to appear on TV to talk about the Suez Crisis as the Foreign Secretary 
was already booked to make a radio appearance on 14th August. The BBC’s 
temporary liaison officer between the political parties, John Green, blocked the 
Menzies broadcast on the grounds that two pro-government broadcasts in close 
succession would call the BBC’s objectivity into question. Eden complained to 
BBC chairman of Governors, Sir Alexander Cadogan and the decision was 
reversed. Menzies made the broadcast. This was a primary indication that what 
Eden wanted was not a fair and impartial public service broadcaster, but a 
broadcaster which would, in essence be a mouthpiece for the government in time 
of war.409 Again, there are comparisons here with Blair’s perception of the BBC 
except that he relied on Alastair Campbell’s advice. However, unlike Tony Blair, 
Sir Anthony Eden felt he could handle this role without professional help such as 
Clark, just in the same way that he appointed Selwyn Lloyd Foreign Minister 
knows full well that he (Eden) would be handling foreign affairs himself. Diplomat 
and Ambassador Sir William Hayter later said: “He (Selwyn Lloyd) had been put 
in the Foreign Office as a kind of Minister of State” adding “he had no personal 
initiative and was under Eden’s thumb”.410
 
 So Eden was taking on two additional 
roles at a time of crisis – Press Secretary and Foreign Secretary – unlike Blair 
who trusted the advice of his Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell. 
William Clark later wrote that Eden was still caught up in “the old imperial dream” 
and failed in his decisions over Suez to take into account the shifts of power and 
influence produced by the Second World War and the end of empire.411
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Clark claims, prevented him from hearing and seeing the criticism of those in his 
own party, such as Sir Walter Monckton, criticism which may have made Eden 
rethink some of his decisions.412 This internal criticism, even from within his own 
Cabinet, expressed itself in terms of  leaks through the Lobby system where in 
return for privileged briefings, media Lobby correspondents agreed not to 
attribute the information published to their source. Patrick Gordon Walker, himself 
Foreign Secretary in the 1964 Harold Wilson Labour administration, makes the 
point that a group of ministers may leak to the press in an effort to get their policy 
accepted by Cabinet and, indeed, in the case of Suez, he says, there were 
extensive leaks about divisions of opinion in the Cabinet, forced by Eden’s 
reluctance to discuss policy over Egypt with his colleagues.413  In terms of 
agenda building literature, Cohen expresses this most pointedly in his study of 
the British Foreign Office, remarking that this method of leaking is used by 
individual ministers who disagree with a decision but cannot say publicly because 
of collective responsibility.414
 
 The use of such “unattributable briefings” is picked 
up by the media who then are more likely to concentrate on a “split” in the 
government rather than reflecting the “official” government line.  
Not only ministers can use such methods; senior civil servants can use such a 
tactical manoeuvre in order to highlight what they regard as a wrong Ministerial 
decision, focus the media on it and, hopefully, force a change.415
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Downing Street special adviser Lance Price, deputy to Tony Blair’s Director of 




This approach, if used in 1956, was not successful. Foreign Office officials had 
recognised that preserving existing interests was out of the question and had 
flagged this up to the ailing Churchill administration in which Eden was nominal 
Foreign Secretary but in whose area of responsibility Churchill consistently 
interfered.417
 
 So, when Eden did succeed as Prime Minister in 1955 he was 
mistakenly determined to run his own foreign policy as Prime Minister, continuing 
the same air of uncertainty as had Churchill and ignoring official advice. 
Opposition to his own views made Eden dig in his heels and Clark referred to a 
crucial meeting of the Egypt Committee on August 2nd, 1956, where he (Clark) in 
the lead up to the invasion of the Canal Zone, had agreed with Earl Mountbatten, 
First Sea Lord, and Anthony Head, now Minister of Defence in succession to 
Monckton, to officially release some of the more obvious information which was 
already public knowledge. In a letter sent to his political chief Lord Hailsham, First 
Lord of the Admiralty Mountbatten referred to the Prime Minister’s refusal to take 
this advice to put out press releases. Mountbatten had told Eden that three ships 
were to leave for Mediterranean in preparation for Operation Musketeer and that 
it would be common knowledge in the ports. He informed Hailsham:  “Mr William 
Clarke (sic) his own press information officer, was present and strongly 
supported me, and suggested that press rumours and stories would get out of 
hand if they were not given a reasonable amount of information”.418 Eden 
refused, but the story still broke on that night’s BBC Nine O’clock News.419
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Julian Amery, a war correspondent during the Spanish Civil War, a staff officer 
during World War II, and later a War Office minister in the Macmillan government 
after Eden’s resignation following the Suez debacle, could view agenda building 
from media, military and government angles. He recorded that Eden was: 
‘Superficially engaging and attractive.’ ‘He would have made a great ambassador, 
brilliant negotiator, but he mistook diplomacy for foreign policy.’ ‘No good at 
delegating. As PM lacked ‘an overall vision of a British role and interest.’420
 
  
The erratic nature of Eden’s decision making was also referred to by Sir Norman 
Brook, Cabinet Secretary at the time of Suez and Britain’s most senior civil 
servant, who over lunch told William Clark that the Cabinet had “blundered 
around a bit” not because Eden could not make up his mind, but because he 
came to a decision without full consultation with other Cabinet members.421 As 
already noted, Eden, when he succeeded Sir Winston Churchill as Prime Minister 
in 1955, had decided to keep virtual control of foreign policy in his own hands, 
leaving his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd as an administrator rather than as a 
policy originator.422
 
 This assumption of the role of Foreign Secretary as well as 
Prime Minister removed a key “checks and balances” in policymaking; Eden as 
Prime Minister was not likely to argue the point with Foreign Secretary Eden nor 
criticise the media policy of Press Secretary Eden. 
Again, in the same way has he accepted only the intelligence which backed his own 
views, the customary relations between ministers and all but one or two officials 
were broken and all the other officials were neither consulted about nor even told 
what the government was doing. Eden refused to accept the advice from those on 
the ground, such as his own ambassador in Egypt, Humphrey Trevelyan, who had 
advised against military action over the Suez Canal. Trevelyan later wrote that 
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during the Suez affair “ the customary relations between ministers and all but one or 
two officials were broken and all the other officials were neither consulted about nor 
even told what the government was doing.”423 Again, at the very top, although 
Selwyn Lloyd was all too aware of Eden’s wish to keep control of foreign policy in 
his own hands it did not stop him trying to block what he saw was a wrong decision. 
Alarmed by Eden’s bellicosity over Nasser, on 23rd August, and showing signs of 
“emotional strain”, he asked US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to intervene 
with his own Prime Minister (Eden) since he was “the only person who could alter 
these plans”.424 Lloyd’s Minister of State, Anthony Nutting, who later resigned over 
Eden’s Suez policy, later wrote “our traditional friendships with Arab world were to 
be discarded” in what Nutting described as a “cynical act of aggression”.425 In 
addition, the soldier who commanded all forces on Operation Musketeer, General 
Sir Charles Keightley also doubted Eden’s ability to win international support and 
warned that without this the military operation would fail. Keightley remarked that 
“Western world opinion” had to be won.426 Similarly, Richard Powell, Permanent 




So, Eden had assumed the Foreign Secretary’s role on top of that of Prime 
Minister. He had been selective in the use of intelligence to fit in with his own 
preconceptions. There was a breakdown of relationships between ministers and 
officials referred to by Humphrey Trevelyan. In addition there was the erratic nature 
of his decision-making, commented upon by his own Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman 
Brooke and his lack of confidence in his own Press Secretary William Clark leading 
him to give key media briefings himself. This lack of confidence in his Press 
Secretary was not true in the case of Tony Blair where, as will be demonstrated in 
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the next chapter, his Director of Communications Alastair Campbell was in the 
middle of decision making, even attending Cabinet meetings. 
 
How did all of these facts affect government agenda building aimed at winning 
national and international support from the media and public for British military 
action over Suez? The contention of this study is that on the research evidence 
Eden’s tactical approach, to policy and to agenda building, was not thought out and 
not strategic and this will be examined further in the Conclusions and Analysis 
Chapter 6. However, before approaching that it would be prudent to examine the 
question of the government’s use of propaganda in time of conflict and the dilemma 
faced by the media in this situation. 
 
 
4.4. Crossing the line between media handling and propaganda 
There is a dilemma for journalists when their own government goes to war, 
especially for those whose media opposed the government’s action and what that 
media interpreted as an unwarranted use of force.  That dilemma is clearly stated 
by three members of Cardiff University’s School of Journalism who investigated 
the Falklands 1982 conflict. Mercer et al wrote: 
 
“In wartime some journalists agree with the more hawkish politicians and military 
officers that everything should be subordinate to winning the battle; others are 
unwilling to suspend either critical judgement or the peacetime pursuit of objectivity. 
In 1956 several British newspapers had opposed the Eden government’s 
intervention in Suez and faced an acute dilemma over maintaining their opposition 
after British servicemen went into action.”428
 
 
In his study of the reactions of the British press during the Suez Crisis, Parmentier 
refers to the fact that newspapers who doubted the stance of Eden in July 1956, 
when Nasser nationalised the Canal, may have lifted these doubts as soon as 
                                            
428 Mercer et al, p.7. 
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military action was taken in October.429 Shaw highlights this dilemma faced by two 
of the newspapers most critical of Eden’s belligerent policy, the News Chronicle and 
the Daily Mirror. On October 31st , 1956, the day virtually all the newspapers carried 
news that British troops would be moving into Suez,  both newspapers, Shaw says, 
were “conspicuously non-committal and affected by indecision”.430 The fact was 
that there had been government briefing (on October 30th, 1956 by Eden’s 
Parliamentary Private Secretary Robert Allan) that the “paratroops would be going 
in the following dawn”, a briefing that he, a political and not a civil service appointee, 
gave to journalists following Eden’s ultimatum given in the Commons calling on 
both Egypt and Israel to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the 
Canal and to allow an Anglo-French force to temporarily occupy the Canal Zone.431
 
 
Given that the Operation Musketeer plan was not for troops to be landed for 
another five or six days, this briefing could be construed as a psychological 
operations ploy designed to draw a line in the sand for the UK media; if they 
overstepped this line it would put them in a position of criticising, not supporting and 
possibly endangering British troops in action. 
Indeed, the use of military force referred to by Robert Allan was picked up by 
Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell the next day when, in the House, he stated: “Last 
night, we begged the Government to give us an undertaking that they would refrain 
from using armed force until the Security Council had completed its deliberations or 
we had had another chance of discussing the matter here. I must say for myself 
that I had hoped, even after the Government's refusal to give us that undertaking, 
that wiser counsels might still have prevailed. 
 
“We are this afternoon still left to some extent in the dark about what Her Majesty's 
Government have done. I must ask the Prime Minister now to repair the omission 
                                            
429 Parmentier, Guillaume, ‘The British Press in the Suez Crisis’, The Historical Journal (Vol. 23, No. 
2, June 1980), p.438, although Parmentier points out that a firm stand against Egypt, in July-August 
1956 would have met with much more support from the press than it did in October since the long 
delay which separated the shock of nationalisation and the ill-timed October military intervention 
allowed many periodicals to entirely change their attitudes. 
430 Shaw, p.72. 
431 Shaw, pp.70-71. 
 123 
from his speech and to tell us, ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, whether, on the expiry of his ultimatum, 




Future Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan interjected in the debate: “I am very 
grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I should like to ask him a 
question to which 50 million people in this country will want to know the answer. Are 




Eden replied: “I am not in any way prepared to give the House any details—[HON. 
MEMBERS : "Resign."]—of the action which will follow the statement which I clearly 
made yesterday, that British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength 
may be necessary to secure compliance.”434
 
 
Conservative M.P. Viscount Hinchingbrooke, then accused Labour members of 
endangering the lives of British troops by asking for details of military movements. 
“What would our troops, who may be landing in Egypt at this moment, say about 
that? What will they say when they hear that their representatives in the House of 
Commons and the leaders of the Labour Party which they may be supporting have 
demanded that everyone, high wide and handsome, should be consulted about the 
Middle East? What about the danger of leakage to the enemy. There is the danger 
that the Egyptians might have been forewarned, or the Israelis might have been 
forewarned, as a consequence of asking for direct consultation all over the world in 
the face of military action. There is the risk to life and limb.”435
 
 
At this point the government appeared to have a strong argument in, as 
Hinchingbrooke said, in not making any announcement about troop movements 
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for fear these would put the troops in peril. Indeed, in order to build up and 
maintain the level of public support required for war therefore newspapers, the 
main public opinion formers, needed to do the ministers’ bidding (wittingly or 
unwittingly), demonizing Nasser and presenting the use of force as necessary. 
The result was arguably the most demanding and intensive propaganda 
campaign conducted by a British government since the Second World War. Did 
the government abuse its position by misleading the media through the use of 
less-than-truthful briefing and propaganda? This section will look at this question. 
 
Former Permanent Secretary at the MoD Sir Frank Cooper later admitted in a 
recorded interview that Eden had sanctioned psychological operations or 
propaganda. “No-one could clarify what was white and what was black, what the 
purpose was and so on. In retrospect it was a failure at home and abroad.”436  
This lack of clarity and direction was also commented upon in a recorded 
interview by Sir Arthur Dodds-Parker, in 1956 a junior minister in the Foreign 
Office whose verdict on Eden was “bad judgement, lack of integrity, falling into 
collusion and finally stopping it for lack of courage.”437 Mountbatten also took 
offence at government propaganda attempts, which continued after Eden had 
resigned, to put out a pamphlet justifying the actions over Suez. In a letter to 
General Keightley, Commander in Chief during Operation Musketeer and now at 
MoD, Mountbatten said that the pamphlet was “political instead of factual.” 
Keightley replied that the pamphlet had been withdrawn, mainly due to pressure 




In the period from Nasser’s takeover of the Suez Canal on July 27, 1956, and the 
British-French-Israeli action in late October the same year, a basic strategy was 
                                            
436 SUEZOHP: 3 1989-91, p.6. In referring to “black” and “white” propaganda Cooper was taking the 
former to be deliberate disinformation designed to deceive and disorientate a potential enemy and 
the latter “slanted persuasion” by selected and weighted use of factual information. See Perloff, 
Richard M., The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communications and Attitudes in the 21st Century 
(London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002), p.17. 
437 SUEZOHP: 6 1989-91, p.12. 
438 Mountbatten Papers, MB1/N109. General correspondence. 21 Jan 1957. 
 125 
worked out to isolate Nasser both domestically and internationally with a gradual 
squeeze on the Egyptian economy in order to create internal dissatisfaction with 
his military regime. Under Operation Omega, black propaganda radio broadcasts 
were used to seek to split off Egypt from other Arab states with disinformation - 
raw material supplied by the embassy in Cairo. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser’s 
confidant, later wrote that this black propaganda centred on Nasser’s supposed 
ambitions to topple the old feudal states throughout the Middle East and take 
control of oil production for Egyptian ends and those of Egypt’s supposed ally the 
Soviet Union.439 Gorst and Kelly say that Operation Omega had the involvement 
of Cairo diplomat Ralph Murray who had been the founding head in 1947 of the 
Foreign Office’s secret anti-communist propaganda section, with the innocent 
name of the Information Research Department (IRD). From early August black 
propaganda produced by this operation included radio broadcasts designed to 
undermine Nasser by appealing for a return to constitutional rule.440 Egyptian 
morale was targeted by the use of psychological and propaganda methods to 
attempt to separate Nasser and his government from the Egyptian population 
and this was an integral part of the military preparations for Operation 
Musketeer.441 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Gerald 
Templar, had used exactly this combination of psyops and military action to crush 
communist guerrilla action in Malaya in 1952-54, as he himself said: “The 
shooting side of the business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 
per cent lies in getting the people of this country behind us”.442
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the war,” realisation having by then sunk in that Germany was going to lose. 
 
British intelligence, stepped up its output of “black” propaganda against Nasser with 
the attachment of two figures from the wartime Special Operations Executive, one 
of whom was Sefton Delmer, now seconded from his post as foreign editor of the 
Daily Express.  There would have been no objection to this from his proprietor, Lord 
Beaverbrook, a man close to Eden and who had already given his editor Arthur 
Christiansen orders “to support Eden in all our newspapers”.443 Both Delmer and 
his associate were attached to the British government funded Arab News Agency 
(ANA) which had offices throughout the Middle East but the Egyptian intelligence 
service in August 1956 denounced the ANA as an MI6 front and arrested 30 of its 
employees. Several, including Delmer, were expelled from the country.444
 
 
Murray, before he was transferred back to the UK at the height of the crisis to 
coordinate black propaganda, wrote to his old department, the IRD, expressing 
concern about  “the greater degree of freedom given by the (Egyptian) regime to 
left-wing elements”, adding that he feared this would allow communists to gain a 
foothold.445 He suggested moves such as cultivating figures on the Egyptian left, 
especially trade unionists and journalists, the value of Egyptian participation in 
British Council exchanges and the charging of lower fees in British schools to 
attract left wingers’ children.446
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 By these moves Murray hoped to gradually build 
up a substantial level of opposition to Nasser and any moves to have closer 
relationships with the Soviet Union, moving Arab nationalist hostility away from 
the West and on to the Soviet Union. From 1953 the IRD had also sought to 
subvert the neutralist policy of Egypt and other Middle East countries in a 
propaganda campaign which included outlining the “lessons of history”. A Central 
Office of Information pamphlet underlined the futility of neutrality against an 
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aggressor by pointing out the fate of neutral Belgium in 1914 and 1945 and 
proposing that “neutrality” would not deter a Soviet Union determined to seize the 
area’s rich oil reserves.447
 
 
On 13th April, 1956, the Cabinet Office’s Official Committee on the Middle East 
met to discuss further ways of countering Nasser’s brand of Middle East Arab 
nationalism and identified this as the greater threat to Western interests in the 
area than possible Soviet aggression. The IRD was given “a new charter” to 
include anti-subversive work in the propaganda and publicity work directed at 
Arab countries. 
 
However, while one Cabinet Office Committee was supporting this line of 
propaganda another, the Joint Intelligence Committee, was predicting that any 
threats of armed intervention in Egypt were unlikely to bring down Nasser and 
would actually arouse the sympathy of Arab states.448 The assessment, which 
Eden would have seen, read: “Should Western military action be insufficient to 
ensure early and decisive victory, the international consequences both in the Arab 
states and elsewhere might give rise to extreme embarrassment and cannot be 
forecast.”449 The sympathy of the Arab states for Nasser stemmed from his 
constant efforts to preserve Egypt’s dignity and honour after years of humiliation 
imposed by British rule.450 Nasser held that the Arab peoples had been mentally 
and spiritually held back for generations and that this had been a major obstacle to 
an Arab renaissance, along with the 19th century European colonialism which Eden, 
with his action over Suez, was attempting to retain.451
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was not going to be overwhelmed by zealous clerics and that a religious colonialism 
would not replace the de facto military/political colonialism of the British in Egypt.452
 
 
Eden did not appreciate this view of the UK as an unreconstructed colonial power 
inspired by greed. Foreign Office Middle East Under Secretary Archibald Ross 
referred to Eden as not so much listening to advice submitted by the Foreign Office, 
but as using the Foreign Office to do “what he thought had to be done.”453 Three 
years earlier Mountbatten had been Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet 
when the military coup had overturned the Egyptian monarchy. He had taken a 
more pragmatic view and in an interview given to United Press International 
reporter, Harold Guard, he said it would be better “to establish friendly relations with 
Egyptians and support Neguib454 regime” rather than spend a vast amount of 
money keeping troops there.”455 Mountbatten, here, was making a political 
comment which, as a military man he should not have. However, with his political 
experience as Viceroy, gained in the lead up to India’s independence, he may well 
have felt safe in floating an idea in the media, hoping that it would take root in 
Whitehall. Using the media for such a ploy to advance a political goal is a common 
tactic as Cohen notes in his study of the Foreign Office.456
 
  
Good advice can be a brake on bad judgement, especially in handling the media, 
but by this time Eden had lost faith in his Press Secretary William Clark who 
earlier in the crisis had played a shrewd hand in keeping the BBC and the new 
commercial Independent Television News (ITN) on side. On July 31st 1956, he 
had given confidential briefings to the BBC’s Sir Ian Jacob and ITN editor 
Geoffrey Cox. An old friend of Clark’s, Cox later said that Clark had told them the 
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government meant business, using his (Clark’s) own authority as press 
spokesman to make an unattributable statement to the two powerful media 
chiefs, convincing Cox that Eden was intent on action. This was reflected in ITN’s 
coverage which fulfilled Eden’s plan of making it clear to Nasser that he was not 
bluffing, Shaw adds, quoting Cox’s later memoirs.457
 
 This is a type of 
psychological warfare through the media to be returned to in the Iraq war 
chapter. 
Clark, as a government spokesman, was essential to the media which, in many 
cases, becomes dependent upon such an “official source”.458 Yet despite Clark’s 
background briefings, he himself was concerned about lack of clarity and 
direction. Describing a meeting he was called to at the Ministry of Defence on 
August 13th, 1956, he noted in his diary: “We dithered about press control. 
Ministers want the press to be quiet about our military preparations because they 
are politically embarrassing (my italics); but fool themselves into thinking that 
they are only asking for military censorship in the national interest.” He goes on 




In terms of press control and the use of the more “dark” side of media 
management, Shaw highlights the dilemma faced by two newspapers critical of 
Eden’s military plans, the News Chronicle and the Daily Mirror. On October 31st, 
1956, the day virtually all the newspapers carried news that British troops would be 
moving into Suez,  both newspapers, Shaw says, were “conspicuously non-
committal and affected by indecision”.460
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not a straightforward one but in fact was disinformation rather than information. It 
was, in effect, a psychological operations ploy to curb in advance any attack on the 
military adventure by Eden by opposing UK media, using psyops as an agenda-
building weapon to target a specific audience into supporting, or at least not 
opposing, Eden’s military and political objectives.461
 
 
On the international scene, Eden’s policy over Suez was exploited for 
propaganda purposes by the Soviet Union as the brutal interference in the affairs 
of a small, weak country at the same time as the Soviet Union was considering 
using military force to suppress the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. U.S. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles told President Eisenhower that U.S. efforts to 
disassociate the free world alliance from British imperialism would suffer 
immeasurable damage from such strong-arm tactics as would the influence of the 
West in the Middle East which, Dulles said, could be lost for a generation if not 
100 years.462 In terms of international agenda building – either winning friends 
and influencing people, or at least reducing their hostility – Dulles was more 
successful than Eden. By commenting that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
was only worrying to the USA if there was a threat to shipping, he implied that 
unhindered passing of ships through an Egyptian-controlled Canal was the USA’s 
only worry. This caused the Egyptians to immediately drop their vitriolic 
denunciation of USA influence in the area as they demonstrated that they could 
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4.5. The Protocol of Sèvres and the “excuse” for invasion  
The inclusion of Israel in the British-French invasion plan Operation Musketeer 
was part of the plot to give a semblance of respectability to the takeover of Suez. 
A secret deal had been plotted at a meeting in the Paris suburb of Sèvres on 21st 
-22nd October, 1956, attended by Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, French Prime 
Minister Guy Mollet and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.464 Lloyd 
returned to London to report to Eden and in his absence the Israeli and French 
delegations, not trusting the British to deliver the military help discussed, drew up 
the agreement on paper. The agreement was that Israel would invade the Canal 
Zone to force a conflict with Egypt, allowing Britain and France to send in their 
own forces to separate the “belligerents” and protect free passage through the 
Suez Canal. Lloyd, suspicious of the whole project, did not wish to return to 
Sèvres and Eden sent JIC chairman Patrick Dean with Lloyd’s Assistant Private 
Secretary Donald Logan back to Sèvres on Oct 24th 1956. Dean agreed to sign 
the three copies of the document produced but when he returned to brief Eden, 
the Prime Minister was horrified that the agreement had been put down on paper 
and ordered the British copy destroyed. The French and the Israelis, however, 
still had their copies.465  Indeed, Kyle makes the point that there was later a 




A similar destruction of compromising government documents may have been 
carried out in the case of Iraq 2003. This may be a key to the research here and 
may open up an audit trail for future research when relevant government 
documents are deposited in the National Archives. 
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The Protocol of Sèvres, as it was called, was not released in the UK until 40 
years later, in 1996. In the Commons, on 20th December 1956, Eden denied all 
knowledge of this collusion with France and Israel, a blatantly deceiving 
Parliament.467 In the debate Eden said he was “not prepared to make public 
communications with other heads of governments.”468 Oborne describes Eden’s 
eagerness to find an excuse for war partly for personal reasons as, “one of the 
worst examples of post-war mendacity.469 Historian Avi Shlaim, who has 
examined the detailed notes of Colonel Mordechai Bar-On, secretary to the 
Israeli delegation at Sevres, points out that Eden wanted the excuse of an Israeli 
“invasion” of  Suez but sent Selwyn Lloyd to the meeting, incognito, in order to 
avoid any involvement himself.470
 
 
At the UN on November 1st, 1956, the Hungarian revolution leader Imre Nagy 
contacted the UN to ask for recognition of Hungary’s neutral status and to appeal 
for protection. However, the UN Security Council was already taken up with a 
resolution condemning Britain and France, supported by the USA and the Soviet 
Union, Britain and France voting against, using their veto. British ambassador in 
Moscow, Sir William Hayter, reported that it had given the Soviet Union a 
“heaven-sent distraction” from Hungary and allowed them to pose as champions 
of the United Nations and of an Arab country.471  Hayter later reflected that he 
could not blame Nasser for the hostility to Britain after the Suez invasion, adding 




Foreign Office junior minister Tony Nutting resigned in protest at the Sèvres 
agreement. William Clark, in a revealing statement in his diary, states that he was 
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asked by the Conservative Chief Whip’s Office: “If I couldn’t hint to the press that 
Nutting was terribly under the influence of his American mistress and anyway 
was not quite himself nowadays”. Clark replied that this was “the sort of thing the 
Party did (Conservative Party), not me”.473
 
 He acknowledged in a diary entry the 
same day that the week had been “the worst of his life” and continued: 
“It seems to me that the PM is mad, literally mad, and that he went so that day 
his temperature rose to 105°. My mood towards him is extraordinary. I never see 
him, worn, dignified and friendly, but a surge of deep and almost tearful 
compassion surges up in me; I leave him and my violent bitter contempt and 
hatred for a man who has destroyed my world and so much of my faith burns up 
again. Then I long to be free as a journalist to drive this government from power 




The Protocol of Sèvres and Eden’s connivance with France and Israel was the 
last straw for Clark who had already lost Eden’s confidence and he felt his 
position was untenable. He then resolved to resign which he did on November 5th  
1956. Clark had faced the conflict of interests of being a former journalist, 
respected by his profession and one who had been appointed to a strictly Civil 
Service role, not a political special adviser’s one.475
 
 The Civil Service, exists to 
serve whichever party is in government, but has a code which precludes civil 
servants taking a political rather than a governmental stance. Clark felt that 
Eden’s policy, in particular his lying to Parliament, prejudiced his, Clark’s, 
standards of press freedom and ethics.  
In their investigation of media handling during the Falklands War, Mercer et al 
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made the point that even in a war for national survival, such as the Second World 
War, there was conflict between politicians, military commanders and journalists 
over the acceptable boundaries of press freedom. In limited conflicts, such as the 
British Suez operation in 1956, there was no guarantee that the media would 
support going to war at all.476 Suez was not a war for survival; it was a conflict to 
restore the status quo, change a regime and protect British interests and access 
to Middle East oil.477 There was opposition amongst the UK national media, but 
that dropped back briefly once troops were committed. Shaw notes that if news of 
the Protocol of Sèvres had leaked out, revealing the hand the UK had in fostering 
an Israeli invasion of Egypt, it would not only have wrecked the whole project but 
would have also threatened Eden’s political survival.478 However, once troops 
were committed there were dangers for UK newspapers opposing the war with 
owners and editors being scared that they would be seen as unpatriotic and that 
their sales would plunge.479
 
  
It was on the international front that Eden had completely failed to agenda build 
and win the support of non-aligned nations. He found himself isolated even from 
Britain’s greatest ally, the USA, who voted against Britain and France in the 
Security Council, on the same side as the Soviet Union. Shlaim makes the point 
that the collusion with France and Israel was so transparent that it was obvious 
as a war plot.480 Such transparency militated against Eden winning any 
international support for his agenda and the Suez fiasco was to leave a deeper 
mark on British policy makers than it actually did on the Egyptians and other Arab 
nations, according to a Foreign Office internal memo of 1961.481
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successor Harold Macmillan: “We are still pursuing our traditional policy of 
extracting oil concessions from an autocratic Ruler in return for military 
concessions. It is doubtful whether this policy is realistic in the circumstances of 
today.”482 This compared unfavourably on the international scene with Nasser’s 
determination to secure “national dignity” for Egypt.483
 
 What an agenda-building 
appeal this was for other Arab states such as Algeria, trying to free themselves 
from colonialism, but also for Third World former colonial states such as India 
and Yugoslavia, which under Tito had broken away from Stalin and the Soviet 
bloc. Eden, enmeshed in colonialism, possibly perceived as a prisoner of his past 
and not thinking strategically either as a policy maker or a positive image maker, 
could not match this international appeal. 
Labour politician Denis Healey, later a Secretary of State for Defence himself, 
described Suez as a demonstration of moral and intellectual bankruptcy. He 
added: “In execution it was a political, diplomatic and operational disgrace”.484 
Healey makes the point that Eden was ill and mentally unbalanced, an opinion 
shared by Bill Deedes, later editor of the Daily Telegraph but then a junior 
minister in the Eden government485. Eden was not in control of his temper and 
reason through, partly, taking copious amounts of drugs for a painful medical 




4.6. Attempts to censor the BBC 
 
The BBC, the public service broadcaster but now with a fledgling competitor in 
ITN, had a particularly strong role in preserving balanced reporting of events. 
This was in contrast to the mainly right-wing supporting national newspapers 
                                            
482 Ashton, p.1083 and NA  PREM11/3430 Brook-Macmillan, 13 Sept, 1961. 
483 Range, p.1011. 
484 Healey, p.169. 
485 Healey, p.404; Deedes, W.F. Dear Bill: W.F. Deedes Reports (London: Macmillan, 1997), p.122. 
486 Deedes, p.122. Also in SUEZOHP 8, p.6. In this interview the UK Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union at the time of Suez, Sir William Hayter,  said  that the bile problem Eden had and the 
medication he was taking was “notorious for affecting your judgement”. 
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whose proprietors exercised their own agenda of a shared interest in maintaining 
Britain’s world status and her empire, with the caveat that they had to be 
convinced that Eden was determined to hit back at Nasser. Eden still had to 
cultivate them and convince them of his imperialist credentials, which had been 
attacked by the Daily Express as “A Day of Shame” when Eden had made the 




However, Eden during the Suez Crisis Eden showed himself unhappy with the 
BBC’s approach, despite the fact that the chairman of governors was his former 
colleague Sir Alexander Cadogan. There was a further conflict of interests here 
since Cadogan was also one of the government directors of the Suez Canal 
Company, enhancing the risk of a potential conflict of interests.488 Despite the 
apparent closeness of Cadogan to the government a rift between Eden and the 
BBC reached the point of attempted censorship by the Prime Minister and Eden 
contemplating taking over the BBC, a fact denied by his own biographer 
Thorpe.489 Yet this was substantiated from other sources such as William Clark 
who in a diary entry of August 16th 1956, noted that he had been at the Home 
Office for a meeting on censorship of the press and added: “I was struck with the 
extent to which the BBC was regarded as completely under government 
control”.490 The Suez Crisis was to cause a rocky patch in many establishment 
relationships including the “common-law marriage” of the BBC and the 
government”.491 In 1956 the BBC was vulnerable to political pressure, funded as 
it was by a licence fee decided by the government of the day, though in ITV’s 
case the dependence on advertising revenue was the vulnerable point.492
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The government’s attempts to control the BBC during the Suez Crisis are shown 
quite clearly in a letter from Foreign Office Permanent Secretary Sir Ivonne 
Kirkpatrick to his opposite number at the Cabinet Office Sir Norman Brook. The 
letter, which was only placed in the National Archives in 2007, 50 years after the 
Suez Crisis, reads:   
 
“I saw Sir Ian Jacob today and told him that Ministers were preoccupied about the 
state of the overseas services. I said that there were two powerful schools of 
thought, one of which was disposed to favour governmental control of the overseas 
services and the other, the curtailment of the £5m grant in aid to the B.B.C and its 
expenditure in other propaganda exercises. 
 
“Sir Ian looked stricken like a mother about to be deprived of her child. He denied 
the Home Service was lowering its standards and claimed that the Overseas 
Service was doing its job. He defied an impartial inquiry to come to any other 
conclusion. 
 
“I told him he might be right, but that I had felt obliged to warn him that Ministers 
were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the BBC in general and with the 
expenditure of £5m a year on its overseas services.493
 
 
“I said it was unlikely that this subject would be raised in an acute form until after we 
had finished with the Suez crisis. I undertook to keep in touch with him should there 
be any new development. 
 
“If any departments have any cause for complaint against the BBC I should be glad 
to have particulars for use in my next conversation with Sir Ian.”494
                                            
 493 Shaw, p.99.The Foreign Office gave the BBC a grant for its overseas services which meant         
that the BBC could be susceptible to political pressure if that grant was withdrawn, that is to  say if 
the UK government was unhappy at some aspects of the BBC’s coverage, such as  during the Suez 
crisis. Also Turner, p.349 
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Eden would have been briefed on this letter by Brook, and may have reflected on 
the wartime control exercised through the Ministry of Information which by 1945 
had grown into a huge organisation employing 2,205 people in the UK and 3,652 
working overseas and dedicated to releasing government news, organising press 
trips and facilities to military bases and providing pictures of actions and battles.495 
Harking back to the Second World War and BBC coverage, Curran and Seaton 
make the point that the BBC also viewed news as a part of propaganda with the 
caveat that home propaganda, the keeping up of domestic morale, depended on an 
informed public and telling people what was happening.496 In contrast, the view of 
Nazi propagandist Josef Goebbels was that ‘News policy is a weapon of war. Its 
purpose is to wage war and not to give out information.’497
 
  
This is an aspect to be examined with regard to the embedded media system in 
Iraq 2003 which, it is contended, was created exactly for the purpose as laid out by 
Goebbels, and was put into operation by the UK and USA in the Iraq 2003 conflict. 
 
In the Second World War the UK’s Ministry of Information, through wartime 
legislation, also exercised great supervision of the BBC, and through the BBC 
engaged in psychological warfare, geared closely to military and political 
strategy.498
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495 Marett, Sir Robert, Through the Back Door: An Inside view of Britain’s Overseas Information 
Services (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p.27. Philip Knightley also makes the point that in “wars 
of national survival” such as World War II, control of war correspondents will be even tighter and 
accepted by the journalists because in wartime proprietors will consider their commercial and political 
interest lie in supporting the government of the day. Knightley, P., The First Casualty: The War 
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 496 Curran & Seaton, p.146. 
 497 Ibid. 
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October 1946.499 On 5th August, 1956, Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold 
Macmillan visited Winston Churchill, who as wartime Prime Minister had exercised 
censorship of the media and who now urged that his successor Eden do the 
same.500 Eden may have thought that what had applied in 1940 did not apply in 
1956 but he did, however, put vigorous pressure on the BBC to deny the right of 
reply to Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell after his (Eden’s) broadcast to the nation 
on November 3rd in which Eden said he was convinced that the military action over 
Suez was right.501 Cadogan allowed the Gaitskell broadcast although he and others 
disliked any implicit condemnation of the British forces about to go into battle. Yet a 
quasi censorship was put into place by someone in authority since the troops on 
the way to Egypt heard the Eden broadcast over loudspeakers on board ship, but 
the Gaitskell reply was confined to officers only in the wardrooms.502
 
 
In addition, Grisewood had had further pressure put on him by Tory Chief Whip Ted 
Heath when he (Grisewood) had told Gaitskell that the BBC would raise no 
objection to a right of reply. Heath, himself under pressure from Eden, told 
Grisewood that a right of reply could only be claimed if it could be proved that the 
minister (Eden in this case) had been controversial or biased.503
 
 The invasion of 
Egypt, which had been hotly debated that day in Parliament, could hardly be 
labelled “uncontroversial.” 
Yet within the BBC itself, senior officials were unhappy and had expressed concern 
about the Corporation’s failure to balance coverage of the Government’s stand and 
opposing points of view, criticism which Cadogan refuted.504
                                            
499 Cockerell, p.499. Shaw, ‘Cadogan’s last fling, p.138. The government threatened to cut the BBC’s 
overseas budget by one fifth. 
 The previous week, 
October 26th, Cadogan and his Director General Sir Ian Jacob had met the Deputy 
Prime Minister R. A. Butler to protest at the Government’s threat to reduce the 
500 Cockerell, p.505. 
501 Cockerel, p.256. 
502 Cockerell, p.256. 
503 Clark, From Three Worlds, p.207. 
504 Shaw, Tony, ‘Cadogan’s Last Fling’, p.137. 
 140 
BBC’s External Services Budget from £5m to £4m.505 The timing of this budget cut 
was surely intended to shock the BBC into collective obedience before the military 
action over Egypt took place and to underline this the Corporation was obliged by 
Butler to have a Foreign Office official install himself at Bush House, from which 
BBC External Services broadcast, to “advise the BBC on the content and direction 
of their overseas programmes”.506   Mr A.D.M. Ross, of the Foreign Office’s African 
Department also wrote to his Information Policy Department to complain about an 
unpatriotic BBC. He said: “The BBC are (sic) the last to understand our guidance 
just as they are in a position to do the greatest harm by taking the wrong line.”507
 
 
The day before Butler’s visit to the BBC, in a Commons debate on 25 October 
1956, Eden appeared not to be putting any pressure on the BBC, answering a 
question saying: “Apart from news interviews, I have made one broadcast on the 
Suez Canal situation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has 
also made one on the same subject and one on the occasion of United Nations 
Day. He has also taken part in a discussion programme.”508 A Member of 
Parliament Mr Woodburn interjected: “I take it that this also includes television 
broadcasts. Is the Prime Minister aware that they sounded, more like apologies 
than statements?”509
 
 This interjection may point towards Eden’s apparent failure to 
win vital support in the House and a critique of his television technique. 
William Clark, Eden’s Press Secretary, said that what especially irked Eden was the 
daily BBC Press Review widely listened to in the Arab world and which gave full 
weight to the attacks on his policy by media such as the Manchester Guardian and 
the Observer. Clark stated: “It was in an attempt to deal with this running sore that 
                                            
505 Shaw, pp.138-9. 
506 Ibid. 
507 NA FO 953B1041/79. Aug 9, 1956. Letter from ADM Ross, African Dept to Information Policy 
Dept. 
508 Hansard, 25 October 1956 vol 558 cc826-7, p.826. 
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various attempts were made to control the BBC, chiefly in its external services.”510 
The BBC had been under pressure to respond to Nasser’s own radio station Voice 
of the Arabs, a very efficient  service initiated in the early 1950s and containing a 
great deal of anti-British and anti-Western commentary. From 1953 the BBC had 
been asked to respond with anti-Nasser propaganda but refused since that would 
have lost the audience’s trust in its accuracy, according to Gordon Waterfield, then 
head of the Eastern Service broadcasts to the Middle East.511
 
 
Kenneth Lamb, Director of Public Affairs for the BBC during the Suez Crisis and a 
member of the BBC’s Board of Management, has underlined the BBC External 
Service’s high reputation for objectivity. Commenting in the Report of the 
Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Services, April 
1954, to which he gave evidence, Lamb stressed that this reputation for objectivity 
had to be maintained at all costs and that the BBC would deplore any attempt to 
use it for “direct propaganda of the most obvious kind”. He added that the “best and 
most effective propaganda to many countries consists of a factual presentation of 
the news and of British views concerning the news”.512
 
  
Commenting on Suez, Lamb admitted that it had posed “exceptional problems” to 
the BBC in terms of it being an issue which could lead the country to war and on 
which the country was “deeply and sharply divided”, but added that the BBC must 
reflect all these opinions and not just those of the Government or the Foreign Office 
who, he added, saw the job of the BBC broadcasts as being to show a united 
country.513  This was the point of conflict with Eden and also the point, according to 
Lamb, when the BBC was “abruptly informed” that the grant-in-aid given by the 
Foreign Office, would be cut substantially (by £1m, a fifth of the budget).514
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Further pressure on the BBC came in a Motion for Adjournment on the BBC 
Charter on November 14, 1956, from Peter Rawlinson, Conservative MP for Epsom 
then but later Solicitor General and Attorney General in three successive Tory 
administrations. His motion carried the words that there had been a “widespread 
impression” that the BBC had not maintained its standards of impartiality over the 
crisis in the Middle East.515
 
  
Rawlinson was a back bencher but an up-and-coming figure within the 
Conservative Party and there is no doubt that this was a government-planted 
question.516
 
 Any UK government has the budgetary big stick to hand in terms of 
dealing with the BBC, through setting the licence fee as well as the grant-in-aid 
given to BBC External Services.  
The BBC, as a funded public service broadcaster, can come into conflict with 
government, especially during a military operation, where secrecy is necessary to 
preserve military security and the lives of soldiers. Yet, in the case of Suez secrecy 
was used to hide facts which the public should have had at their disposal in order to 
come to their own decisions on the rights and wrongs of the matter. Distinguished 
journalist Anthony Sampson comments in the case of Suez that the rule here was 
that everything was kept secret unless until the government decides “it wants the 
public to know what is going on.”517
 
 
Suez was to be the first crisis of the television era when what began as a military 
success and an attempt at regime change turned into a political disaster ending 
with the ignominious resignation of the Prime Minister.518
 
 
                                            
515 Lamb, p.237. 
516 Planted questions are a common tool in policy agenda building. I have been involved in them 
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4.7 Nasser v Eden: Comparisons in agenda building 
 
British propaganda may have been able to cope with the relative simplicity of the 
Cold War, but in the more complex case of the Suez Crisis it was not so easy to 
produce a good case for British intervention.519 In the West versus the Soviet 
Union, it was far easier to portray white and black, freedom versus tyranny, 
democracy through the ballot box versus imposed Communist quisling 
governments. Chapman gives an example of this “simplicity” of approach in 
1948-49 with the rise of Communist China, the ‘Yellow Peril’ added to the Soviet 
Union’s ‘Red Peril and the emergence of ‘gung-ho’ media over-enthusiasm with 
both America and Russia attaching top priority to winning over opinion at home 
and internationally by using the media to influence content.520
 
  
However, in the case of Suez how could Britain justify the invasion of a sovereign 
state for perceived financial gain with the spurious claim that Nasser was a 
Communist lackey, when there was no evidence for this?  British propaganda 
efforts just did not work on the international stage at least, although it may have 
to a certain extent in winning UK national media support where government 
claims over Egyptian “communism” on the one hand conflict with Eden’s own 
condemnation of Nasser as a fascist. Eden wrote in his own diary: “Some say 
that Nasser is no Hitler or Mussolini. Allowing for a difference in scale, I am not 
so sure. He has followed Hitler’s pattern, even to concentration camps and the 
propagation of Mein Kampf among his officers. He has understood the Goebbels’ 
pattern of propaganda in all its lying ruthlessness.”521
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 This, indeed, was turning a 
blind eye to the truth from a Prime Minister who engaged in the propaganda war 
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Aburish makes quite clear that Nasser was equally willing to send to his 
concentration camps members of the Egyptian Communist Party and those of the 
right wing Muslim Brotherhood, the latter supported by the Eisenhower 
administration as being seen as avowed anti-communists.523 Nasser would accept 
arms and other support from the Soviet bloc, but not as a satellite.524
 
 
Searle, commenting on UK government attempts to win over world opinion states 
that while jingoism may have won over a majority of the British public to support the 
invasion of Egypt, Nasser was being saluted as a hero by the leaders of many non-




Propaganda was certainly involved on both sides, but in the case of Nasser he 
won much more international support for his efforts than did Eden. Eden’s 
perception of the role of the media in successful agenda building by a 
government made him fear the effect that Nasser was having. Third World 
governments saw the extent to which Arab nationalism could defeat former 
imperialist powers, in particular through Nasser’s use of his radio station Voice of 
the Arabs to achieve these aims.526
                                            
522 Taylor, Philip M., ‘Through a Glass Darkly? The Psychological Climate and Psychological Warfare 
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 Nasser’s expert use of radio put real concern 
into the minds of the Eden government since as well as it bringing national 
support in his own country; Eden feared the destabilising effect of it throughout 
the Middle East. The invention of radio in the late 19th century had altered for all 
time the practice of propaganda with its ability to send messages across borders 
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and over long distances.527  In this vein Mohamed Heikal, editor of Egypt’s semi-
official newspaper Al Ahram, and a propagandist and ghost article writer for 
Nasser, stressed that Nasser’s attractiveness to other Arab peoples, if not 
necessarily their governments, was of a nationalist rebel searching for dignity and 
alternatives in the world political system.528 Voice of the Arabs commanded a 
much bigger audience in the Middle East than the British-sponsored Near East 
Broadcasting because of its attractive anti-colonial message and appeals for the 
rights and dignity of the common Arab.529 Indeed, the Voice of the Arabs was so 
potent that the French, fighting their own war against Algerian nationalists, set up 
a “Free Egyptian” radio station broadcasting in Arabic at a frequency close to 
Voice of the Arabs. British radio also pumped out rival broadcasts from Libya, 
Cyprus and Aden.530 The British Cyprus operation was Sharq-al-Adna based at a 
Cyprus village called Polymedia and gave a programme of music and drama 
which allowed for the almost imperceptible insertion of pro-British comment.531 
Yet it was Voice of the Arabs and Nasser’s passionate broadcasts on it to an 




Boyd describes Sharq-al-Adna, renamed as the Voice of Britain, as a 
“propaganda disaster” in his analysis of the station’s output.533 He adds that 
when the Suez War started virtually all the Arab announcing and production staff 
(many of whom were Palestinians or Egyptians), quit or were fired after 
announcing on air that they were on Egypt’s side.534
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citing eight Egyptians who would be acceptable to Britain in a new Egyptian 
government only helped to increase Nasser’s popularity and credibility since two 
of the eight were already dead.535
 
 
Egypt and Britain had made an agreement in October 1954 the terms of which 
would result in the complete withdrawal of British forces by June 1956, some 74 
years after the “temporary occupation” of Egypt began. Nasser could then gain 
great credit in the Middle East as the man who had  kicked out the British and 
within six weeks of the last British troops leaving he completed the process of 
freeing Egypt from foreign interference by nationalising the Suez Canal. This 
made him the dominant figure in Middle East politics, but also a potent force in 
the Third World.536 The use of radio was one of his main tools in building up his 
prestige and power outside as well as inside Egypt and this gave him significant 
advantages over Eden who may well have achieved domestic media backing in 
the main, but failed to build any supportive agenda internationally, had 
unsuccessfully sought to build up a picture of Nasser as a serious and ideological 
threat to Britain and the Free World.537
 
   
Nasser put something more into his broadcasts which stirred the Arab soul – 
passion – and it was through a passionate speech on Voice of the Arabs, on 26th 
June, 1956, that he gave a signal for his troops to take over key canal points. His 
declaration provoked a 10-minute ovation from the crowd gathered to hear him in 
Menshira’h Square, in Cairo and united the Egyptian people and their parties.538
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and that opposition to his rule came not only from other parties but from other 
figures within the military junta.539
 
 
Eden received the news at 10.15pm while holding an official dinner at No 10 
Downing Street for ‘friendly’ Arab leaders of the Baghdad Pact, including King 
Feisal of Iraq.540 Eden, despite training from a young BBC broadcaster called 
David Attenborough, lacked that passion and had no real feel for projecting 
himself compared with later Downing Street practice as run by Bernard Ingham, 
for Mrs Thatcher, and Alastair Campbell, for Tony Blair.541 Eden himself noted 
that every effort had to be made to prove Nasser was in the wrong and at the 
same time public opinion in this country and the world “should be prepared to 
support any action we eventually might take”.542 Public opinion, contrary to myth, 
was generally in favour of Eden and in November 1956, at the height of the crisis, 
his approval rating as Prime Minister, stood at 52 per cent, compared to 42 per 
cent for the Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell.543  Yet this could be put down to 
the public’s reluctance to be seen as not supporting the troops on the ground, the 
same feeling which, as previously noted here, led newspapers previously critical 
of Eden’s military plans, to tone down their opposition. Nevertheless, while the 
troops had landed in Suez Eden’s government was in disarray and the 
Parliamentary Opposition, unusually in a national emergency, was solidly against 
him. Most of the oil-producing nations and nearly all the oil-importing countries 
were convinced Eden was wrecking their economies and even Commonwealth 
nations were to lobby world opinion against him.544 What support Eden had, as 
reflected by the poll above, came from die-hard Conservatives and imperialists 
and those unwilling to “stab the troops in the back.”545
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Eden, contrary to his own words quoted above, failed in winning international 
support. General Sir Charles Keightley, later noted that world opinion “is now an 
absolute principle of war and must be treated as such” adding that purely military 
operations would fail in their object unless Commonwealth and Western world 
opinion was firmly on the British side.546  In this Keightley would have been 
referring to Western political leaders’ opinion rather than media which could have 
varying views. The key support would have been from the USA; it never came 
and would never come according to Sir Walter Monckton who constantly objected 
within Cabinet to armed intervention in Suez on the grounds that it would “inflame 
Arab opinion against us in the Middle East” and that it “would jeopardise our 




In an MoD paper examining all aspects of the military operations in Suez Keightley 
directly criticised Eden’s conduct of media policy and lack of international agenda 
building stressing that the lack of a strategic media plan “resulted in shortcomings in 




Turning to Nasser’s propaganda techniques, Monckton made the shrewd 
observation that anyone who had studied the Middle East and had experience of 
Middle East countries would have observed how propaganda had been used to 
support Nasser’s ambitions and “his dream of an Arab-Egyptian empire from the 
Atlantic to the Gulf.” In an insight which certainly escaped Eden, his own Prime 
Minister, Monckton added “violent, abusive insistent, hostility to us, crude it may 
have been, but persuasive in the territories in the Middle East and Africa to which 
it was addressed”.549
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 Eden, according to his Commonwealth Secretary (and later 
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(Eden was a fluent Arabic speaker) since Nasser reminded him so acutely of 
Hitler. Home said that, in retrospect, that parallel was not justified.550 In 
comparison to Nasser’s effective radio broadcasts, Sharq Al Adna/Voice of 
Britain was, according to Boyd, an embarrassing display of military and 
diplomatic ineptitude from a country otherwise experienced in radio warfare.551
 
 
Nasser’s style is clearly laid out in a telegram from the British Embassy in Tripoli 
to the Foreign Office in which a Mr Watson refers to the Libyan newspaper 
Tarablus al Gharb and an editorial praising Nasser and attacking the French and 
their allies for daring to criticise Nasser’s annexing of the Suez Canal. The 
telegram also contained a cutting from the newspaper Al Zaman which analyses 
the success of Nasser in winning Middle East support. The article says that 
Nasser discarded protocol by divulging state secrets to his people. He told the 
people of all the difficulties standing in his way. He expressed the innermost 
emotions to the people and had caught the world out by his bold act of 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the transfer of its income to the State 
Treasury.552 One of the main themes of the British propaganda war was that 
Britain’s quarrel was not with the Egyptian people but with Nasser alone and the 
British Embassy press secretary in Cairo, John Tull, gave daily briefings and 
guidance to journalists to this effect. On August 17th, the Daily Express 
correspondent in Cairo wrote an article attacking Nasser which included 
attributed off-the-record comments by Tull, a serious breach of diplomatic 
etiquette. Nasser responded that very same day by pointedly giving interviews to 
rival correspondents, including John Slade Baker of the Sunday Times.553
 
  
Unlike Eden, Nasser did not rage about critical articles, he acted to counter them 
and as his reputation grew he was visited by a steady stream of journalists and 
political figures looking to meet him and talk to him. These included three Labour 
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Party figures who became the mainstays of the UK opposition to Eden’s use of 
force, Aneurin Bevan, Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman and Heikal says 
that Nasser liked to hear arguments and views which were not quite his own.554
 
 
Evidence already quoted here points to Eden taking the opposite point of view 
and preferring arguments which supported his stance. 
Nasser’s own agenda building worked in gaining international support in the way 
that Eden’s failed. During the lead-up to the British landings at Suez Nasser 
watched “with fascination” films of the Trafalgar Square meeting with a speech of 
his friend Bevan, and the visible strength of opposition to Eden. So by Monday, 
when the landings actually took place, Nasser could see that failure was inevitable. 
All plans for the Egyptian leadership to go underground and preparations for a 
guerrilla war were cancelled.555
 
 MPs in London could even hear the roars of protest 
from the crowd in the Commons chamber, at the other end of Whitehall.  
Nasser’s opposition to the new, from 1948, Israeli state was quite clearly on record. 
He had described its creation as a result of “imperialism” maintaining that if 
Palestine had not been under the British mandate Zionism would never have been 
able to muster up enough support to realise a national home there.556
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Israeli and pan-Arab rhetoric made him popular throughout the Middle East in the 
way that the British propaganda efforts did not really capture.  Nasser’s adviser 
Mohamed Heikal comments on this and says that in foreign policy, Nasser was 
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telling tribute was the fact that its transmitters were among the RAF’s first targets 
when the British began to bomb Egypt in November 1956”.557
 
  
The British IRD never exploited radio as effectively as did Nasser, as a medium to 
get directly to the people, to hear the voice, to gauge the emotion of the speaker 
(Nasser) to be moved by that emotion and to support Nasser’s agenda.  Range, in 
his analysis of Nasserism, refers to Nasser’s tactic of using demagoguery to arouse 
Arab nationalism because he believed it could not be aroused effectively by calm 
reason and gentle persuasion. Yet in private, Nasser revealed himself to those 




The mainstay of IRD activities within local media outlets was to prepare articles for 
insertion into newspapers, magazines and journals and even then editors were 
reluctant to take them because of the lack of journalistic and editorial appeal.559 The 
IRD resorted to bribery but the point was made by diplomatic sources on the 
ground in the Middle East that the fact an editor had to be bribed pointed to the 
article not being of much interest to his readers in the first place.560 In comparison 
to this the policy of Nasser to effectively articulate Arab nationalism in the face of 
the imperialist threat from the old colonial powers, revolving around a powerful set 
of populist appeals elevated the principles of  ‘anti-colonialism’, ‘independence’, 
‘sovereignty’, and ‘dignity’ to positions of prime importance.561
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world and did not take into account the appeal of Nasser over the radio, an appeal 
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stuff”.562 But the IRD did supply the BBC with negative and scurrilous material 
about Nasser which was transmitted from Aden, Cyprus and Libya.563
 
 It had little 
effect on Nasser who had won the airwaves battle “hands down”, as Sir Humphrey 
Trevelyan, the British Ambassador in Cairo stressed in a telegram to the Foreign 
Office containing the draft of a Nasser speech made at a university rally on August 
2, 1956. Here is an extract which conveys the emotional approach of Nasser: 
“O citizens of youth, youth has always been lying in wait for imperialism. They have 
struggled for many years and never abandoned their right to live. Egypt is united we 
go ahead in our path to confirm our liberty ad independence. She has declared her 
policy of neutrality for the sake of peace, justice and humanity at large, her 
opposition to military blocs and her refusal to engage in the trade of war.  The Suez 




Trevelyan notes that the same day he made another speech, this time at a scout 
camp, telling the young audience:  “With unity and mutual faith of the Arab 
countries, Arab nationalism can stand in the face of tyranny and imperialism and 
can liberate Arab countries which have not yet been liberated”.565
 
 His technique 
worked for him in both national and international agenda building whereas Eden 
failed in the latter. 
 
4.8. Eden’s failure at internal and external media agenda building 
 
Was public relations considered seriously enough by Eden? Even in 2009, 53 years 
after the Suez Crisis, documents which touch on information handling policy are still 
absent from the files at the National Archives. Certainly Eden managed to build up 
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a climate for war very successfully in the early stages of the crisis but he could not 
maintain this over the whole three months leading up to the Suez invasion.566  He 
failed to sustain his media agenda building support within the UK; he failed ever to 
gain it internationally. The British public was deeply divided as was Eden’s own 
Cabinet; even his own senior Royal Navy adviser, Earl Mountbatten offered his 
resignation in protest over military action.567
 
 
Former Spectator editor Bruce Page makes the point that popular journalism has 
drawn successive layers of society into political decision-making and in the case of 
Suez he points out that the Daily Mirror, although it did not build its five million 
audience of 1936-1967 on those passionate about politics, provided potent 
opposition in “two of British power’s worst abusive interludes, the 1930s 
appeasement and Suez 1956”.568  The Mirror was in a minority in 1956, says Page 
where most of the press “failed dismally” in shining a true investigative light on 
Eden’s policy of invading Egypt.569
 
 Yet was this not a success for Eden in terms of 
successful agenda building? Had he not brought most of the UK media with him 
and their readers?  
He may have won support from the majority of the British media but there was 
opposition within his own Cabinet and party, opposition within Parliament and, a 
key factor, widespread international opposition including that of the USA. The time 
was past when “gunboat diplomacy” was a tool to be used by British Prime 
Ministers, a fact which Eden did not factor into his agenda building plans. He had 
isolated himself from his own press officer, he had isolated himself from intelligence 
which did not fit in with his own conception of Nasser, and he had isolated himself 
from military and Cabinet colleagues whose advice may have reined him into 
offering a more peaceful solution to the crisis instead of an ill-considered invasion. 
Tulloch writes that Eden’s resignation, on January 9th, 1957, on “health grounds” 
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was best seen as a palace coup within the Conservative Party under US 
pressure.570 His successor Harold Macmillan had long-standing personal 
relationships with President Eisenhower and documents in the Eisenhower’s 
Presidential Library in Abilene show that Macmillan had been in contact with the 
White House in November 1956 to try to restore normal relationships with the USA. 
In the memorandum of one meeting held at the White House on November 20th, 
Eisenhower referred to Cabinet changes in the UK and the “outstanding” abilities of 
Macmillan. Eden was not mentioned.571 Kyle also refers to the close relationships 
between Macmillan and Eisenhower and Macmillan’s visit to Washington on 19th 
November 1956 when he indicated that Eden would “go on vacation and eventually 




It is crucial for any government media agenda-building plan that it is strategic, 
reasoned and clearly thought out in order to get to those whom it wishes to 
influence, nationally and internationally and internally. If it is not then this offers the 
media the opportunity to provide their own interpretation of the information. Negrine, 
writing in 1996, said the media’s role had traditionally been seen as the watchdog, 
one holding governments to account with the idea that “neutral journalism” probing 
politicians puts the media in a superior and judgemental position. Yet, is this may 
not be the case in an industry where the private media are only accountable to their 
proprietors and the increasingly self-important and enhanced role may be taking the 
place of, or become a replacement for, public participation in the political debate573 
Chapman makes the point that there is an argument for the fact that the media are 
compromised by their dependence on advertising and the requirement to satisfy 
shareholders, patrons and owners.574
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opponent of the Suez invasion, labelled newspapers supporting Eden as “the most 
prostituted press in the world, most of it owned by a gang of millionaires”.575
 
 
Nevertheless, despite winning substantial media support at the start of the Suez 
crisis in July 1956, that support ebbed away and there was no strategic media 
handling strategy in place to retain it.576
 
 In August 1956, Cabinet Secretary Sir 
Norman Brook advised Eden that the use of force was becoming unpopular and 
that there could be a split in the Cabinet. Eden’s failure in the long run to bring his 
Cabinet with him, his self–isolation from colleagues and the breaking down of 
internal communication links as Clark and others have described, it is difficult, if not 
impossible to produce a strategic and successful media agenda-building plan.  It is 
suggested that there cannot be successful external communication without 
successful internal communication, which is why, at least until the fall of Baghdad in 
2003, the Blair government succeeded in successful agenda building whereas 
Eden failed. The success of the Blair government’s internal communications will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
The point has already been made in this section on the Suez Crisis that Eden had 
an obsession to remove Nasser by military means. That obsession led him to 
selectively use intelligence which fell in with his own erroneous belief, contrary to 
the evidence, that Nasser was a communist tool of the Soviet Union. That 
obsession also led him to ignoring advice from Cabinet colleagues, ignoring his 
own press adviser, ignoring advice from his own military chiefs and producing a 
government media handling agenda which may have at the start of the Suez Crisis 
won domestic media support. Yet this support was won without the media being 
aware of all the facts, especially those surrounding the Sèvres agreement and the 
involvement of Israel in which Eden lied to the media and the nation. The Times, 
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which had supported Eden from Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, 
changed sides once hostilities had started. The newspaper felt it had been used by 




The Sèvres agreement was kept secret from most of the Foreign Office and Eden 
lied about collusion with Israel to Parliament. This collusion for each country’s own 
reasons – Britain believing Nasser was undermining its Middle East position; 
France knowing that Nasser was aiding and abetting the rebels in Algeria and Israel 
resenting Egypt’s organisation of terrorist raids into their territory and preventing 
their shipping from using the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba - was denied by 
Selwyn Lloyd in Parliament on 31st October, 1956, and by Eden later on December 
20th, 1956.578  Thomas notes in his 1967 study of the British Press during the Suez 
Crisis that at this crucial point there was hostility from nearly all of the press, with 
the exception of the Daily Express and the Daily Sketch.579 Within Eden’s own 
government Foreign Office Minister of State, Anthony Nutting denounced this 
participation in what he called “a sordid manoeuvre” and claimed it would cause a 
rift between Britain and the United States, split the Commonwealth and unite the 
Arab world against Britain.580
 
  
Eden did not listen to advice and selectively used the intelligence which fitted in 
with his own preconceptions. Successful policy agenda building relies on accurate 
information to build to a solid foundation, accurate information as contained in an as 
yet to be declassified despatch from British diplomat P. H. Lawrence, in Israel.  
Dated November 10th, 1956, this casts doubts on Eden’s speech to Guildhall a few 
days before in which he gave his government’s reasons for intervention in Suez  as 
one to keep Israel and Egyptian forces apart. The telegram points out to strong 
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evidence of collusion with Israel including units of the French air force being 
stationed in Israel long before hostilities broke out. The telegram states “the French 
have managed to conceal their real intentions from HM Government”, points out 
that relationships with Arabs states and vital oil supplies have been jeopardised and 
that the “confidence of the US government in us has been shaken”.581 Mr 
Lawrence, by this time, may have been writing with tongue in cheek by not referring 
to Anglo-French collusion rather than just French collusion with Israel. Long-time 
British propagandist Robert Marett also referred to the weaknesses of British anti-
Nasser propaganda when he said that anyone with average intelligence can think 
up a propaganda line to suit a particular situation, but it will be of no value unless 
there is the men and machinery to put it across.582
 
 This study suggests that the 
“men and machinery” were present in Iraq 2003 but not in Suez 1956. 
However, there is the message to consider and the audience to whom it is directed 
and the British propaganda line to demonise Nasser did not work against a line 
from Nasser which appealed more to the Middle East mind – anti-colonialism, 
independence and dignity. This was the warning to Eden from the JIC which 
assessed that any threats of military action to bring Nasser down were unlikely to 
do so and would only arouse the sympathy of Arab states for Egypt.583 Marett 
differentiates between Arab support for the Allies in the Second World War where 
there was a traditional Arab respect for the British people combined with a 
realisation that the defeat of Germany might more quickly lead to Arab nationalist 
aspirations.584 However, as soon as the German danger was removed, Marett 
adds, the UK had no longer any message which could conceivably appeal to the 
Arab because of the UK’s involvement in the Israel/Arab dispute and the UK’s need 
to protect the Suez Canal and the oil fields when the UK’s interests came “slap up 
against those of the Arab nationalists.”585
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Keane proclaims that “the nasty business of lying in politics” is a characteristic of 
democratic governments as well as other non-democratic regimes.586 Yet the 
media can lie as well as governments, although in terms of the Suez Crisis the 
media which supported the government and their readers who supported them 
were swept along by a swell of patriotic fervour in which balance and objectivity 
were the real casualties of war.  Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism argues that 
Western (occidental) culture is saturated with negative images of the Arabs who are 
portrayed as irrational, menacing, untrustworthy, anti-western and dishonest, 
exactly the image Nasser was trying to deal with in fighting for the aspiration of 
“national dignity”, an aspiration some British media did not appreciate. 587 American 
historian Willard Range, writing only three years after Suez 1956, and well before 
Said published his theory, said that Nasser had repeatedly expressed his contempt 
at Western perceptions of the Arabs and the West’s failure to grasp their yearning 
for national equality and almost pathological suspicion of any attempts to maintain 
supervision or control over them.588
 
 
In the context of conflict this would lead to a disregard for Arab communication and 
encourage a greater willingness to attack Arab states.589 The Arab is seen as a 
disrupter of the West and Israel’s existence and who, through oil (or control of the 
Suez Canal in 1956) threatens the West’s existence. 590
 
 All credit then to media 
such as the Mirror, as Page has pointed out, who ignored the stereotype, were not 
caught up in jingoism and asked the questions other media should have been 
asking. All credit, too, should be given to the BBC who, despite improper pressure 
from Eden did its best to uphold its own Charter and the ethos of public service 
broadcasting.   
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Shaw states that Eden certainly built the climate for war in the early stages of the 
Suez Crisis with newspapers such as the Daily Express holding to the imperialist 
past policy of its owner Lord Beaverbrook591. This is a stark contrast to the 1956 
coverage of the Daily Mirror which took a line contrary to Eden’s media agenda 
building. One of the great innovative newspaper editors in terms of investigative 
reporting was Harold Evans of the Sunday Times and in referring to the 1899-1901 
Boer War he labels the atmosphere in Britain as too jingoistic and with a perverted 
sense of patriotism.592
 
 This could equally have been applied to media coverage of 
the 1956 Suez Crisis, a media coverage which, on the whole, followed Eden’s 
agenda building (such as it was) and certainly gained national support. Yet it 
dismally failed to extend that to international support, so much so that 48 hours 
after the military landings at Suez the war was stopped, due mainly to international 
pressure from the USA. That pressure was done through the International Monetary 
Fund which, without American backing, refused to bail the UK out of its serious 
financial crisis which it was then going through, without withdrawing from Egypt and 
coming to a peaceful solution to the crisis. It also led to Eden’s resignation as Prime 
Minister, ostensibly on “health grounds” and his replacement by Harold Macmillan. 
The lack of international support was referred to in a reflective Ministry of Defence 
paper from General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander in Chief Allied Forces 
during Operation Musketeer.  Entitled Operations in Egypt November to December 
1956 and dated 24 Sept 1957, it reviewed all aspects of the military operation and 
was favourable towards the purely military aspects. However in a last paragraph 
Keightley directly criticised Eden’s conduct of media policy and lack of international 
agenda building. The paragraph reads:  
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“In modern days world opinion is a most important weapon of war. This was fully 
appreciated at the outset by myself and my staff but regrettably the short notice 
which we had before operations started resulted in shortcomings in press 
communications and arrangements which we never managed to rectify in time.”593
 
  
Once military action starts it is easy for any government to play the patriotic card 
and attempt to curb press criticism by claiming it endangers the troops. Walter 
Monckton, no longer Minister of Defence due to his internal, but not publicly 
expressed, opposition to military action and still in the government with new 
responsibility for coordinating government PR, refers to this in a diary entry of 23rd 
November, 1956. He had received a letter from Daily Mirror editor Hugh Cudlipp 
which criticised Anthony Head, Monckton’s successor at MoD. Head was quoted in 
the publication Everybody’s Weekly, dated 3rd November, 1956, saying:  “The 
easiest thing in the world is to spread discontent among the troops who haven’t 
enough to do.” Cudlipp took umbrage at this and pointed out to his own service with 
8th Army in the Second World War. He also referred to the Territorial Army and 
pointed out that despite objections to the Eden military action, the Daily Mirror had 
urged reservists “Do your duty – whatever your grievance”.594
 
 
Mountbatten refers to the lack on international support in a letter to the First Lord of 
the Admiralty Lord Hailsham, sent on 2nd November, 1956 in which he also quotes 
General Keightley telling him that the plan (Operation Musketeer) would “make the 
whole of the Middle East almost untenable and would entirely defeat the objects 
which he thought the Government had in view.”595
 
 Mountbatten also criticises 
Eden’s failure to gain international support for his agenda, quoting the same letter 
to Hailsham:  
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“I felt that in doing so (attacking Egypt) we would be acting against the charter of 
the United Nations which we ourselves had done so much to build up,” and adding 
“it would lose us any support in the Arab world”.596
 
  
Indeed, Mountbatten’s determination to set the record of Suez straight and defend 
his own position was baulked by Eden’s successor as Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, who in 1963 imposed a special embargo on records relating to the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. This meant that ministers or officials could not consult records 
relating to Suez without the express permission of the Prime Minister. Macmillan’s 
embargo, primarily intended to prevent Lord Mountbatten gaining access to the 
Suez archive.597 Eden had lost the internal support of Mountbatten and others such 
as Keightley, Monckton and Clark, he had failed to gain international diplomatic 
support, but he also failed in public diplomacy, attracting little support from the 
international media. The Normandy-style invasion of Suez, with the build-up and 
time factor involved in assembling the forces, moved international opinion already 
sympathetic to Egypt further away from the UK.598 Two days after Mountbatten’s 
letter, on November 4th, 1956, Soviet forces entered Budapest in massive numbers 
to crush the Hungarian uprising. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev later admitted in 
his memoirs that the Politburo had been riven with indecision about “crushing the 
mutiny” but the Suez Crisis reinforced the decision to use force and influenced the 
timing of the Soviet operation.599 Suez was a welcome distraction as the British 
Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Hayter, warned in a cable to London on 2nd 
November, 1956. He said that the Russian change of stance over Hungary “was 
largely because they saw us taking the law into our own hands in Suez”.600
 
 
Unlike the Blair government in Iraq 2003, Eden failed in media agenda building. 
There was no real media strategy in his plans, other than personal talks to editors 
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and the use of propaganda, often “black propaganda” at that. Governments have to 
use carefully crafted communications strategies to ensure they get “good press” for 
their policies.601 He also failed to effectively use television which by then was in 
two-thirds of British homes and, in his Prime Ministerial broadcast of 8th August 
1956, he had not learned his script as he had in previous interviews, and was 
forced to wear spectacles to read the script in large type. He looked uncomfortable 
and, according to his Press Secretary William Clark, believed that “these 
communists in the BBC” were deliberately shining the studio lights in his eyes.602 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, in contrast, looked comfortable on television and gave 




Eden certainly did not face the problem of dealing with the satellite and internet age 
and 24-hour reporting as did Blair, but he recognised that something had to be 
done when in the immediate aftermath of the crisis he appointed Charles Hill, a 
former broadcaster, as Postmaster General, to undertake a comprehensive review 
of the Government’s information services.604 Hill, in his memoirs, refers to his 
review and is scathing about the lack of guidance given to government spokesmen 
by the Eden administration. He said that despite the lack of success in government 
media handling during Suez, in his restructuring of government communications he 
still found ministerial colleagues suspicious of anyone talking to the media.605 His 
findings were particularly critical of the presentation of the UK Suez case overseas, 
but also of the lack of access by press office professionals to their ministers and the 
perception by permanent officials of press officers as a “necessary evil”.606
 
  
For Eden in the Suez Crisis there was a failure in policy agenda building in terms of 
winning international support and, more crucially, support from the Middle East 
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states.  William Clark recounts a conversation with King Hussein of Jordon when 
Clark was later working for the World Bank. The king asked if Clark had been 
involved in the Suez affair, and when Clark replied that he had, King Hussein said: 
“What a tragedy; the day that Britain finally fell off its pedestal, particularly around 
here.”607 There was a failure to build an agenda with the USA which wished to 
avoid any disruption to essential oil supplies and forced the UK to withdraw from 
Suez by withholding $600 million financial guarantees needed to relieve the 
country’s financial crisis.608 President Eisenhower offered the UK these guarantees 
on 20th November 20, 1956, with the proviso that the UK and France withdrew from 
Suez, which they did on 21st November.609  The US secret negotiations were with 
Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Deputy Prime Minister R.A. 
Butler and not with Eden, negotiations which Eisenhower personally authorised at 
the November 20th White House meeting. At the same meeting Eisenhower 
authorised Deputy Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr, to assure Arab nations 
that the USA was putting great pressure on trying to get the troops out of Suez and 
re-establish the oil markets.610
 
  
There is irony in the statement made by Eden in 1937 when he was Foreign 
Secretary: “Good cultural propaganda cannot remedy the damage done by bad 
foreign policy” adding “even the best of diplomatic policies may fail if it neglects the 
task of interpretation and persuasion which modern conditions impose”.611
 
  In 
highlighting this quote Nye was referring to his concept of “soft power” and Eden’s 
understanding in 1937 of the necessity of combining good foreign policy with 
interpretation and persuasion, a policy he did not follow in 1956. 
Eden, in 1956, was determined to use “hard power”, the use of force as a matter of 
policy. In order to retain support for the use of force a key tool was to win the 
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backing of the bulk of the UK media in order to use their influence to gain the 
support of their readers. He had a smaller media field to influence in 1956 than did  
Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2003 yet Eden forgot his own 1937 words in that this 
influence had to have a persuasive and justifiable foreign policy in a democratic 
society in order to build up a persuasive and effective media agenda building policy.  
 
Four years after Suez, when Eden published his memoirs, he was still blind to his 
failures in media and policy agenda building. He quoted his own statement of 14th 
December, 1956, when departing from London Airport for a holiday in the West 
Indies. He defended his actions and said: “We were right, my colleagues and I, in 
the judgements and decisions we took, and that history will prove it so.”612
 
  
History has not. Suez showed that Britain could no longer act in world affairs in a 
manner seriously politically at variance with its senior partner and protector the 
United States.613 William Clark, in his 1974 essay, put it succinctly when 
commenting on the lessons future Prime Ministers could learn from Suez: “One 
cannot successfully lead the country into a military adventure without preparing 
public opinion.”614
 
 And to reach the public and mould public opinion, this does 
involve a successful media agenda building policy which brings the media on side, 
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5. Iraq 2003 
 
5.1 Background  to the 2003 Iraq conflict 
 
The publicly-stated purpose of the United States’ going to war in 2003 was “regime 
change” – to rid that country of the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. U.S. 
President George W Bush emphasised the urgency of this course of action on 
January 28, 2003, in his nationally televised state of the union address.615 In a 
similar vein, as quoted in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair said: “Our quarrel is not with the Iraqi people but with Saddam, his sons 
and his barbarous regime which has bought misery and terror to their country.”616 In 
a speech to the House of Commons on 18th March 2003, Blair committed the UK, 
subject to a Parliamentary vote, on backing President Bush and taking military 
action to remove Saddam, repeatedly accusing the Iraqi leader for failing to 
disclose the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in his country.617
 
  
Regime change, therefore, as in Suez 1956, was on the UK government agenda. 
Blair told the ‘House: “It has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in 
the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in 
public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances;  
notes the opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq 
being at the time of Resolution 1441618
                                            
615 Mian, Zia, ‘The Empire of Fear’, in Vanaiik, Achin (ed), Selling US Wars (Moreton-in Marsh,           
Gloucs: Arris, 2007), pp.154-155. 
 and continuing to be in material breach, the 
616 Snow, Nancy, ‘From Bombs and Bullets to Hearts and Minds: U.S. Diplomacy in an Age of 
Propaganda’, in  Kamilipour, Yahya R. & Snow, Nancy (eds) War, Media and  Propaganda 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p.19. 
617 Kampfner, John, Blair’s Wars (London: The Free Press, 2004), p.308 and Hansard, House of 
Commons debate, 18 March 2003, c760. 
618 Resolution 1441 said: “Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to 
international peace and security,Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to 
use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 
1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore 
international peace and security in the area. Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed 
obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring 
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authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today;  
believes that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations 
as set out in Resolution 1441 and many Resolutions preceding it, and therefore 
supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the United Kingdom should 
use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction; and offers wholehearted support to the men and women of  Her 
Majesty’s Armed Forces.”619 Blair’s Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell says that it is all 




In a January 28, 2003, Blair’s speech had referred to WMD, adding: “The British 
government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities 
of uranium from Africa.”621
 
 This bought in the question of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) being in the hands of Saddam Hussein, a fact later disproved 
but enough to raise fears in the West and win Bush and Blair sufficient, but not 
majority, media and public support for intervention and regime change just as the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956 had given Eden substantial media 
and public support. If the Bush and Blair fears over WMD, and their continuing 
public relations policy exposing these fears were calculated to win support for 
intervention before the invasion of Iraq, the embedded reporter system was put in 
place to sustain that support during the actual conflict, an agenda-building tool 
Eden did not have. 
                                                                                                                                  
international peace and security in the area. Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an 
accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its 
programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 
one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and 
production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it 
claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material. 
619 Hansard, House of Commons debate,18 March 2003, c760. 
620 Powell, p.264. 
621 Sylvester & Huffman, p.7. Note: Bush also implied that Saddam had WMD and US presumptive 
action would be based on a UN Security Council resolution requiring Saddam to fully disarm. On 
March 17, 2003 Bush gave Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq or be removed by force. By this time most 
journalists were in Kuwait or embedded with their  assigned troops. Months of positioning satellites 
and preparation were about to pay off with the most advanced equipment any journalist had taken on 
the battlefield. 
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Britain’s ambassador in Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer, reflected that the 
failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was hugely embarrassing to 
Tony Blair “who had rested his case for war solely on Saddam’s failure to disarm”. 
Yet Meyer asserts that in fact Saddam was buying off France and Russia through 
supplies of discounted oil, illegal under the UN interdict, in exchange for weapons, 
most of which went unreported in the media.622
 
 
Saddam had failed to comply with a UN Security Council Resolution and to readmit 
inspectors to his country to search for WMD and, in his memoirs, Meyer recounts 
the diplomatic to and fro in Washington and London as to whether to wait for a new 
Security Council Resolution, or to go ahead and invade Iraq. That resolution (USCR 
1441) came on November 8th 2002 and offered Saddam the final opportunity to 
admit the weapons inspectors, which he did and the team returned to Iraq in 
November after a four-year absence. However, Meyer points out the weakness of 
Resolution 1441 in that its wording threatened “serious consequences” if Saddam 
failed to comply and did not specify war. Yet President Bush was determined on 
regime change, as he said in his State of the Union speech to Senate and 
Congress on January 29th, 2003, calling it “a crusade against evil.623  Meyer, who 
retired early in 2003, reflected that there were too many mistakes and 
misjudgements in the lead-up to the conflict which helped alienate world opinion but 
continues to maintain that Tony Blair, far from being an American “poodle”, was 
acting from “the highest of moral ground”.624  This may have been the case, but as 
in the UK military action against Egypt in Suez 1956, it lacked the international 
legitimisation conferred by a UNSCR such as was the case in 1991 when the 
United Nations passed a resolution giving Iraq until January 1991 to pull out of 
Kuwait.625
                                            
622 Meyer, Christopher, DC Confidential (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p.227. 
 Also, in 2003, the Coalition had only four members - USA, UK, Australia 
and Poland, although Colin Powell, now US Secretary of State, claimed there was 
623 Meyer, pp. 254-262. 
624 Meyer, p.284. 
625 Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-maker from the 
Crimea to Iraq (London: Andre Deutsch, 2004), pp.489-90. When the deadline passed with no action 
from Saddam Hussein U.S. and Coalition aircraft began their attacks on Iraq. 
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another 15 members who preferred to remain anonymous.626 In addition, compared 
to the 35-member Coalition of 1991 against Iraq which had Arab members and the 
fiat of a UNSCR for military action against Iraq, in 2003 there were no formal Arab 
military contributions.627 Here then in the two case studies set out here are the 
points of similarity – regime change without the international approval given by a 
UNSCR – in addition to military action against Iraq in 2003 being hotly disputed 
throughout the UK, in the media and in Parliament where 139 Labour MPs rebelled 
against the government motion for military action.628 As experienced war reporter 
Jon Swain remarked in January 2003, just before the actual fighting broke out, this 
was the first time since the invasion in Suez in 1956 that a British government had 
sent British troops into combat without popular support at home.629
 
 
It is interesting that Blair, in the House, gave an ambiguous statement to qualify the 
support he had had from the public. He said: “To date I have received nearly 
30,000 letters and cards about the subject of Iraq. Given the volume of 
correspondence I receive, over one million letters in the last year covering a broad 
spectrum of issues, my office records the numbers of letters received on a subject 
rather than by the view expressed. However, I know that many people have written 
to me expressing concerns about action against Iraq and I reiterate what I have 
said that no decision has been made to take military action and military action is not 
inevitable. My office works hard to ensure that all the letters receive appropriate 
responses.”630
 
 There is, in this statement, no qualification about support for 
government policy, only the numbers of letters received. 
Blair, not being able to quantify the public support he was receiving and lacking that 
vital agenda-building UNSCR that he wanted was still committed to action with the 
USA. General Sir Michael Jackson, the UK’s Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in 
2003, wrote in his memoirs that Blair needed the UNSCR “possibly for internal 
                                            
626 Moorcraft & Taylor, p.182. 
627 Ibid, p.182. 
 628 Kampfner, p.309. 
629 Swain, Jon, ‘Close-up: Iraq’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003), p.25. 
630 Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 15 January 2003, c676. 
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political reasons as much as for anything else.”631 Jackson, one of the intellectual 
soldiers of our generation, despite his rough, plain-speaking image and nickname 
of “The Prince of Darkness”, examined previous UNSCRs himself and concluded 
that Blair was entitled to authorise military action against Saddam Hussein since he 
(Saddam) had not complied with the terms of the ceasefire halting the 1991 conflict 
(in being open about ridding himself of WMDs). Therefore, says Jackson, it is 
entirely possible to regard the two Gulf Wars “as being a single war with two ground 
actions separated by a long operational phase.”632 One may regard this as a valid 
point of view, or mere semantics, but Jackson, who later stated that the political 
reasons for action against Saddam have proved to be flawed, had highlighted a 
valid point on agenda building – the necessity of an additional UNSCR for “internal 
political reasons” as Tony Blair’s Director of Communications at the time, Alastair 
Campbell, reflected in his diary, making the point that the UK, unlike the USA, was 
not a “superpower” and ideally required the legitimacy conferred by a UNSCR to 




Alastair Campbell adds, in the second part of his diary, that Blair needed the 
legitimacy of a new UNSCR in order to mobilise Arab opinion.634 However, as well 
as this international legitimacy, Blair needed to gain domestic support once military 
action started, and the embedded reporter system was key to winning and retaining 
that support once the actual conflict had commenced, a conflict perhaps the most 
controversial UK military intervention since the 1956 Suez Crisis.635 The embedded 
reporter system built on the support Blair already had won through backing from 
newspaper proprietors Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black, with the majority of 
newspapers supporting military intervention.636
                                            
631 Jackson, General Sir Michael, Soldier: The Autobiography (London: Transworld Publishers, 
2007), p.328. 
 Blair also went on a round of 
632 Ibid, p.329. 
633 Campbell, p,635. 
634 Campbell, Countdown to Iraq, p.439. 
635 Moorcraft & Taylor, p.183. 
636 Greenslade, p.661. Greenslade reflects that the Mirror’s criticism of Blair going to war with Iraq in 
2003 lost the newspaper readers, on the grounds that its readers did not “revel in criticism of a 
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television and radio interviews (he was much happier and more skilled in media 
presentation than Eden), including an ITN discussion when he faced a group of 
voters sceptical of the need for force and an hour-long show on MTV when he 
discussed the need for military action with a group of young people from Europe 
and the Middle East.637 It is worth comparing this with Eden’s media approach to 
radio and television which he outlined in the House of Commons. Labour M.P Willie 
Hamilton asked Prime Minister how many broadcasts he had made in his official 
capacity in previous three months; how many such broadcasts have been made by 




The Prime Minister (Eden) replied: “Apart from news interviews, I have made one 
broadcast on the Suez Canal situation. My right hon. and learned friend the Foreign 
Secretary has also made one on the same subject and one on the occasion of 
United Nations Day. He has also taken part in a discussion programme.”639
 
 
In his autobiography Blair comments that his involvement in Iraq was not the same 
as Suez where in 1956 Britain and France, against America’s wishes, sought to 
topple Nasser and failed.640
 
 He was right about America’s wishes but it is 
suggested that both had the commonality of taking military action for regime 
change and being without the international legitimacy of a UNSCR. 
In the lead-up to the actual outbreak of military action Blair used other methods to 
strengthen his political agenda and justify military action. These included the setting 
                                                                                                                                  
government in times of conflict”, exactly the same situation that the Mirror  faced in Suez 1956. Also 
(Greenslade p.271) the Sun, with its normal “jingoistic” stance offered Tony Blair its full support, 
increasing its sales while the Mirror’s circulation dropped below two million for the first time in seventy 
years. 
637 Stanyer, James, ‘Politics and the Media: A Crisis of Trust’, Parliamentary Affairs (Vol. 57 No. 2 
date), p.421.  Six daily papers supported the need for invasion –The Times, Sun, Daily Telegraph, 
Express, Daily Mail and Star – a combined circulation of 9.4 million. Opposing military action were 
the Mirror, Guardian and Independent with a combined circulation of 2.7 million.  
638 HC Deb 25 October 1956 vol 558 cc826-7 
639 Ibid. 
640 Blair, Tony, A Journey (London: Arrow, 2011) p.391. 
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up of a unit nominally in his No. 10 office but physically situated in a basement in 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the other side of Downing Street.641 This 
unit, the Coalition Information Centre (CIC), headed by Blair’s Director of 
Communications Alastair Campbell, researched any material which could discredit 
Saddam Hussein and produced articles which could be published in the media. 
This was a similar unit to the IRD, trying to do exactly the same job of discrediting 
Nasser in 1956. The CIC articles could be placed in the realm of “white” 
propaganda by some commentators although they were all factual and truthful. 
However, one could more accurately use Entman’s definition of this as “mediated 
public diplomacy” in that this technique uses mass communication (including the 
internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign policies among 
audiences beyond that country’s borders.642 For example one article written 
demonstrated Saddam’s (a Sunni Muslim) persecution of Shiite clerics and his 
murder of prominent mullahs. This was distributed through another government 




To ensure uniformity  and to co-ordinate US and UK media agenda-building 
strategy, CIC conference calls were made every day at 10am UK time, linking 
No.10 with the White House, State Department, Department of Defense and other 
elements of the US administration plus the briefing centres in the Middle East.644  In 
the UK the Ministry of Defence (MoD) responsibility for co-ordinating media within 
the UK fell under Lt.Col. Angus Taverner, the director of news media operations 
policy, whose remit was to co-ordinate the military and civilian press functions 
within the MoD.645
                                            
641 The author was seconded from the Home Office to join that team as a researcher and writer of 
articles. 
 More than 100 media reservists were called up with secondary 
642 Entman, Robert M., ‘Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. case’, The International 
Journal of Press/Politics (Vol. 13, No. 2, 2008), p.88. 
643 The author of this study’s own recollections, and the article in question, as a member of the CIC. 
644 Author’s recollection but also in Tumber, Howard & Palmer, Jerry, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis 
(London: Sage Publications, 2004), p.64. 
645 Ibid, and also J.T. Campbell interview with Lt.Col Taverner 22nd May 2008. 
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roles to act as media operators when needed.646 A number of these were members 
of the Media Operations Group (V), Territorial Army media specialists whose civilian 
jobs were in newspapers, radio, television or public relations. The original strategy 
of forming that group was that they knew and understood the journalistic trade and 
could, it was hoped, for links with the media covering the build-up to the actual 
conflict. This was not a group in existence during the Suez 1956 conflict. For Blair, 
and the whole UK government media agenda building machine, anything that could 
give them an edge and win media and public support was justified. Tulloch writes 
that the Daily Mirror had opposed both the Suez and the Iraq 2003 conflicts and 
had helped to mobilise popular opposition to the war, including large-scale public 
demonstrations and both Swain and Tulloch in their essays are exposing the need 
for the Blair government to win greater media and popular support.647 Tulloch 
points out that from January 1, 2003 until 20 March, 2003, in the run up to the 
invasion of Iraq, the Mirror devoted 20 front pages in their entirety out of a total of 
68 to the issue with a further 26 in part devoted to Iraq.648
 
  
Alastair Campbell refers to the Mirror’s opposition in his diary entry for January 31st, 
2003, when he wrote that a poll in the Mirror said 2 per cent felt the war on Iraq 
would make the world a safer place.649 He passed this news on to the White House 
just to show President Bush “so that he knew we were up against it” and also noted 
that Tony Blair had slept badly that night feeling that there had to be a second 
UNSCR to legitimise any military action, in contrast to President Bush who felt that 
the invasion could go ahead without this legitimisation.650 Campbell notes that he 
had to let the White House know that with this newspaper opposition and public 
lack of support “our balls were in a vice.”651
                                            
646 Tumber & Palmer, p.65 
 He also recollected that Blair felt that 
without the fiat of the UN, media pictures of Iraqis carrying “dead babies out of 
647 Tulloch, John, ‘The Daily Mirror and the invasions of Egypt (1956) and Iraq (2003)’, Journalism 
Studies (Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007), p.45. 
648 Tulloch, p.48. 
649 Campbell, Alastair, Countdown to Iraq, p.440. 
650 Campbell, Alastair, The Blair Years (London: Arrow Books, 2007), p.660. 
651 Ibid. 
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bombed buildings” would put the British government in real trouble.652 Former 
Cabinet Minister and Labour Party strategic media planner Peter Mandelson 
comments that previously in 2002, Blair had persuaded President Bush to work 
through the United Nations to build up diplomatic pressure against Iraq to disarm 
but if diplomacy failed then the case for military action would be harder to make 
than that against Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on America.653 Jonathan 
Powell, arguing for diplomacy, wrote that “to turn Karl Von Clausewitz’s dictum on 
its head, diplomacy is nothing but a continuation of war by other means” adding that 
the Blair government had spent most of its time in government not fighting wars but 
trying to prevent them, citing diplomatic initiatives to stop or prevent military 
violence in Northern Ireland, India and Pakistan but particularly in the Middle 
East.654
 
 There was no diplomatic breakthrough and no UNSCR and both Bush and 
Blair prepared for military action and sought support for it. 
In the lead-up to the actual fighting, the UK government did not neglect to use on-
line news, not only from the websites of No.10, the Cabinet Office and the MoD, but 
also through press releases to try to influence favourable coverage on media 
websites, not only reaching domestic audiences but those abroad since there were 
only four countries in the Coalition and the UN Security Council had not voted for 
military action.655  Best et al, in their examination of on-line news during the conflict 
with Iraq, point out that for the BBC news websites, more than 50 per cent of the 
on-line traffic originated from outside the United Kingdom.656
 
 Any UK government 
media agenda-building policy would have to keep this in mind bearing the lack of 
domestic and international support for military action.  
Also, the Cabinet Office had a 24-hour Media Monitoring Unit (MMU) which 
constantly reviewed what was published in newspapers, radio and TV. When 
                                            
652 Ibid, p.661. 
653 Mandelson, Peter, The Third Man (London: Harper Press) p.353. 
654 Powell, p.277. 
655 Kampfner, p.306. 
656 Best, Samuel J., Chmielewski, Brian & Krueger, Brian S., ‘Selective Exposure to Online Foreign 
News During the Conflict with Iraq’, The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics (Vol. 10, No. 
4, 2005), p.54. 
 174 
adverse coverage of UK political actions is discovered a rapid rebuttal machinery 
moves quickly into motion to refute any bad publicity and seek to place proactive 
material. All UK government departments were represented  at the 0830 meetings 
of all Ministerial departmental media heads, or their deputies, chaired by Alastair 
Campbell in which adverse news coverage was discussed and a quick decision 
was made on what the line to attack that adverse coverage was to be and how it 
was to be done. For instance, if the attack was made by newspaper A, an exclusive 
off-the-record briefing could be given to rival newspaper B to undercut the first 
report. This would not be done by a press office civil servant (Civil Service rules of 
impartiality precluded this) but by a political appointee, usually a special adviser 
who was a Labour Party member. If a Minister was put up to refute any allegation, 
Alastair Campbell would pick the best one for the job, and not necessarily a minister 
from the department which was the subject of the adverse news report. It was his 
call, and the Secretary of State for that department could not, or would not, contest 




Nevertheless, in the lead-up to what was to be an unpopular war the UK 
government had a media agenda-building advantage with surveys showing that 51 
per cent of newspaper readers in Britain read a newspaper which shares their 
political leanings.658 With a majority of the UK national newspapers showing 
support for the government’s possible military action against Saddam, that did ease 
pressures on the government’s attempts to seek positive supportive newspaper 
coverage. Even the Mirror, which opposed the war, was forced to tone down its 
attacks as readers turned away, according to Greenslade because “Mirror readers 
do not revel in criticism of the government in time of conflict”.659
                                            
657 Author’s personal recollections. 
 Moreover its main 
competitor and rival, the Sun, kept up its accustomed jingoistic stance offering Tony 
658 Best et al, p.56. 
659 Greenslade, p.661. 
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Blair full support, causing its circulation to rise while in contrast, the Mirror’s 




5.2. The embedded reporting strategy evolution 
 
The embedded reporter system as operated in Iraq 2003 emerged from the media’s 
dissatisfaction with the “pool” system as operated in the 1991 Iraq War when the 
journalists were kept back from access to the front line, bringing accusations 
against the military of micro-managing battlefield news.661 Curtis maintains that in 
the 1991 Iraq War both Britain and the US established a tightly-controlled “news 
management” system in which no journalists were allowed into Saudi Arabia 
without official permission. Once they were there they came under the control of the 
Joint Information Bureau (JIB) run by British, Saudi and American officials. The JIB 
was accused of issuing, under the pretext of press briefings, disinformation such as 
Iraqi soldiers surrendering and helicopters defecting, not to mention the Iraqis 
moving chemical weapons to the front line, as reported by the BBC and others.662 
Swanson touches upon this when he refers to politicians and officials becoming 
much more sophisticated and effective in manipulating news coverage by methods 
such as staging events to satisfy journalists’ needs for interesting video pictures 
and timing statements and actions to meet news deadlines.663
                                            
660 Greenslade, p.671 
 This can lead to 
journalists seeking to resist politicians’ manipulation and asserting their own 
661 Knightley (2004), pp.49-492. 
662 Curtis, Mark, Web of Deceit (London: Vintage, 2003), pp.23-24. 
663 Swanson, David L., ‘Transnational Trends in Political Communication: Conventional Views and 
New Realities’, in Esser & Pfetsch, p.51. From my own experience in Whitehall I can testify to this 
view except, when arranging major announcements I would look for pictorial illustration to illustrate 
that announcement since I knew that is what the media wanted. For example, when I was Assistant 
Director of the UK Government’s Anti-Drugs Co-ordination Unit in 2001, when publicising the Annual 
Report I arranged a media picture opportunity with my Cabinet Office Secretary of State in front of a 
seven-foot high pile of bags of seized heroin and cocaine. The picture appeared in most of the UK 
national newspapers. I would hardly call this manipulating; it provided acceptable pictures for the 
media and it was factual. 
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There was, from the media’s point of view, a lack of live action coverage which led 
journalists to seek to manufacture news. Colonel David McDine, a member of the 
Territorial Army Public Information Officer group, was stationed at the JIB in 
Dhahran and touches on this subject. 
 
 “In the absence of hard news, journalists interviewed one another and on one 
afternoon alone three backwoods American television crews in succession filmed 
British public information officers fighting the verbal war – on the telephone. It was 
evidence, if any were needed, of the thirst of material to fill the apparently endless 
hectares of air and print space devoted to the conflict.665
 
 
The BBC’s Ben Brown refers to the same lack of news in 1991 and recollected: “It 
was a weird war then, sitting with the troops for weeks and weeks and it was all 
over in 72 hours. So there wasn’t a huge amount to report.” Brown, who also 
covered the 2003 Iraq War, maintains that due to the amount of media complaints 
and dissatisfaction he felt that this led to the change of policy in 2003 when 




In 2003, both the US and British military introduced “embedded journalism” where 
accredited journalists travelled, slept and ate with combat units – and faced the 
same enemy fire.667
                                            
664 Ibid. 
 It seemed a fair deal for the media proprietors and editors in 
that their reporters and cameramen were now in the front line and, with modern 
technology, could broadcast and send live material of on-going military action. Yet, 
as this study will contend, this government amending of the 1991 Iraq War “pool” 
665 McDine, David, ‘The view from Dhahran,’ Despatches (London: MoD, Autumn 1991), p.21.  
666 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Ben Brown 28/09/2007. 
667 Katovsky, Bill & Carlson, Timothy, Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq – An Oral History, 
(Guildford, Conn., USA: Lyons Press, 2003), p.xi. 
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system, while apparently satisfying the media, actually allowed the UK government 
to build its own political and military agenda under the guise of a media agenda, a 
fact admitted by the UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon who 
commented that while the viewers would be seeing more of the war than ever 
before they may actually be learning less.668 Alastair Campbell, after a meeting with 
NATO Director if Information and Press Jamie Shea, and his deputy Mark Laity, 
said that it was almost impossible to lose the military battle with Iraq but perfectly 
feasible that we could lose the battle for hearts and minds.669
 
 
Therefore, on October 30, 2002, Campbell, as Blair’s senior adviser, was already 
aiming to formulate a media plan to secure public support. Key to this was the 
embedded media plan and this chapter looks at this initiative in the lead up to and 
during the three-week 2003 Iraq War. The first section will deal with the evolution of 
the embedded media strategy and in the following section how this strategy worked 
for the media. Section 3 will examine how embedded journalism actually worked for 
the UK government and the next section will look at the question as to whether 
embedded reporters were a bonus for objective reporting or coup for government 
media agenda building.  
 
There is a symbiotic relationship between the policy maker and the media, each 
feeding off the other, each gaining something from the bargain. Although some 
politicians may regard the media as parasitical (sucking from the host body politic 
without contributing anything in exchange) the real relationship is in the way of 
symbiosis, which unlike parasitism gives some benefit to both parties in the 
biological bargain. So, we have an arrangement here, with host (government) and 
symbiote (media) equally benefiting. But in a time of conflict this may not be enough 
since any government has to secure its home base and support its own agenda. 
Influencing the media is part of that agenda-building process, but as ITN’s Political 
Editor Michael Brunson comments, 2003 made this difficult for the UK government 
                                            
668 Tumber & Palmer, p.24. 
669 Campbell, Countdown to Iraq, p.73. 
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in that they had far less control than they used to over information reaching 
journalists from the battlefield.670 Advances in broadcast technology such as 
satellite transmission, digital photography and lightweight portable equipment put 
more power in the hands of the reporter while eroding official capacity to control 
that information and “allowing individuals to consume more information, more 
quickly, from more places in the world, and with less interference from censors than 
ever before”.671
 
 This is not a problem Eden had in 1956. 
Even before these technological advances, and reflecting on the Vietnam War, 
Sylvester and Huffman refer to TV eroding support for the conflict. “Nightly news 
film of carnage on the battlefield created a stark contrast to official military 
pronouncements that the United States was winning the conflict - uncensored 
reporting resulted in a distrust between the military and the media that continued 
until the embed programme began.”672 The embedded programme arose when the 
American and British authorities realised that with the new portable satellite 
equipment it would be almost impossible to enforce a blanket news ban.673 
Therefore the principle of embedded reporting became a very attractive proposition 
in that it appeared to give the media the access to front line fighting which they 
were denied in the 1991 Iraq conflict, but it also gave the military authorities greater 
control (my italics) since the embedded reporters relied on the military for transport, 
food, power (the ability to recharge electronic equipment) and protection. Knightley 
remarks that there had to an “appearance of open-ness and truthfulness.”674
                                            
670 Brunson, Michael, ‘Putting ourselves beyond reproach’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 15, No. 1, 
2004), p.17. 
 The 
embedded media system appeared to fulfil this but Konstantinidou, reflecting on the 
media images of death in the Iraq 2003 conflict refers to the images produced by 
embedded reporting as “perception management”, part of a government learning 
process stemming from the Vietnam war, the “body bag” syndrome and the desire 
671 McNair, Brian, ‘From Control to Chaos: Towards a New Sociology of Journalism’, Media, Culture 
& Society (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2003), p.550. 
672 Sylvester, Judith & Huffman, Susan, Reporting from the Front: the Media and the Military (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p.5. 
673 Hamilton, John, War in Iraq: Real-Time Reporting (Minnesota, USA: Abdo, 2004), p.27. 
674 Knightley (2004), p.529. 
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One can refer back to the 1991 Iraq War and the fierce criticism of the BBC’s 
Jeremy Bowen’s report on the deaths of civilians following a missile attack an 
alleged Iraqi military command bunker which was actually an air-raid shelter 
and contained 300 civilians.676 Bowen was accused by a UK newspaper of 
“stabbing our boys in the back” for featuring the images and two diverging 
points emerge from this. Firstly, the UK and US authorities would try to 
avoid such images in 2003 and, secondly, it would be in Saddam Hussein’s 
interests to allow in 2003, as he did in 1991, Western media access to 
civilian casualties – his own attempts at “perception management” and the 
showing of images of civilian death and grief calculated to turn the opinion 
of those seeing them against the military invasion of his country, as featured 
in the Greek media according to Konstantinidou’s study.677 The contrast 
here, as Nossek states,  is in the message of political violence which is why 
media coverage is important for those behind it, both as an end in itself, and 
as a means to other ends.678
 
  
For the UK and US governments the “political violence” of civilians, 
especially women and children, being killed, would be counter-productive to 
their political aims, a similar problem faced in Suez 1956. Therefore, 
embedded reporting which showed only military conflict, would win more 
support and less opposition than showing civilian casualties. The opposite 
was the case for Saddam Hussein to whom the showing of civilian 
casualties would be more likely to win support for a cessation of hostilities, 
as happened on February 1991 when two laser-guided bombs smashed 
                                            
675 Konstantinidou, Christina, ‘Death, lamentation and the photographic representation of the Other 
during the Second Iraq War in Greek newspapers’, International Journal of Cultural Studies (Vol. 10, 
No.2, 2007), p.149. 
676 See footnote 673. 
677 Konstantinidou, p.150. 
678 Nossek. Hillel, ‘Our News and Their News: The Role of National Identity in the Coverage of 
Foreign News’, Journalism (Vol. 5, No. 3, 2004), p.349. 
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through the roof of a shelter, believed to be an Iraqi command post, but in 
fact was an air-raid shelter holding over 400 people.679 Western reporters 
were ushered to the scene by Iraqi minders and given free rein to film the 
devastation, horribly charred remains being brought out to ambulances and 
angry relatives screaming in grief.680
 
 One can make a similar case for the 
Israeli/Hamas conflict in Gaza in January 2008; Hamas gains more world-
wide support from “civilian” casualties inflicted by the Israeli military 
whereas the opposite is true for Israel which, indeed, banned foreign media 
from the area of fighting, it is proposed, for that very point of view. 
Robert Hodierne, who covered the Vietnam War as a reporter and was the senior 
managing editor for Army Times during the 2003 conflict, said that embedded 
reporting was a brilliant strategy based on a more sophisticated understanding of 
the role that the media can play.681 In the 1991 Iraq War the stated reason for 
keeping reporters out of the front line was the fear of inadvertent broadcasting of 
information to the enemy over 24-hour news channels, coupled in the American 
government’s case with the spectre of the Vietnam War and the effect television 
reporting had on raising public opposition to the war.682 Paul and Kim refer to the 
“horrible press-military breakdown” in the Vietnam War which brought trust between 
the two to an all-time low, forcing changes in how the USA, and other 
democratically-elected governments, could forge an agenda-building policy to win 
media support, key to reaching out for public support.683 Cottle, in his study of 
media coverage of conflict, refers to the self-conception of the journalism profession 
as public watchdog and provider of information and resources for public opinion 
formation.684
                                            
679 Moorcraft & Taylor, p.160. 
 Bearing this in mind, in planning coverage of the 2003 Iraq conflict, 
media organisations had also to take into account the danger to their reporters, 
cameramen, drivers, and other supporting staff. As Katovsky and Carlson underline 
680 Ibid. 
681 Hall, Jane, p.79. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Paul & Kim, p.iii. 
684 Cottle, Simon, Mediatized Conflict (Maidenhead, Berks: Open University Press, 2006), p.3. 
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at the start of their study into the embedded reporter programme: “Statistically, 
journalists were ten times more likely to die than the 250,000 American and British 
soldiers who would be involved in the war”. So, taking into account the risk to life if 
any organisation chose to go the “unilateral” way, that is to cover the war using their 
own transport, entering the front line without protection and possibly being victim to 
live fire from both sides, it is not surprising that many major media organisations 
chose to take part in the embedded reporter programme.685
 
  
The programme itself caught the media by surprise when on October 30th, 2002, 
U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld “wandered unexpectedly into a meeting of 
Washington bureau chiefs of the major media outlets” and told them that he 
regarded the best way to combat the news management of the Taliban, in 
Afghanistan, and the terror group Al-Qaeda was to have accurate, professional 
journalists on the ground to see the truth of what was going on; thus the embedded 
programme was apparently born.686
 
 
This contention is denied by Lieutenant Commander Steve Tatham, a British 
military briefer in the Iraq 2003 War. He said that when he joined the media 
planning staff for Operation Rocky Freedom in September 2002 the embedded 
programme was already well set in place although there has been disagreement 
between the U.S. and the UK governments over its exact structure. Tatham said: 
“The U.S. decided that all its media coverage was going to come from the embeds, 
whereas the UK said no. All the embeds are going to see are a tiny, small, subset 
of the operations the unit they are embedded with. So the major information plan 
will come from a strategic level, from Downing Street, from the press office there, 
from the Ministry of Defence and from three press information centres at the 
operational level.”687
                                            
685 Katovsky & Carlson, p.xi. 
  In other words, Tatham says, there was no UK intention to 
use the embedded reporting system as a “distraction” but he did admit that the 
media became fascinated with the imagery from the front line embedded reporting, 
686 Ibid. 
687 Campbell, J.T., Interview with Lieutenant Commander Steve Tatham. 
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a narrow, action focussed imagery which dominated television especially, it is 
contended, at the cost of more strategic analysis of events.688 Rumsfeld certainly 
praised it as a “historic experiment” with its initial appeal to the media of front-line 
reportage, a clear improvement over the pool coverage of Iraq 1991.689 The 
journalists had to sign a contract with rules on what and when they can report, 
including restrictions on reporting details of military actions and on showing the 
faces of the dead and wounded.690
 
 
Mark Laity, a former BBC Defence Correspondent, and now spokesman at 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, refers to 
the embedded reporters suffering from the Stockholm syndrome, that is to say 
close identification with their “captors”, the military unit with which they were 
embedded and which may have affected their objectivity. He is also critical of the 
original concept of just having embeds at the front and then nothing between them 
and the main Coalition briefing centre in Doha, in Qatar. Laity would have had 
embeds at brigade, division and corps levels to give greater strategic media 
coverage, he said in an interview.691
 
 
Laity, as one of the very few military “spin doctors” who has had a senior 
broadcasting background, praises the UK military briefing system in 1991 in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as much superior to the Coalition briefings in Doha, in 2003. 
He reflected: “Every day (in 1991 when he was a BBC Defence correspondent) I 
got real meat, analytical meat. As the BBC radio pundit in residence at HQ in 
Riyadh for four days out of five I got real meat at the briefings where things were 
said, things were briefed where I could say well they’ve done this and  this what it 
                                            
688 Stanyer, p.422. At the beginning of the military intervention TV audiences soared with the main 
BBC and ITV news  attracting five to six million people. In addition, compared to the 1991 conflict 
40& of British households had access to three or more 24 hour news channels whose viewing 
figures swelled, particularly when news was breaking. Sky News was the most watched with figures 
peaking at 1.23 million. 
689 Kennedy, Liam, ‘ Securing vision: photography and US foreign policy’, Media, Culture & Society 
(Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008), p.284. 
690 Ibid. 
691 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Mark Laity. 
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means. In the 2003 Doha briefings there was no meat…it was bland, soporific stuff 
cotton wool stuff. If I had been there I would have been furious, absolutely 
furious.”692 Laity, as a former top rank defence correspondent refers to the main 
U.S. military briefer Brigadier General Vincent Brook as a “motormouth” who just 
set the lines and said nothing of substance.693 It is a fascinating view from a 
“poacher turned gamekeeper”, which is to say from a former BBC war 
correspondent who was now a military spokesman. Hammond also quotes criticism 
of the lack of detail in the Doha briefings at the expense of presentation and wrote 
that Coalition spokesmen held forth from a ‘podium of truth’ designed by Hollywood 
art director George Allison; Michael Wolff, of New York described the media centre 
there as the “theatre of the absurd” and articles in the Independent and the 
Guardian respectively referred to jargon used after a cock-up and “the way the war 
is being spun and reported”.694
 
  
The embedded system created a conflict for American and British media 
organisations: 
 
• accept the protection, support and special briefing of embedded status with 
its risks of censorship and possible loss of objectivity, or 
• risk the lives of staff by going down the “unilateral” route.  
 
Major UK and U.S. media organisations opted for embedded status, no doubt with 
the thought that they could still preserve journalistic integrity. Nevertheless, there 
was a hidden agenda here in that the military, US and UK, abandoned the policy 
that had been (despite some, and mainly print journalism criticism) successful in 
1991 in media agenda building and adopted a policy of embedding in 2003, a policy 
which they had resolutely refused to implement in the first Iraq War. In their study of 
media/military relationships Hess and Kalb say that the embedded policy was 
adopted in 2003 because the war was an unpopular one, compared to 1991, and 
                                            
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Hammond, p.61 
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that the public needed to see that information came through the media rather than 
official sources if public support was to be won.695 ABC’s Ted Koppel, who covered 




Yet, in a moment of truth Vice president Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense in 
the 1991 Iraq War, said: “I do not look on the press as an asset. Frankly I looked on 
it as a problem to be managed.”697
 
 In 1956 Anthony Eden felt the same as the 
Suez chapter demonstrates. Cheney is regarded as one of the most powerful vice 
presidents ever and the “management” implicit in the 2003 embedded journalist 
system may have stemmed from the 1991 media handling arrangements where 
there was a gap between the reporters at the front with their narrow tactical view 
based on what one small formation of soldiers was doing and those at the press 
centre in Dubai who accepted the big picture strategic briefings. The former may 
have been too narrow and tactical in what they saw/reported and in the latter the 
journalists may have been too reliant solely on what they were fed by the one-star 
briefers who went live on TV leaving the reporters little to do themselves 
In contrast to, and in apparent conflict with, his vice president, one of the prime 
designers of the embedded journalist programme, the U.S. Defence Department’s 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Bryan Whitman, maintains 
that the policy was implemented to give the American people the opportunity to see 
their military at work and also to counter disinformation from the enemy.698
  
  
Yet not every journalist accepted this almost Faustian bargain. The Independent’s 
Robert Fisk, who had covered the 1991 conflict, and was now reporting on the 2003 
war takes issue with even the word “embedded”. He asserts: “It was a sign of 
complacency of the press that they willingly adopted this supine word as part of 
                                            
695 Hess, Stephen & Kalb, Martin (eds), The Media and the War on Terrorism (Washington D.C: 
Brookings Press, 2003), p.12. 
696 Ibid. 
697 Sifry & Cerf, p.127. 
698 Hall, Jane, p.77. 
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their own vocabulary”.699  More circumspectly, the BBC’s Middle East editor Jeremy 
Bowen, who also covered both Iraq wars, underlines the advantage of the 
embedded system to the military. Bowen says: “What has changed enormously, 
even in the years I have been in the news business, is the technology, and the fact 
that everyone from governments to insurgents knows that the best way to 
communicate with their supporters, and to win over new ones, is to get their version 
of what happened on to the airwaves. Winning the information war is no longer 
incidental: it is a top military priority”.700
 
 The embedded reporter structure gave just 
that advantage to the military and this study will examine the contention that the 
system was deliberately employed by the UK and US military as a positive agenda 
building policy, not as one to give the media better access to the battlefront, the 
access they had been denied in the 1991 war. 
Writing in 1986, Blumler and Gurevitch accepted the idea that the mass media play 
a pivotal part in the nexus of power relations in society but at the same time 
suggested that the linkages between media organisations and other power-wielding 
institutions are still segmented and incomplete.701
 
 More than 20 years has gone by 
since they made this academic assertion. In observing these linkages from the 
point of the UK political decision makers it is proposed to follow an audit trail which 
may, or may not, show that as far as embedded reporting was concerned, the links 
between the media and the UK government (as a power wielder) was not 
segmented, was far from incomplete and, in fact, was planned and a success for 
UK government media agenda building. The “audit trail” referred too should provide 
the answers to this dissertation’s main research question: 
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How did the UK government plan and successfully amend its agenda-building 
strategy in order to win the support of the media in two conflicts - Suez 1956 and 
Iraq 2003? 
 
It may be worth noting in comparison that in the early days of the democratically- 
elected National Socialist government in Germany in January 1933, Chancellor 
Adolf Hitler had yet to bring in the total command of the media and was confronted 
with an elaborate network of competing interests and elites (military and business 
mainly) whose support or cooperation was essential to maintain the impression of 
voluntary coordination in terms of press ownership and cinema and working 
together to support the state.702 Kallis in his study refers to this as “remarkably 
orderly and consensual.”703
 
 This could provide the template on which a UK 
government could work, similar to the early generative days of the Nazi government 
before total control of the media was enshrined in German legislation, a control the 
UK government could never have in 2003 not only because of the freedom of the 
press ethic enshrined in British life and legislation but also due to the fast 
expanding globalisation and technical changes in media transmission. 
Globalisation has also meant that by 2002 an increasing number of Arabs were 
getting their news from sources outside their borders, a point not missed by British 
and American media policy makers who wished to influence this group and win 
their support. Tumber and Palmer make the point that the advent of transnational 
Arab language satellite broadcasters, such as al-Jazeera, using Western-inspired 
news gathering methods fundamentally changed the pattern of the media in the 
region.704
                                            
702 Kallis, Aristotle, ‘Nazi Propaganda and ‘Coordination’: The Haphazard Path to Totalitarianism’, 
European Review of History (Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2006), p.116. 
  Alastair Campbell recollects that in a meeting with King Abdullah of 
Saudi Arabia on November 1, 2002, the king said he was worried about the impact 
of al-Jazeera which was developing a real sway among the broader Muslim 
703 Ibid. 
704 Tumber & Palmer, p.130 
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community.705 In 2003, unlike the 1991 Iraq War, there were no Arab troops in the 
Coalition forces and therefore no real political support for the invasion of Iraq from 
neighbouring Arab countries. In 2001, Professor Shibley Telhami, of the University 
of Maryland, conducted a survey with Zogby International in six Arab countries—
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates. He 
repeated the survey in 2003 and found in just two years, a huge increase in the use 
of satellite television. Egypt, for example, went from about 8 per cent to 46 per cent, 
and similar percentages of change were found in the other countries.706
 
 Hiebert 
makes the point that mass communicators often must work in a hurry and convey 
the message in the shortest possible time or space. This is where the 
instantaneous nature of TV came in, from embedded reporters conveying live 
images by satellite to not only their own countries, but to the whole world, including 
Arab countries which had doubts about the evidence for war. 
Indeed, there is an abundance of research to show that the mainstream media 
have a long history of supporting the efforts of a government during war.707
 
 Kumar 
makes this allegation in support of her accusation that the Bush administration used 
“faulty and false” information to justify the 2003 war on Iraq, but the accusation 
surely applies to the UK government who supplied some of that information. 
McQuail comments on the changing media conditions in 2003 relating mainly to the 
continuing expansion and globalisation of the media and their main forms as “news 
and entertainment.” He cites this as creating a voracious demand for content 
through instant reporting from the battlefield which creates “dependencies” in terms 
of government news management through access to the battlefield and the offering 
the benefits of war coverage to chosen media.708
                                            
705 Campbell, A., Countdown to Iraq, p.75. 
 This area of “dependencies” will 
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be looked at in the next section and, from analysis from personal interviews with 
media figures and military media planners, other published media accounts of 
relationships with military “minders”, this dissertation will attempt to answer the 
question cui bono, for whose benefit?  
 
 
5.3. How the embedded reporter strategy worked for the media 
 
Media editors certainly saw benefit in the scheme, compared to the barred access 
to the front line in Iraq 1991 and on the whole accepted the new embedded system 
and nominated staff to embedded positions. But what did the embedded reporters 
themselves and other media specialists think about the system? Louis A. Day, now 
a media professor and himself a U.S. Army Public Information Officer with 199 Light 
Infantry Brigade in Vietnam, said that the disadvantage of embedded reporters from 
military’s standpoint is that if something goes wrong “reporters are right there to 
report it.” Nevertheless, he claims it can be a big dividend when reporters are 
around compared to 1991 when reporters were kept out of the front line.”709 Ed 
Timms was a staff writer on the Dallas Morning News.  A very experienced 
journalist, having covered Iraq 1991, Balkans and Israel-Palestine conflicts, he 
believed the embedded reporter programme worked well, and added: “After the 
1991 War, journalists had clamoured for better access to front-line units. Certainly 
there were attempts to manipulate the media, but journalists were able to do a 
much better job this time because it was cheaper than fielding so-called unilateral 
reporters in the region. Ideally a good mix of embedded and unilateral journalists 
would provide the most comprehensive coverage, but that wasn’t always the 
practice. Embedded reporters had little opportunity to include the perspective of the 
Iraqis in their stories. Few of us spoke Arabic.”710
 
 
                                            
709 Sylvester & Huffman, p.34. 
710 Sylvester & Huffman, pp.120-121. 
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Philip Jacobson, veteran foreign correspondent for the Sunday Times, Sunday 
Telegraph  and Times, notes that when the 2003 war with Iraq was likely journalists 
in Britain and the USA were rushed through costly “battlefield survival”  courses, 
most run by former special forces soldiers, with SAS veterans cornering the UK 
market. He makes the point that he was all in favour of reducing the occupational 
risk with the best equipment on the market, including a £750 state-of-the-art flak 
jacket.711 He quotes BBC correspondent Kate Adie, similarly protected, as saying 
that in a front-line situation “the search for facts was one of the minor aspects of life 
and survival became a priority.”712 How attractive then was a place as an 
embedded reporter, protected by professional soldiers while at the same time 
getting exclusive access to front-line stories, access not allowed in the 1991 
conflict. Knightley refers to the danger of unilateral or freelance reporters in the 
2003 conflict with 15 journalists reported dead, some media suspecting that they 
had been targeted by the American forces. “Those journalists prepared to get on 




There appears to be no suspicion, on the other hand, that British forces targeted 
unilaterals. Yet there is an interesting view from BBC embedded reporter Tim 
Franks, who was stationed with an Army Field Press and Information Centre six 
miles north of the Iraq/Kuwait border. He said it was: “Also known as the FTU – 
Forward Transmission Unit, or, as our commanding officer explained to us, ‘Fuck 
the Unilaterals’.”714
                                            
711 Jacobson, Philip, ‘Hacks dodging the flak’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003),pp.30-
31. 
 It is interesting that he refers to “our” commanding officer. It is 
even more interesting that the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sean Tully 
used that statement. People may be all too familiar with the black humour often 
employed by troops; it helps to lighten the load in times of stress. Yet in this case it 
seems to indicate a deliberate policy to control media information flow through the 
712 Jacobson, p.33. 
713 Knightley, Phillip, ‘History or bunkum?’ British Journalism Review (Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003), p.7. 
714 Franks, Tim, ‘Not war reporting – just reporting’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003), 
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embedded reporter system – use of a technique to influence the media into 
supporting a political agenda.715
 
 
The BBC’s Ben Brown was stationed at divisional level with a Forward 
Transmission Unit with the task of gathering material from embedded reporters with 
the front-line units, and transmitting the material back to London via satellite link. He 
admitted that the Army briefer at this level, Colonel Chris Vernon, had actually 
admitted that he wanted to try and use the media as a psychological weapon. “His 
idea was that there was an uprising in Basra and me and Christiane Ammanpour 
(CNN) would be choppered in by the British military with our satellite dish and we’d 
be broadcasting from there. Saddam would be sitting in Baghdad and would see 
that CNN and the BBC were in Basra, the second city, and the whole regime would 
implode and crumble and that would be a kind of propaganda way of winning the 
war, but it never quite worked out like that.”716
 
 Again, this appears to be a deliberate 
attempt to use the military tool of psychological operations by involving the media, 
as stated in additional research question No.4. 
John Donvan, who reported the war for ABC’s Nightline as a unilateral and not an 
embedded reporter, is critical of the concept in that the latter trivialises war. He 
commented: “The only thing I have against embedding is that the news media itself 
falls in love with the glitz and glamour and the whiz-bang of embedded reporting 
and puts too much emphasis on embedding that it lets the public forget they’re not 
seeing the war itself, but a tiny slice of the war.”717
                                            
715 The full question is:  How did the UK government make use of media management techniques to 
influence the media into supporting the government’s political agenda? 
  One has then to speculate if this 
was actually the intention of the government media controllers who formulated the 
programme. John Hodierne, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter who covered the 
Vietnam War, said the problem with embedded reporting was that there was no 
overview and he put that down to the military briefers in the rear areas who, he 
716 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Ben Brown. 
717 Hall, Jane, p.83 
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The UK had actually used embedded reporters in World War 1. Six correspondents 
were embedded with British forces on the Western front and produced, according to 
Knightley, the worst reporting of just about any war and were knighted for their 
services. He added: “One of them, Sir Philip Gibbs, had the honesty, when the war 
was over, to write that he and his colleagues identified themselves completely with 
the armies in the field. Their successors in Iraq 2003 “soon lost all distinction 
between warrior and correspondent and wrote and talked about ‘we” with boring 
repetition,” Knightley contends.719
 
 This points towards to a reliance on “official 
sources” with reporters appearing not to feel themselves manipulated, which in 
itself appears to be a success for the political agenda of the UK government and its 
media agenda-building policy. 
BBC war reporter veteran Kate Adie, commenting on media/military arrangements 
in the 1991 conflict, pays tribute to the military personnel assigned to the media as 
appreciating the working principles and understanding the technical side of 
journalism.720
                                            
718 Hall, Jane, p.84. 
 This was not surprising as many had professional journalism 
experience themselves and were Territorial Army members of the Media 
Operations Group, originally headed and founded by a former Territorial Army 
colonel, Alan Protheroe, also a former Assistant Director General of the BBC. Adie 
wrote than in retrospect she would liked to have had more cameras up with the 
forward units, though this would involve the military committing transport and escort 
resources. This was noted by the military and the changes were made to realise 
Adie’s aspirations through the embedded reporter system in Iraq 2003 as outlined 
by Earl Casey, a senior editor at CNN and involved in training and equipment 
issues. Casey claimed the embedded reporter programme worked better than any 
719 Knightley, p.8. 
720 International Press Institute, Reporting the War: A collection of experiences and reflections on the 
Gulf (London, 1992), p.1. 
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other approach and comparing it to the first Iraq War he added: “In 1991 there was 
no freedom of access. It was not perfect but Iraq was not conducive for unilaterals 
because the chance of being shot up by the U.S. was high.” He had his teams of 
reporters and cameramen field testing new equipment in Kuwait for weeks before 
the outbreak of fighting, especially the Thurya cell phone system based in Dubai 
and which gave good reception in the battle area.721 The embedded reporter 
system in 2003, and its approval by senior media editors such as Casey, appears 
to partly answer the “release of information” point in that the media were up in the 
front line, they had up-to-date transmission facilities and had access to information 
denied in Iraq 1991.722
 
 
Chris Shaw, a senior Channel 5 news controller, says that during the three-week 
Iraq war around 1.5 million people became addicted to rolling war coverage with 
Sky News increasing its audiences by a factor of seven. At certain key moments 
Sky news was actually the fourth most popular channel in all British homes, 
something that had never happened before – a real success for embedded reporter 
coverage.723
                                            
721 Sylvester & Huffman, pp70-72. 
 Terrestrial programmes, especially ITV and BBC went “war crazy” with 
huge volumes of special programming, fed again by embedded reporters and 
instant satellite pictures, linked to the usual studio analysis. ITN also switched its 
bulletin from 10pm to 9pm to get in with the latest news an hour before BBC’s 10pm 
programme. The key difference between Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003 was the sheer 
volume of action footage which, it is suggested, left less room for studio analysis. 
This contention will be approached again in this dissertation’s Conclusions chapter. 
BBC World presenter Nik Gowing refers to this instantaneous action coverage as 
“the tyranny of real-time” which creates an immense political problem for the British 
government. Gowing, who made this statement in a lecture in May 2004, was 
referring to events reported post conflict in Iraq when there was much more time for 
722 Additional research question No. 1 is: What arrangements were made by the UK government and 
military sources for the release of information to the media, and why were these arrangements made?  
723 Shaw, Chris, ‘TV News: why more is less’, British Journalism Review (Vol.14, No.2, 2003), p.58. 
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media analysis and reflection.724
 
 This was not the case, it is suggested, during the 
period of actual conflict when instant images from the battle front were in the 
forefront of news reporting. 
Hilary Andersson was in Iraq 2003 for the BBC, based at British Divisional HQ in 
southern Iraq. She had two other female colleagues also based there for the BBC – 
Caroline Wyatt and Kylie Morris – and also based at the HQ were veteran conflict 
reporter Christiane Ammanpour (CNN), along with Cordelia Kretzschmar (GMTV) 
and Emma Hurd (Sky). Andersson recollects the amazement of the soldiers at the 
female presence: “We were, of course, immersed in the male-dominated world of 
war. The tens of thousands of soldiers by whom we were surrounded couldn’t have 
been more amazed at our presence had it been the Dark Ages.”725
 
 She refers to 
the “wow” factor of having them in the front line in her article and the novelty of 
female presence so near the battle front. That “wow” factor, seeing female reporters 
in flak jackets and helmets, ostensibly reporting from the front line, may have been 
a strong attraction to viewers but the key word here is “ostensibly”. In other words 
the figure of a reporter, female or male, appearing to report from the front line, not 
able to see any action and relying on information from “official sources”, transmitting 
these answers to the public via satellite link, may be in danger of unwittingly falling 
into a propaganda or psychological information trap, as outlined by Ben Brown. 
Knightley makes the point that the main problem with the British embedded 
coverage was that there was so much of it. British news networks extended their 
budgets by a combined £22 million to cope with raised viewing figures and there 
were more live pictures from the battlefield than had been the case in any previous 
war.726
                                            
724 Gowing, Nik, Media, the Law and Peace-building: from Bosnia and Kosovo to Iraq’, The Alistair 
Berkley Memorial Lecture (London: London School of Economics, May, 2004). 
 This multitude of images obscured any real analysis of the war which had 
become television picture-led and deployed the best writers and reporters, 
regardless of their gender.  Pictures showed women reporters giving live on air 
725 Andersson, Hilary, ‘The wow factor’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003), p.20. 
726 Knightley, p.10. 
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reports near “the front line” but actually in a more safe position of a headquarters, 
created a “wow” factor, mentioned earlier in this chapter by BBC reporter Hilary 
Andersson. “That’s why women and war make good television”, she said.727
 
 
Andersson adds that women added a breadth to war reporting, perhaps by 
reporting the human side more fully, but she is frank when she says that there are 
many men who report with enormous depth and adds that the best argument for 
woman reporting is that it massively expands the pool of available talent. 
The deployment of embedded women reporters certainly added to the variety and 
attractiveness of TV coverage, but it could also be seen to be advantageous to the 
military and politicians. The reports from female reporters were not from the front 
line, as Andersson admits, and the material they broadcast – picture opportunities, 
interviewees – were provided by the military and naturally weighted in their favour 
without appearing to be so and could be construed as propaganda or psyops ploys. 
 
Caroline Wyatt, like her BBC colleague Ben Brown, was based at an FTU, or “hub” 
with the job of receiving reports from the front line embeds, processing them and 
transmitting them to London, adding her own live on camera assessments. “They 
would be doing the micro stuff, in theory, and we would be adding the briefing that 
we had. In theory this should make sense of what was happening,” she said. “In 
practice, it was very hard to make sense of what was happening from where we 
were because in terms of the people who were commanding the war, leading the 
war, they were not based in our camp.”728
 
 
Andersson admits, despite her flak-jacketed and helmeted presence and reports to 
camera, all was not what it seemed: 
 
“If you dig beneath the surface of Gulf War II, beneath the fact that every time you 
turned on your television a woman was on screen, you will discover that we were 
                                            
727 Andersson, p.22. 
728 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Caroline Wyatt. 
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not actually at the front line. We were visible all right, but that was because we were 
far enough to the rear of the action to be able to use a satellite dish safely without 
endangering large numbers of troops by attracting incoming fire. In fact on the real 
front line, military embed positions were entirely dominated by men.”729
 
 
Wyatt admitted that she was not getting enough briefings from the general at her 
location, a point reinforced by Ben Brown. Both are honest enough to admit that the 
generals had a war to fight and could appreciate the real situation. She reflected: 
“We were sitting in the middle of a very sandy camp with some very nice people but 
we weren’t really at headquarters.”730
 
 
Wyatt and Andersson’s BBC radio colleague Tim Franks was in a more front-line 
position, based at a Forward Transmission Unit (FTU) supposed to provide a view 
of the broad sweep of British military operations across southern Iraq. He would 
receive material from the actual front-line embedded journalists, known as “rushes” 
in the business and add to it briefings he received from the military and material he 
would gather himself from Army organised facility trips. Franks makes it quite clear 
that the FTU commanding officer, Lt. Col Sean Tully wanted the journalists to be 
part of their “information operations”, that is to help the military deliver “a particular 
message to particular audiences”, both in the UK and Iraq. Franks adds: “We were 
in Tully’s words ‘a tool, a weapon, and a battle-winning asset’”731 In addition, a 
senior officer, who did not wish his name used, told Franks: “We are in the business 
of news management. We are not interested in the anti-war view”. This 
“management” concentrated on British journalists; French and German 
broadcasters who asked for embedded status and “were told to go to hang”, 
according to Franks.732
                                            
729 Andersson, p.21. 
 Again the evidence here from Franks points to the UK 
730 Campbell, J.T., Wyatt interview. In military terms the “hub” reporters like Wyatt, Brown and 
Andersson were at “echelon”, the administrative area to the rear of the actual operational divisional 
HQ. It was the wrong place to be since it gave no access to the divisional commander whose HQ 
was nearer the front line. 
731 Franks, p.16. 
732 Franks, p.16. 
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government making use of propaganda techniques through selective management 
of news. 
 
Franks said the embedded system worked for him although he tried to keep up 
normal journalistic objective standards and distance himself from the military, 
particularly difficult when living check by jowl with soldiers and relying on them for 
everything to sustain life, including protection. Franks here is expressing his 
thoughts on possible military manipulation affecting journalistic objectivity as 
outlined in my supplementary research question No. 3.  At the FTU journalists were 
given privileged access to information but Franks notes that it was “information 
which had always to be treated sceptically.733
 
  
However, to be fair to Lt.Col. Tully, Caroline Wyatt takes a more sympathetic view 
when the news did come that Allied troops had entered Basra. By then the military 
could receive BBC TV at their camp and Wyatt did a live broadcast in which she 
confirmed the news about Basra. “Sean came up to me after the live broadcast very 
upset that I had not used the words ‘Basra had been liberated.’ I felt that it was my 
job to remain impartial in the use of words. Yet I could see his criticism was from 
the heart and that he was genuinely upset.” Wyatt said she had fallen into military 
speak on occasions and in one live broadcast she referred to ‘the RAF taking out 
targets’ which led to an article in the Independent criticising her for not referring to 
civilians being killed. “I should not have said that. If civilians are killed you should 
report that,” she added in retrospect.734
 
  
Caroline Wyatt admits that as an embedded reporter she was in the wrong place. “I 
can see that they did not want us sleeping near to the general but where we were 
they did keep us at arm’s length,” she added. “People were extremely pleasant, 
very helpful. We did get daily briefings, some of which were more informative than 
others. Some of them would turn out to be utterly, absolutely wrong and where 
                                            
733 Franks, p.17. 
734 Campbell. Wyatt interview. 
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those failures of communication came from I don’t know. There was one day we 
reported that 80 Iraqi tanks had been seen breaking out of Basra; about two hours 
later it was down to one Iraqi tank. It was a failure of communication somewhere 
along the line.”735 She described Col. Chris Vernon as “an incredibly nice chap” but 
by the time she was briefed she said the information was probably third or fourth 
hand and that it was difficult to get the full picture.736
 
 
Yet there were good relationships between military and media which extended 
beyond professional and into comradely. On a professional and trust level, the 
BBC’s Adam Mynott explains how he was taken into confidence on attack plans, a 
confidence which can, and must for fear of endangering troops, put some 
inhibitions on the reporter: “The commander of the 15th MEU (Marine Expeditionary 
Unit) had opted for a policy of total disclosure to the journalists embedded with his 
troops. The conditions he placed on reporters were straightforward: we were to 
report only events that had happened, not what was planned. Days before the 
attack took place I had a clear idea of how the ‘war plan’ should enfold.”737
 
  
On a comradely level, almost as one of the soldiers himself, the BBC’s Ben Brown 
spelled out the conflict between getting close to the troops and journalistic 
objectivity: 
 
“Normally I feel rather revolted if I see bodies on a battlefield; I flinch from looking at 
them too closely. They are the ultimate reminders of the naked brutality of war, 
which most of our audience, including our politicians, never get to see because 
they’re usually too horrific to broadcast. But on this occasion I caught myself 
experiencing a nasty sense of triumph. The man who wanted me dead, was now 
                                            
735 Campbell. Wyatt interview. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Mynott, Adam, ‘Mynott, Adam, ‘Umm Qasr – assault on the port town’. In Beck, Sara & Downing, 
Malcolm (eds), The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War against Saddam and a 
New World Agenda (BBC Worldwide, 2003), p.7. 
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dead instead. And as the old saying goes, there’s nothing more exhilarating than 
being shot at without result.”738
 
 
Similarly, Asahi Shimbun correspondent Tsuyoshi Nojima embedded with the U.S 
1st Marine Expeditionary Force noted: “I have repeatedly asked myself whether I 
can keep a neutral attitude because I sleep with [U.S.] soldiers every night and I am 




Hamilton asserts, that embedded reporters bonded with the troops and “many 
reported that they were uncomfortable portraying their comrades in an unfavourable 
light.”740 Who benefited? It was surely the military who saw their troops portrayed in 
a mainly favourable light and at the same time the TV viewing figures shot up in 
both the UK and the USA, “a brilliant public relations move, according to 
Hamilton.741
 
 The BBC’s Caroline Wyatt felt that embedded reporters had accepted 
the restrictions in exchange for protection and improved access to briefings, but that 
towards the end of the military campaign the restrictions were too inflexible; 
embedded reporters were not allowed to move around and the unilateral journalists, 
such as Sky, were welcomed when they turned up at a British unit location. 
BBC Special correspondent Gavin Hewitt was embedded with the 3rd U.S. Army 
Infantry Division. He says they treated him cautiously at first but they gradually 
accepted him. Yet, at the same time, he made it clear that “if something happened 
and it did not reflect well on them, I would have to report it, and they regarded that 
as a fair deal.”742
                                            
738 Brown, Ben, ‘‘Basra – The second city falls’ in Beck & Downing, p.29. Also Campbell/Brown 
interview.  
 Yet Hewitt brings up the worrying point about new technology and 
said: “Some enables the battlefield to come into the front room, but all the material 
needs interpreting. It requires correspondents who are prepared to report 
739 Hess & Kalb, pp.12-13. 
740 Hamilton, p.33. 
741 Hamilton, p.30. 
742 Katovsky, Bill & Carlson, Timothy, Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq – An Oral History, 
(Guildford, Conn., USA: Lyons Press, 2003), p.313. 
 199 
independently and to report what they see. Technology does a lot. But ultimately 
you’ve got to have people who are faithful to what they see out there.”743
 
  
This is a key point: the instant images went back from the embedded journalist to 
producers and commentators behind the front line or at a studio back in the UK. 
The Cardiff School of Journalism Report on Embedded Journalists says: “Our 
analysis indicates that embeds provided more coverage from the region than any 
other kind of reporter on location. This seems to have been largely at the expense 
of reporters based at the main military briefing centres, who enjoyed less coverage 
than in previous conflicts”.744
 
 This is verified by both Ben Brown and Caroline Wyatt 
who both complain about the lack of briefing and in being at the administrative 
headquarters of a division rather than the operational HQ. 
Robertson, in his examination of Scottish newspapers’ coverage of the Iraq 2003 
War, concluded that The Scotsman/Scotsman on Sunday relied on government 
information to the extent that they failed to give attention to the kind of evidence 
(civilian deaths and injuries, public health and environmental damage) which would 
fundamentally undermine UK foreign policy. He queried whether this failure was 
evidence of the hegemonic power of elites over self-censoring journalists.745
 
 Both 
the Cardiff School of Journalism report and Robertson’s analysis point out to a 
restriction of information which could be due to several reasons: 
• Embedded reporters’ material was from the front line and often featured live 
action, particularly exciting to television, but was restricted in its strategic 
view (Cardiff University report) 
                                            
743 Katovsky & Carlson, p.315. 
744 Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Too Close for Comfort? The Role of 
embedded reporting during the 2003 Iraq War: Summary report (Cardiff University, 2004), p.11. 
745 Robertson, John W., ‘People’s Watchdogs or Government Poodles? Scotland’s National 
Broadsheets and the Second Iraq War,’ European Journal of Communication (Vol. 19, Issue 4, 
2004), p.479. 
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• Editors may have found this more attractive than material from briefings at 
the main military briefing centres, well away from the military action (Cardiff 
University report) 
• Briefings were held at administrative headquarters and not at operational 
level (according to BBC’s Ben Brown and Caroline Wyatt) 
• UK editors were reluctant to report civilian deaths and damage which could 
undermine the war effort (Robertson) 
 
5.4. How the embedded reporter strategy worked for the authorities. 
 
Mark Laity, a BBC journalist in 1991, was happy with the UK military briefing system 
in place then. As a military spokesman in 2003, having switched roles, he is quite 
honest about the advantage of the embedded system to the military and political 
machine.  
 
“Let’s be brutally frank about it, if you put a reporter with the average British or even 
American soldier for any length of time they will end up sympathising with them. So 
from a government point of view, embedded reporting will promote a greater deal of 
sympathy/understanding provided that you deserve it, if you have faith in your 
cause and your soldiers. One of the great besetting sins of modern journalism is the 
prejudice with which they approach most things. Journalism is a rag bag of 
prejudices masquerading as objectivity. Journalists think they are incredibly 
objective when in fact what they are doing is defining their objectivity as opinion. 
One of the most common features in modern journalism is the way in which they 
distort the language and say what we are interested in is what the public is 
interested in without properly analysing why people are interested in it. Bad news is 
more important than good news, so in any conflict situation a journalist will go into it 
with a ragbag of various prejudices. Embedded reporting challenges this and put 
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In other words Laity is critical of the prejudices and lack of objectivity of his former 
colleagues in the media which, he says were “corrected” by the embedded system. 
Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant director for media operations, U.S. Department of 
Defense, on the other hand, was not comfortable in making comparisons with 1991 
and concentrates on the technical side of reporting in both conflicts. “I always tell 
people that it isn’t useful to compare conflicts in some respects, because the 
situations are so different. If you look at the advances that have been made in the 
news business since 1991, we couldn’t have done this (embedding) in ’91. The 
news media didn’t have the capability to be able to file from the field in real time. 
You had to get back to where there was bigger, more stationary type of equipment 
to move video. You didn’t have computers that were small and rugged enough and 
durable enough and with the transmission capabilities to be able to send copy.”747
 
 
Yet, despite the technology difference one photographer, Joseph Giordano, of the 
American publication Stars and Stripes was quite blunt on his assessment.    
He believed the embedded programme worked in many different ways. “I think the 
military got exactly what they wanted from the embed program – mostly positive, 
admiring stories about the military. Regardless of what any embedded reporter 
says, it was impossible not to lose some of your objectivity. These were the men 
and women who were feeding you, protecting you and befriending you. It wasn’t 




Whitman has explained above, from the official side, why embedded reporting was 
a possibility in 2003. Giordano, as a journalist, admits that the system did work due 
to the relationship built up between military and media. Yet that military media 
                                            
746 Campbell, J.T., Interview with Mark Laity 14 Aug, 2007.  
747 Sylvester & Huffman, p.44. 
748 Sylvester & Huffman, p.112. 
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relationship, with each getting something out of it, would not have worked if trust did 
not exist between those media who were embedded and the military with whom 
they lived and worked. Hooper, with his experience within the military makes the 
point: “We live in a free society, with a free press. It is the journalist's right to ask 
questions: he accepts he has no divine right to receive an answer”.  Explanation 
prevents speculation: explanation guarantees understanding.”749
 
 This is true and 
explains that the build-up of trust between journalist and source is so very important 
for a firm working relationship. A military or political press officer can give a 
journalist a thousand factual answers to queries and preserve that trust. However, 
give one incorrect answer, or even worse, give a lie, then that trust is gone forever 
and, what’s more, that smear soon spreads throughout the journalistic grapevine. 
This trust may make the embedded journalist scheme work more for the military 
than for the media since the live action material sent back from the front line was 
motivating the professional skills of the journalist, exciting the creativity of the 
editors, attracting greater attention of the viewers, and satisfying the profit margins 
of the owners. Hooper points to the mistakes of the Vietnam War in terms of 
military/media relationships in that the military bureaucracy failed to realise the 
importance of providing the media with facilities to follow the military situation and 
their regarding of the press as a necessary evil. Here, too, journalists were whisked 
into the battle area and then whisked out again with their material and many had no 
conception of what war was really like. The bond was never made between military 
and media as it was in the embedded programme. 750 Paul and Kim refer to the 
potential for conflict arising from the different missions of the press and the military, 
the contrast between the press’s interest in gaining access to information so that it 
can inform the public, and the military’s need to secure operational and 
informational security.751
                                            
749 Hooper, p.110. 
 Yet the embedded system, in the words of embedded 
media themselves, blurred the differences in these conflicting missions, with media 
identifying themselves with military (and therefore political) objectives, perhaps 
750 Hooper, p.113. 
751 Paul & Kim, p.xiv. 
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unconsciously losing their journalistic objectivity and being influenced into 
unwittingly supporting a propaganda ploy, albeit a propaganda of a white or grey 
nature rather than black. 
 
Bruce Conover, Senior International Editor CNN, later commented: “There is a 
danger of losing one’s objectivity.”  CNN editors consistently warned their reporters 
to use the word they rather than we in reports referring to military activity, especially 
in live news reports, when they were under the most stress.752 He also refers to the 
limitations and “view down a narrow hallway”. Reporters were unable to lag behind 
and “establish what actually happened in many situations.” But  he refers to 
misunderstandings where many of the officers he had spoken to believe that the 
embedded journalist will function as a kind of public relations officer for the brave 
men who are fulfilling their duty.753
 
 The BBC’s Caroline Wyatt and Ben Brown have 
already referred to this tendency as have other journalists in the previous chapter. 
In addition there was a complete reliance on the military for help. Cheryl Diaz 
Meyer, photographer for the Dallas Morning News, Texas, refers to digital 
photography being dependent on the power from military vehicles to charge up 
satellite phones and computer.754 However the danger here was that the military 
vehicles carrying journalists could then develop flat batteries and the vehicle would 
be stuck in an emergency. Despite this a close working rapport was developed. 755 
Meyer added ““People ask me ‘Can you be objective?’ No, I’m not objective – not 
when you’re nearly killed with these people. You know what they’re going through. 
You know exactly how they feel because you feel it.756
 
 
                                            
752 Sylvester and Huffman, p.68. Giordano also agreed with the analogy that each embedded 
reporter was essentially viewing the war through a straw, seeing only what their own unit was doing. 
However, he was working for a military newspaper. 
753 Ibid, p.69. 
754 Note: This was not a problem for the BBC’s Caroline Wyatt who had her own vehicle complete 
with a generator to power the satellite link (Campbell/Wyatt interview). 
755 Sylvester & Huffman, pp. 92-93. 
756 Ibid. 
 204 
Sarah Dodd, a CBS affiliate reporter, raised another flaw in the embedded system: 
its narrow focus. She did feel very much part of the unit and was “well informed” 
about everything the unit (4th Division Apache Helicopter Unit) did, but found the 
lack of awareness of what was going on in other parts of the country very frustrating 
- “It was like living in a vacuum.”  With no TV access she depended on short wave 
that picked up BBC World Service. However she felt that the  embeds were a 




Dodd, as an American, refers to turning to the BBC for the broad picture and she 
was not alone in this. Christian Christensen, also American and whose research 
work at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University includes international news coverage, 
refers to “a significant number of Americans turning to British news sources – such 
as the Guardian and the BBC – for information regarding the conflict- and adds that 
during the conflict about 40% of the Guardian’s online readers were located in the 
United States and the BBC website had a similar boost.758 Christiansen cites media 
critics as being unhappy with the “highly commercialised and nationalistic nature of 
the U.S. media” but also with “an uncomfortably close relationship between the 
press and the military which made it impossible for the average citizen to get 
“objective or unbiased information”. Aufderheide refers to this as “therapeutic 
patriotism” and a “response squarely within American ideological traditions.759
                                            
757 Ibid. p.126. 
 Wall 
and Bicket, in their examination of the attacks by U.S conservatives on the BBC 
post 9/11, reveal that this “patriotic” line was aimed at undermining the objective 
BBC coverage being increasingly tapped in to through BBC World and BBC Online 
by Americans eager to get a more objective news coverage than that provided by 
758 Christensen, Christian, ‘For many, British is better’, British Journalism Review (Vol. 15, No. 3, 
2004), p.23. 
759 Aufderheide, Pat, ‘All-too-reality TV: challenges for television journalists after September 11’, 
Journalism (Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002), pp. 7-14. Although this article was written with reference to 
American TV coverage after September 11, it may equally apply to some of the coverage of the Iraq 
2003 conflict, as will be touched upon in this chapter. 
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This approach, indeed, is a condemnation of a section of the American media in 
Iraq 2003, one that the UK media seems to have escaped on the whole.761 
Christiansen refers to Fox News as tarring CNN and other U.S. outlets with a broad 
“ugly American” brush through its subjective and unapologetic nationalism and its 
reflection of what is wrong with American foreign policy – an excessive focus on 
U.S interests above other interests.762
 
 
Historically, the BBC has taken this objective stance and has resisted UK 
government pressure to bow to government propaganda pressure in time of 
conflicts with doubtful justification, such as has been pointed out in Chapter 4 (Suez 
1956). For example, in referring a Parliamentary Review Committee on Overseas 
Representation 1968-69, the then Director of Public Affairs for the BBC, Kenneth 
Lamb noted: “As an instrument of communication the BBC has the decisive 
advantage that it has a world-wide reputation for telling the truth. Its overseas 
broadcast bulletins are therefore widely believed to give true and objective accounts 
of world events and they provide a sure basis for influential comment.”763 However, 
harking back to Suez 1956 and the previous chapter it is clear that Sir Anthony 
Eden did not want this “objective” reporting of the BBC but instead wanted a 
compliant and “patriotic” BBC to support the government agenda and intended to 
go as far as censoring it, “bringing it to heel” as Kyle puts it.764
 
 
As with Suez 1956, the Blair government complained about the BBC coverage of 
the Iraq 2003 war as Alastair Campbell notes in his diary when he says: “I wrote 
letters of complaint to [Richard] Sambrook [director of news] on various issues re 
                                            
760 Wall, Melissa & Bicket, Douglas, ‘The “Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation”’, Journalism (Vol. 9, 
No. 2, 2008), p.125. 
761 Christiansen, p.23. 
762 Christiansen, p.24. 
763 Lamb, Kenneth, ‘Disclosure, Discretion and Dissemblement: Broadcasting and the National 
Interest in the Perspective of a Publicly-owned Media’, in Franck & Weisband, p.235. 
764 Kyle, p.191. 
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[John] Humphrys, [Andrew] Gilligan and Rageh Omaar [BBC journalists] on the 
nature of their coverage.”765 It should be noted that none of these were embedded 
reporters but were filing analytical pieces, in the case of Gilligan and Omaar, from 
Baghdad where they broadcast on Iraqi civilian casualties, gathering the same 
complaints that BBC reporter Jeremy Bowen had when reporting civilian casualties 
in Baghdad in the 1991 Iraq war.766
 
 
Peter Mandelson is critical of the pressure Alastair Campbell tried to put on the 
BBC over a document on WMD which, the BBC Today programme’s reporter 
Andrew Gilligan said had been “sexed up” to strengthen the argument for war and 
attributed this to Campbell.767 Campbell wrote to the BBC’s Head of News Richard 
Sambrook who replied that if the story proved to be false there would be a BBC 
apology, but he broadly defended the Today programme as reasonable and 
accurate reporting of what Gilligan’s source had told him. Campbell chose, against 
Mandelson’s advice, to appear on Channel 4 News and attack the Today story as 
“a fundamental attack on the integrity of the government, the Prime Minister and the 
intelligence agencies.”768 This application of pressure on the BBC bears 
comparison with Eden’s attempts to bring it into line and support the government in 
the Suez Crisis but, in time of conflict Campbell won support from members of his 
own party, such as Dennis Skinner, but also from Tory MP Nicholas Soames who 
said the BBC was “out of control,” adding “do you think my grandfather [Winston 
Churchill] had a spin doctor? Course he fucking did.”769 However, the problem with 
“spin doctors is that if they become the story then there is a danger that the 
government’s agenda building will be affected. Jonathan Powell refers to Alastair 
Campbell’s “war with the BBC” and reflects that once spin and the spin doctor 
become the story then the agenda-building battle is lost.770
                                            
765 Camp[bell, A., Countdown to Iraq, p.512. 
 However, in the main 
766 See footnote 657. 
767 Mandelson, p.361. 
768 Mandelson, pp.361-362. 
769 Campbell, The Burden of Power, pp.621-623. 
770 Powell, p.203. 
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while the fighting was still going on the embedded reporting system maintained UK 
public support and the BBC’s credibility with the public was maintained. 
 
The Cardiff University’s Summary Report on Iraq 2003 embedded reporting quotes 
a survey which gave 93 per cent support for impartiality within broadcasting in time 
of war, adding that the most trusted source of information was the BBC (47 per 
cent) compared to the tabloids (7 per cent).771 Tumber & Palmer cite BBC 
objectivity during the 2003 Iraq War attracting government criticism but also that 
poll evidence suggested that the public placed high value on such objectivity, even 
under wartime conditions.772 Chapman says that the BBC’s close structural ties 
with, yet semi independence from government, gave the BBC a unique air of 
authority and integrity which distanced it from a partisan popular press.773 American 
academics Jowett & O’Donnell, in their study of propaganda methods in wartime, 
also refer to dispassionate, objective and factual reporting of the BBC.774
 
 So, if 
Americans were turning to UK sources for a more objective view on the Iraq war; 
what does that say about the comparative quality of UK media reporting of Iraq 
2003?   
Christiansen points to the American media’s lack of objectivity in quoting CBS news 
anchor Dan Rather who, when asked about the relationship between patriotism and 
journalism during time of conflict, said that when it came to the crunch he would 
always be on the side of the American troops.775
                                            
771 Cardiff University report, p.32. 
  However, Christiansen refers to 
clear blue water between the likes of the unashamedly one-sided reporting of Fox 
and the objective balance of the BBC and the fact that unlike British politicians and 
772 Tumber & Palmer, p.165. Government criticism featured in the Butler Report which “severely 
criticised”  BBC editorial and management processes for allowing the broadcast of an unchecked 
report on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by reporter Andrew Gilligan. The report was 
released on January 28th 2004 and attracted much media criticism for its “whitewash” of the 
government, exceptions being the Rupert Murdoch Sun and Times who concentrated on the 
blameworthiness of the BBC, in line with their “long-term agenda” on attacking the Corporation” 
(Tumber & Palmer pp.167-169). 
 773 Chapman, p.155. 
774 Jowett & O’Donnell, p.295 
775 Christiansen, p.25. 
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military personnel, who are quite willing to face the abrasive interview style of Tim 
Sebastian and Jeremy Paxman, their American compatriots are clearly unnerved 
by such aggressive interview techniques.776 In addition, in praise of the BBC, 
Christiansen points out to its relatively level-headed reporting and news 
presentation. In terms of embedded reporting, it is clear that good relationships 
were built up between UK military and media which, on the whole, showed support 
for the UK government agenda, although whether the media consciously realised 
this is a debatable point as the BBC’s Director of News Richard Sambrook may 
have touched on when he admitted the difficulties of retaining a balance in reporting 
the news of a conflict in which the “British public were split from the start”.777
 
  
Sambrook admits to the power of pictures but raises a key point in that some of the 
BBC audience complained that there was “too much live coverage from the front for 
them to really understand what was happening”.778 That, it is suggested, is exactly 
what the embedded reporter system was intended to achieve and in the close 
relationships that were built up, the embedded media may not have looked too hard 
at the end product of their endeavours, as Sylvester and Huffman conclude.  TV 
journalist Byron Harris summed this up when he said that “the restrictions of the 
embedded process gave the military a tremendous opportunity to manage the 
news. We were tethered to them for transportation. We could not break away. If our 




                                            
776 Aufderheide, p.11, makes the point that coverage of international affairs in the USA is difficult in a 
country where “geography test scores are abysmal and isolationism a convenient fig leaf over 
ignorance” and public television audiences stand at only around 2%, compared with the well-
established and respected public service ethos of the BBC. Also, over the past two decades the US 
news media  has become consolidated into a few, very powerful, conglomerates with journalism 
accounting for only a small percentage of their profits. Profit is paramount and the number of 
overseas correspondents  has been slashed and international coverage has plummeted 
[McChesney, Robert W., ‘The US News Media and World War III’, Journalism (Vol. 3, No. 1, 
2002(p.20). 
777 Sambrook, Richard, in Beck & Downing (eds), p.16. 
778 Ibid, p.17. 
779 Sylvester & Huffman, p.148. 
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Journalist John Hamilton makes the additional point that being too close to the 
action, as embedded reporters often were, made war more difficult for the average 
viewer to understand.  Hamilton claims: “Some compare it to looking at an elephant 
through a drinking straw: you only get to see a small part of the larger picture” and 
maintains that through the embedded system the public “were less informed”780 
Former Panorama editor Roger Bolton stresses that this is the problem with making 
political television in that it encourages a superficial approach, a picture driven 
one.781 He also comments on “an insidious form of self-censorship” which comes 
from the desire to preserve “contacts”, such as the Parliamentary Lobby782 and the 
need for “exclusive” stories which are, in fact, government leaks and leaves the 
journalist unable to check the facts but still anxious to print the story. The reward for 
the politician is dictating the agenda.783 In 1991, according to Mark Laity, in Riyadh 
as a BBC journalist, he felt that he had “a good deal” with regard to briefings and 
background information and could see the big picture in comparison with what he 
calls poor and lack of detailed briefings at the Doha centre in 2003 linked with the 
too-narrow focus of the embedded reporters. “The grammar of TV, the grammar of 
journalism requires that the story comes from the place where the smoke is 
thickest,” he told me.784
                                            
780 Hamilton, p.31. Also in Hooper, p.51 who remarks that the camera cannot capture the broad 
panorama of action on its own; that is up to the reporter. 
 In other words, it was the whiz-bang action provided by the 
embedded reporters in the front line, which dominated the TV coverage at the 
expense of the bigger picture and a more detailed analysis. The BBC’s Director of 
News Richard Sambrook later suggested that the difficulty with a 24-hour news 
781 Bolton, Roger ‘The Problems of Making Political Television: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, in 
Golding et al, p.94. 
782 Note: The UK Parliamentary Lobby system is an arrangement where accredited journalists are 
accredited as a bloc to hear off-the-record briefings by senior ministers on a regular basis. This elite 
group may be flattered to be privy to government confidences but is bound by the rules of the game 
to censor itself communicating many specific aspects of what it hears. In terms of military information 
many Parliamentary correspondents are not adept at handling details and thus can be fed 
comfortable generalities [Downing, John, ‘Government Secrecy and the Media in the United States 
and Britain’, in Golding et al, p.157]. 
783 Bolton, pp103-104. 
784 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Mark Laity 14, August 2007.. 
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The Independent’s Robert Fisk, with 30 years’ experience of reporting from the 
Middle East, makes a similar comment on the “closeness” of relationships between 
the embedded media and the military. “These journalists were dependent on the 
troops for communications, perhaps for their lives. And there was thus a profound 
desire to fit in, to “work the system”, a frequent and growing absence of critical 
facilities, Fisk maintains.786 The BBC’s Jeremy Bowen, too, has his criticism of the 
embedded system. Bowen remarks that in 2003 some people saw embeds as a 
cop-out, “a betrayal of important principles of journalistic integrity and 
independence. I do not think it was, as long as the reporters who did it remembered 
what they were there for, and the basics of journalism,” he says. “Journalists should 
do journalism, not the official history of the unit to which they were attached”, 
Bowen claims. He pays tribute to embedded reporters such as James Mates and 
Gavin Hewitt but adds “Problems start if only viewers are led to believe that the very 
focused and narrow look at the war coming from an embedded reporter is the 
whole truth, when it is only a fraction of it.” Inexperienced reporters in that situation 
can produce very superficial work.787
 
 This picks up on Hamilton’s analogy of 
looking at an elephant through a straw. 
Unilaterals, journalists who were not tied to the military and took the risk of travelling 
independently in the war zone, viewed the embedded system with suspicion. 
Australian reporter Peter Wilson points to false information given to embedded 
reporters which was then fed to viewers, for example the embedded reporter story 
of a Shiite rising in Basra, was praised on air by British deputy commander Major-
General Peter Wall as “just the sort of encouraging indication we have been looking 
for”. Al-Jazeera reported that there had been no uprising. Wall wrote:  “They were 
right. Coalition officials later conceded to me privately that the uprising claim was a 
                                            
785 Stanyer, p.424. 
786 Fisk, p.766. 
787 Bowen, pp.112-113. Also Campbell/Bowen interview. 
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deliberate lie aimed at encouraging the real thing.”788
 
 This implies that UK military 
authorities made use of disinformation and propaganda. 
Television and the embedded reports from the front line meant that one week into 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the public saw more of the conflict than they saw 
in all of the 1991’s Persian Gulf War. New technology had created a real-time 
television war.789 That war was welcomed by the TV stations who enthusiastically 
embraced the embedded system, with all its restrictions and inhibitions that in other 
contexts, they rejected. For example Miles, in his study of the Arab Al Jazeera TV 
station, refers to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Director of 
Communications Alastair Campbell summoning top British broadcasters and 
warning them about support for Al-Qaeda and “acceptable reporting.” BBC, ITN and 
Sky issued joint statement which read: “As responsible broadcasters we are mindful 
of national and international security issues and the impact reports can have in 
different communities and cultures. But we will retain the right to exercise our own 
independent, impartial editorial judgement…the provision of independent and 
impartial news is a fundamental part of a free society and democratic process.”790 
Looking at the relationships both the Blair and Eden governments had with the 
BBC, Jonathan Powell states: “All governments have problems with the BBC, and 
as a general rule that is to the BBC’s credit.”791
 
 
With this in mind it seems that Campbell may not have learned from Eden’s 
attempts to threaten, censor or put financial pressure on the BBC in order that they 
take the government line as has been indicated in this study’s Suez chapter. He 
had not learned from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s demands during the 
Falklands conflict that the BBC take a more “patriotic” line in objection to Panorama  
and Newsnight programmes over the use of pundits and film from Argentinean 
                                            
788 Wilson, Peter, Long Drive Through a Short War: Reporting on the Iraq War (Victoria, Australia: 
Hardie Grant Books, 2004), p.25. 
789 Hamilton, John, War in Iraq: Real-Time Reporting (Minnesota, USA: Abdo, 2004), p.6 
790 Miles, Hugh, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World (London: Abacus, 2005), 
p.118. 
791 Powell, p.205. 
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sources.792 Indeed, Campbell’s reaction was similar to that of the U.S Conservative 
element in the study by Wall and Bicket, an element which was openly hostile to the 
“Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation”. Since September 11 Americans have 
increasingly turned to the BBC as a respected, objective, public service 
broadcaster.793 As an example of pressure put on the BBC, Alastair Campbell, in 
his diary entry of 9 November, 2002, recollects calling BBC Director of News 
Richard Sambrook about coverage of UK military operations in Afghanistan saying 
it was a “fucking disgrace.”794
 
 
In retrospect, current BBC Political Editor Nick Robinson, said 10 years later: “The 
build-up to the invasion of Iraq is the point in my career when I have most regretted 
not pushing harder and not asking more questions, but I reject the idea that I and 
my colleagues were either the willing slaves of government hell-bent on 
propaganda or naïve dupes.”795
 
 
Yet here is a contrast – on the one hand the BBC and other TV stations take the 
Nick Robinson approach and robustly refute any suggestion of censorship over war 
coverage, yet accept similar, although perhaps more subtle censorship, inherent in 
the embedded reporter system. On the former point it is worth pondering on a quote 
of Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary in the first (1964) Harold Wilson 
Labour administration: “We must not take too seriously the claims of the press and 
TV networks to be guardians of liberty and of the public’s right to know. The media 
are unlikely to be the best judges of what is in the national interest. This, indeed, is 
not their principal goal, which is to increase circulation and ratings.”796
 
 
                                            
 792 Mercer, Derrik, Mungham, Geoff & Williams, Kevin: The Fog of War (London: William    
Heinemann, 1987), p.132. 
793 Wall & Bicket, p.124. 
794 Campbell, A., Countdown to Iraq, p.84. 
795 Robinson, p.394. 
796 Gordon Walker, Patrick, ‘Secrecy and Openness in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A British 
Cabinet Perspective’, in Franck, Thomas M., & Weisband, /Edward (eds), Secrecy and Foreign 
Policy London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.50. 
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In contrast, a much younger Patrick Gordon Walker in 1944, while the Second 
World War was still in progress but Labour were planning for a post-war election, 
uses the word “propaganda” in a policy document addressed to Labour’s National 
Executive. Dated July 13th, 1944, it looks ahead to the end of the war and argues 
that Labour must prepare for a renewal of political warfare. It almost looks forward 
to the Alastair Campbell era by underlining the need for “members with special 
knowledge and experience” to produce better “propaganda which is presently 
indifferent in quality and not calculated to compete in any sense with modern 
advertising methods.”797 Gordon Walker goes on to make a plea for modernisation 
of propaganda with a proper use of radio, a proper press service and methods for 




Here we have the classic contrast of agendas which has been referred to earlier in 
this passage, with journalists clinging to the portrait of media in a democratic 
society as the guardians of the peoples’ rights, objective, ethical and incorruptible; 
certainly not engaging in self-censorship. Politicians, on the other hand, wish to win 
political battles and have their own agenda which can be in direct conflict with 
journalists in time of conflict and can lead to the politicians’ demanding journalistic 
self-censorship in the national interest. 
 
This same self-censorship came into the equation in Iraq 2002 as Western TV 
stations with embedded reporters infrequently screen the gory details of war. Hiro, 
in his study of the Iraq 2003 war, maintains that al-Jazeera provided straight news 
(objective, ethical and incorruptible?) “that in many ways gave their viewers a more 
rounded picture- than the Anglo American networks did. They showed the 
devastation of war, grievously wounded civilians, charred bodies of Iraqi soldiers, 
hospitals choked with wounded and burned Iraqis.”799
                                            
797 Greenwood, Tony papers, Bodleian Library Ms. Eng. C.6294, Folio 3. 
 Miles underlines the fact that 
al-Jazeera from the start of the conflict, rejected the legitimacy of the invasion and 
798 Ibid., Folio 6. 
799 Hiro, Dilip, Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War (London: Methuen, 2005), p.192. 
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continued to take this subjective view in the way it edited and juxtaposed its 
pictures and scripts.800  In comparison the US/UK television footage played a 
crucial (for them) role in identifying the “good” and the “bad” sides and broadly 
legitimising the causes and intended outcomes of the war.801 It did it by appearing 
to be impartial and objective since it was seen through the eyes of the embedded 
reporter such as CNN’s Christiane Ammanpour who remarked that the coalition 
troops wanted to be seen “as benefactors not just as bombers”.802 The pictures 
shown through embedded reporters did not reflect the suffering of the Iraqi people 
to reflect “the politics of pity”, in other words the showing of death and suffering. 
Instead, they reflected an aura of objectivity and impartial observation, two points 
which separate this view from that of propaganda, which presupposes a prior 
commitment of the spectator to a cause. Chouliaraki concludes that the politics of 
pity (her phrase), in contrast, is moved by the suffering he or she witnesses before 
exercising his or her right to make a decision on which side to take and in the case 
of embedded reporting the moving pictures provided to the spectator removed that 
option.803 Similarly, the “moving pictures” provided during the bombing of Baghdad 
at the opening of the war were of missiles and bombs landing in the dark, flashes of 
light and the noises of impact and anti-aircraft fire. In other words, the “suffering” of 
the people of Baghdad was expressed largely in non-human terms with the 
“sufferer” verbalised as “compounds” and “buildings” and work to subtract the 
sympathy away from the personal aspects.804
 
 To report on and picture a sobbing 
father trying to dig his baby girl out of the ruins of his house fall under the “politics of 
pity”; to report on the bombing of a city through the night footage of moving pictures 
provided does not. It is too impersonal. 
                                            
800 Miles, Hugh, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World (London: Abacus, 2005), p. 
242. 
801 Chouliaraki, p.263. 
802 Ibid, p.264. 
803 Ibid, p.265. 
804 Chouliaraki, p.272. 
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Taylor comments on TV’s “pathological need for moving pictures” which delivers it 
into the hands of those who control access.805 In the case of Iraq 1991 it was the 
military that controlled that access either through restricting the movements of the 
media at the battle front or providing pictures from their own military media teams. 
Steele, in her examination of television news in the 1991 Iraq War, refers to “the 
operational bias of television journalism presenting only the most narrowly framed 
coverage of the war.”806 As a result there was endless footage of what the Allied 
commanders were prepared to allow to be filmed and no pictures at all of the 
situation in Iraq.807 The inevitable result is that coverage was biased because the 
story has to be led by pictures. Taylor adds; “More importantly, the speed of 
communications technology has eroded our capacity to reflect, interpret, and sift. 
The imperative is to get the story on the air, no matter how dubious or 
uncorroborated it is.”808  Schlesinger also comments that TV is pictures; it feeds on 
them and must always have them. There can be silence on the screen, no words, 
no music, and no sound effects – but there must always be pictures.809
 
 Pictures, 
live pictures, of battle action is what the embedded reporter system provided on a 
24-hour a day basis, making the viewing figures swoop up as outlined elsewhere in 
this chapter, but perhaps at the expense of standing back and analysing what had 
actually happened, as stated in the report on embedded journalists by Cardiff 
University’s School of Journalism, already referred to. 
This lack of analysis is strongly supported by Ted Koppel, ABC anchorman and a 
journalist who has covered wars from the Vietnam conflict until Iraq 2003.  Koppel 
says that in Vietnam up to three days could pass between the time a story was 
written and it got on the air. In contrast in Iraq 2003 a journalist had to be prepared 
                                            
805 Taylor, p.16. 
806 Steele, Janet, E., ‘Experts and the Operational Bias of Television News: The Case of the Persian 
Gulf War,’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly (Vol.72, No.4, Winter 1995) p.809 . 
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to go on the air instantly, 24-hours a day. Koppel’s view is that this meant less time 
for the journalist to think about and report events.810
 
 
Therefore, if film material supplied by embedded reporters, up at the frontline, is 
further restricted by the conditions in which the embedded reporter and cameraman 
are working, and the bonds that have been formed between military and media 
which may affect journalistic objectivity, the weight of reporting surely tends to 
favour the military point of view, somewhat near to propaganda or, as referred to by 
Lt.Col. Sean Tully, “information management.” On this point, the BBC’s Caroline 
Wyatt felt that as a TV reporter doing live broadcasts from the “hub”, where she 
received the tapes from her embedded colleagues with front line units, she was 
operating in a vacuum since she was in a small rear area not up at the operational 




Evidence submitted here may point to the fact that the UK and US governments 
considered this point of view when setting up embedded reporting in Iraq 2003, 
putting reporters with front line fighting units to get their own pictures and copy. This 
dissertation’s contention is that this was just another way of maintaining control 
whilst, on the surface, appearing to be offering unbiased access in return for 
favourable third party endorsement of policy, although as Col. Paul Brook told the 
author of this dissertation there was no official plan on these lines. There may be a 
distinction to be made here between the UK and the US media, the latter, according 
to McChesney, having a record of supporting “official sources” and becoming a 
“superior propaganda organ for militarism and war”.812
 
 
On the British side, Col. Brook, one of the military media planners on the embedded 
programme, is adamant that the programme was designed to give the media better 
facilities than they had had in the 1991 conflict and that the Stockholm syndrome 
                                            
810 Hess, Stephen & Kalb, p.6. 
811 Campbell, J. T., Wyatt interview. 
812 McChesney, p11. 
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arose purely by accident. He says that the fact that TV in particular concentrated on 
the action footage at the expense of strategic analysis was their choice and that this 
was not the military media plan. “There was no conspiracy here,” he said. “It was 
more cock-up than conspiracy which led to this.”813
 
  
This study does not accept what may be is an honestly-offered view and will further 
examine the “conspiracy” contention in the Conclusions chapter. 
 
 
5.5. Relationships between media, media minders and military 
 
In this context, it is worth noting the views of “unilateral” journalist Christopher 
Walker who covered the 1991 war and criticised “too many” of his fellow journalists 
for trying to be soldiers. Yet he makes a comment which may well point to the 
principle of embedded reporters being in the British military mind as far back as 
1991. In the post 1991 War report produced by the International Press Institute he 
refers to the restrictions on movement and lack of facilities provided by the military, 
but adds: “The Ministry of Defence showed more subtlety and deviousness than the 
Pentagon and attempted to defuse criticism by ‘bonding’ journalists so closely to 
their units (and even providing them with unusable secret information about plans) 
that some even began writing like soldiers as in ‘I think I can say on behalf of the 
whole 4th Armoured Brigade etc’”.814
 
 
The closeness which can develop between media and military implicit in the 
embedded arrangement was referred to by Morrison and Tumber in their analysis 
of news reporting during the Falklands War. Although the arrangements for media 
coverage caused much controversy on the long ship-borne route to the Falklands 
(where the media were looked after by MOD civilian information officers) when the 
                                            
813 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Colonel Paul Brook. 
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landings took place and journalists shared the same hardships with the troops, the 
situation changed. The authors wrote: “In effect what was happening to the 
journalists was that their professional need to cover a story in a detached way was 
being slowly swamped by the very real, human need to belong, to be safe. The 
comradeship and closeness demonstrated by the troops, which the journalists so 
admired, were not just the random product that any occupational association throws 
up, but the response to having to work closely together especially during military 
exercises and having to solve tasks as a group.”815
 
 The authors make the point that 
when you are in the midst of battle and suffering the same fear and dangers as the 
soldiers alongside you it is not easy to hold on to the values of impartiality and 
objectivity of your editors, a safe 8000 miles away in the UK. The Guardian’s Ian 
Bruce eventually got through on a land line from the Falklands  1982 conflict to his 
office to be told that ‘perhaps he could do a more reflective piece’ and was told he 
sounded ‘very bitter’ at his curt response. Bruce said: 
  “That's because I am fucking bitter at this stage of the game. I want to go home. I'll 
hang on until everything's over but, [I'm] fairly shagged out. Bitter about people I 
know who are dead, and I think the whole thing's a waste of time in some ways. 
What have we done, we've liberated 700,000 sheep and 1800 sheep-shaggers. 
Terrific”.816
ITN’s John Martin refers to relationships being much better when they were with the 
troops and were without the MoD civilian “minders” who had accompanied the task 
force down through the Atlantic. He added: “They were actually quite amazed that 
we were living the same way as them. Not asking for anything more than them. 
Thought we were bonkers being there.”  
 
One may agree with Morrison and Tumber in that much of the minders’ troubles 
in the Falklands stemmed from the ambiguity of their position. They were 
among the military but not of them; they found themselves perhaps unfairly 
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despised by both the reporters and the services. The information officers with 
the Task Force, had their positions compromised when they were told that they 
had to censor journalists’ material as well as acting to arrange media facilities. 
This highlights the fact that censorship of journalists’ material by the same 
civilian information officers who were there to provide facilities and factual 
information was not a wise move.817 Nothing worse could have happened to 
destroy any trust between minder and media, especially since the material was 
being censored for a second time when it reached back to the MoD via Royal 
Navy satellite (bear in mind that the media had no satellite technology in the 
Falklands and were wholly dependent on the Royal Navy for transmission of 
their copy). Brigadier David Ramsbotham, a Director of Army Public Relations 
who went on to four-star general rank, later said that control of censorship 
should be based on operational needs and not on public relations.818
This point was made very clear by implementing the embedded media plan for 
Iraq 2003, where, it is contended, the main plank of the plan was to do just that; 
it was not brought in to satisfy the demands of the media for greater access to 
the battle front, as the media had unsuccessfully demanded in Iraq 1991. 
 There is 
merit in this in that the censorship duty should not have been forced on the 
MoD press officers and should have remained with the uniformed branch. Yet, 
Ramsbotham is missing the point, made by General Westmorland during the 
Vietnam War, that winning support on your home ground is just as much an 
operational need as planning an attack.  
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6. Analysis and Conclusions 
 
 
6.1. Official sources and the release of information to the media 
 
A foreign policy which has weaknesses can be glossed over by an effective and 
persuasive media agenda building strategy, as it was with the embedded reporter 
initiative in 2003; there were only four members in the Coalition then, no Arab 
countries involved and no United Nations Security Council Resolution to give the 
invasion of Iraq international legitimacy as there was with the 1991 conflict.  
 
Eden was in a similar position to Blair in terms of limited international support for 
military action. A key figure in building an effective media agenda building strategy 
should have been Eden’s Press Secretary William Clark. However, by mid-1956 
when the Suez crisis escalated the relationship between them had become strained 
with Clark looking for a more strategic view of press affairs and Eden depending on 
a more tactical approach, an approach which relied heavily on Eden himself briefing 
influential, and mainly right wing, national newspaper editors and their autocratic 
owners. Clark was isolated from influence, compared to the position of Blair’s 
Director of Communications Alastair Campbell who was at the centre of UK 
government media planning and strategy and had Blair’s confidence. Indeed, 
Campbell, unlike Clark, was a potent communications policy force in the War 
Cabinet and a force for change.819
 
 
Clark, in contrast, reveals his frustration with Eden approach and asserts that there 
was no “big design” in terms of being ahead of events and, by implication, no real 
public relations strategy with a narrow fire-fighting role obscuring what was the big 
picture. He feared that the result of the mishandling of the Egyptian situation would 
“result in some terrible humiliation when the war begins”.820
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doctors Eden was not very political in the sense of knowing how to lead and 
manipulate public opinion through the media.  
 
Eden failed in government agenda building since there was no real media strategy 
in his plans, other than personal talks to editors and the use of propaganda, often 
“black propaganda” at that. There were no carefully crafted communications 
strategies to cultivate good and supportive coverage.821 Certainly to the mainly 
right-wing press who were supporters of the Conservative Party and who, like the 
Daily Express and Daily Telegraph clung to the old British Empire image, a weak 
Eden would be counter-productive to their own media policy and philosophy. They 
had already attacked him over him signing an agreement with Nasser two years 
before to withdraw British forces from the Suez Canal by 1956.822 The absence of 
these forces then allowed Nasser to send his own troops into the zone on July 26th 
1956 prompting the right-wing media to call for military action to retake Suez. It was 
only Eden’s personal assurances to newspaper editors and proprietors that he 
would not pursue a policy of appeasement and would take action that brought them 
over to his side. As noted in the Suez chapter, two senior members of Eden’s 
Cabinet visited the Daily Telegraph’s owner Lord Berry, his main critic, and the next 
day assured him that Eden would pursue the Telegraph’s imperialist line.823
 
 Berry 
then changed the policy line of his newspaper and swung it behind Eden. 
Nevertheless, as the crisis developed the internal differences within the Eden 
administration did not augur well for a cohesive media agenda building policy. 
Above all, to carry out effective external communications, any government must 
have effective internal communications and with Eden and his press secretary at 
odds this was hardly likely to happen. The erratic nature of Eden’s decision making 
was also referred to by Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary at the time who told 
Clark that the Cabinet had “blundered around a bit” not because Eden could not 
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Moreover, the diaries of Mountbatten, Eden’s First Sea Lord, and Sir Walter 
Monckton, his Minister of Defence, also show deep internal divisions within the 
Eden administration, hardly a firm foundation on which to build a lasting and 
successful media agenda-building strategy. Monckton, writing to a colleague in 
September 1956, says he had no doubt Nasser could be defeated militarily, but this 
tactical aim would be overshadowed by the lack of a strategic aim “if world opinion 
turns against us?”825 World opinion did turn against Eden and his policy of military 
action in Suez and quickly forced a withdrawal of the UK, French and Israeli forces 
involved. The adverse effects of a military invasion of Suez on world opinion were 
also the fear of the soldier who commanded all forces on Operation Musketeer, 
General Sir Charles Keightley. He doubted Eden’s ability to win international 
support and warned that without this the military operation would fail. Keightley 
remarked that “Western world opinion” had to be won.826 Richard Powell, 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence also said that invasion would turn 
world opinion against the UK.827
 
 
Monckton had referred to Eden’s ignoring the effects of negative world opinion in 
order to achieve tactical military success. Mountbatten, looking to hold on to 
domestic support and avoid harmful media speculation was angry at Eden’s refusal 
to issue any press releases when three ships of the Suez invasion force were about 
to leave port. His argument that it was widely known in these ports that the ships 
were about to leave and that  press rumours and stories would get out of hand if 
they were not given a reasonable amount of information was rebuffed by Eden, 
despite the support for Mountbatten of Eden’s own press secretary William Clark.828
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Here was yet another constructive and sensible arrangement for releasing material 
to the media rejected by Eden who continued to rely on his personal briefings to 
editors and proprietors. 
 
Eden’s obsession to get rid of Nasser at all costs, led to his ignoring advice from 
Cabinet colleagues, his own press adviser, his military chiefs and producing a 
government media handling agenda which certainly at the start of the Suez Crisis 
won the majority of media support, whereas Tony Blair had substantial media and 
public doubts to face in order to win support for his agenda, like Eden that of regime 
change. 
 
Also, Blair took a more strategic view as his address to the House of Commons on 
18 March 2003 showed. Blair said: “The country and the Parliament reflect each 
other. This is a debate that, as time has gone on, has become less bitter but no less 
grave. So why does it matter so much? Because the outcome of this issue will now 
determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the 
Iraqi people who have been brutalised by Saddam for so long, important though 
those issues are. It will determine the way in which Britain and the world confront 
the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United 
Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within 
the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest 
of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of 
international politics for the next generation.”829
 
 
Also addressing the House of Commons, on 3 November 1956, Eden showed that 
he was thinking short term and not strategically. He said: “The first and urgent task 
is to separate these combatants and to stabilise the position. That is our purpose. If 
the United Nations were then willing to take over the physical task of maintaining 
peace in that area, no one would be better pleased than we. But police action there 
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must be to separate the belligerents and to prevent a resumption of hostilities."830
 
 
From the exposé of the Treaty of Sèvres, as outlined in the Suez empirical chapter 
here, Eden was lying to Parliament and hiding the agreement made between the 
United Kingdom, France and Israel to invade Egypt. 
In Eden’s case the media were not aware of all the facts, the internal dissensions 
within the Eden administration, the Sèvres agreement and the involvement of Israel 
in which Eden lied to the media and the nation.  As a result The Times, which had 
supported Eden from Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, switched its 
support to opposition once hostilities had started. The editor and proprietor felt they 
had been used by Eden all along through his confidential briefings of its editor 
Haley, and its foreign editor McDonald.831 Only the Daily Sketch and the Daily 
Express remained to support Eden.832
 
 His media agenda-building strategy had 
failed, which was not the case for Blair in Iraq 2003. 
Certainly the media structure was by 2003 radically different and technology had 
produced portable satellite equipment which would have made it almost impossible 
for military authorities to enforce a blanket news ban in the battle area.833  Yet there 
was also a key difference in approach in media handling between the UK and USA, 
as Lieutenant Commander Steve Tatham outlined in an interview for this 
dissertation. The USA had decided that all its media coverage was going to come 
from the embedded journalists, whereas the UK opted for a different system, the 
major information plan coming from a strategic level, from Downing Street, from the 
press office there, from the Ministry of Defence and from three Allied Press 
Information Centres at the operational level.834
                                            
830 Hansard, House of Commons debate 03 November 1956 vol 558 cc1857-73, p.187. 
  The intention was to “flesh out” the 
embedded journalist reports with a more detailed and informed type of briefing at 
the Allied Press Information Centres  but, according to Tatham and others  the 
media became fascinated with the imagery from the front line embedded reporting 
831 Shaw, p.70. 
832 Thomas, Hugh, The Suez Affair (London: 1967), p.133. 
833 Hamilton, John, War in Iraq: Real-Time Reporting (Minnesota, USA: Abdo, 2004), p.27. 
834 Campbell, J.T., Interview with Lieutenant Commander Steve Tatham. 
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which dominated television,835 This was at the expense of a more strategic analysis 
of events by the media  but it is worth noting Seib’s observation on war reporting 
that journalists working within the embedded reporter system may have found it 
tempting to set aside judgement in return for speed.836
 
 The demands of 24-hour 
media coverage, especially with television, led to an increasing demand for fresh 
pictures to feed a hungry audience, an audience which in television terms had 
dramatically risen in 2002-2003 with CNN being joined by other worldwide news 
networks which had not existed in 1991, including BBC News 24, BBC World and 
Fox. 
The UK and US authorities provided that material through the embedded system; 
the media accepted the embedded system at face value as a means to get the 
front-line coverage themselves that they were denied in the 1991 conflict. Thus the 
arrangements were acceptable to both parties in what may, in retrospect, appear to 
be a Faustian bargain – the authorities being Mephistopheles and the media taking 
the Dr Faustus role without fully appreciating the advantages it gave to the 
politicians and military.  
 
This “bargain” can hardly be blamed on the embedded journalists who were doing 
precisely what they were supposed to do in their somewhat isolated positions with 
individual military units. Perhaps the blame, if blame is to be apportioned, lies with 
producers and editors at the home end of the satellite link whose editorial 
judgement became more biased towards the “entertainment” side of television 
rather than the informative, as Taleb notes, a term he describes as “infotainment” 
with news being framed in a more attractive package for the public.837
 
  
From the perspective of the UK government’s media agenda-building policy 
mobilising, informing and persuading the public are integral to the conduct of war in 
                                            
835 Stanyer, p.422. 
836 Seib, Philip, Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World shaped by War (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.12. 
837 Taleb, p.4. 
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order to win and retain support. This was particularly crucial in the 2003 conflict in 
which, like Suez 1956, there was no official sanction of a UNSCR to invade Iraq 
and also no large 35-member Coalition including Arab members as there was in  
Iraq 1991. The result, as Brown points out, is that attempting to shape a favourable 
representation of the conflict becomes more important for the belligerents even as it 
becomes harder to do.838 This, it is contended, could be an important factor as to 
why the arrangements for embedded reporters were made. In any case, such as 
Iraq 2003, any belligerent would have to consider how to win the media over to its 
own agenda building without appearing overtly to either censor the news or engage 
in propaganda. The embedded system fulfilled that role and, in addition, it obliged 
the media to concentrate on the military aspects and not on civilian casualties, 
producing images referred to by Konstantinidou as “perception management”, the 
desire by US and UK authorities to keep the visual representation of death off 
Western television screens.839 Seib underlines the dangers to any belligerent which 
allows the media to capture images of, for example, dead and wounded women 
and children, crying and distraught relatives, bombed hospitals and so on which 
conflict with the official dominant story line of “grand achievement and noble 
sacrifice”.840
 
   
However, to bring international pressure to stop the conflict it was in Saddam 
Hussein’s interests to show civilian casualties in order to increase international 
opposition to the invasion of his country and UK domestic opposition in a country 
already divided on whether or not to support the war. He did this by allowing 
Western reporters access and also through the Arab TV stations such as al-
Jazeera whose pictures also went out to Western TV stations. Western reporters 
were allowed to film the devastation, horribly charred remains being brought out to 
ambulances and angry relatives screaming in grief.841
                                            
838 Brown, p.87 
  These sorts of images were 
counterproductive to UK and US government aims as Konstantinidou reveals in her 
839 Konstantinidou, p.149. 
840 Seib, p.xiv. 
841 Ibid. 
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study of the Greek press coverage of Iraq 2003, images which aroused opposition 
to the invasion of Iraq and the rationale behind the conflict.842
 
 
6.2. Censorship during conflict. 
 
It was not only the BBC Eden attempted to censor; he also “censored” his own 
Cabinet by denying them vital intelligence information. Former Joint Intelligence 
Committee chairman Sir Percy Cradock says that intelligence was being used 
selectively by Eden in disregard of the no-confrontation policy approved by the 
Cabinet, which had voted for a less belligerent policy of long-term isolation of 
Nasser.843  This is also confirmed by Dorrill who claims that Eden only wanted to 
hear information which suited his own conclusions.844 Adamthwaite adds that 
valuable experience and advice was lost to Eden when he failed to consult the 
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, a think tank for the coordination of 
foreign and defence policies.845 The Cabinet Permanent Secretary Sir Norman 
Brook later said that the whole Suez affair had been a folly, a folly perhaps 
exacerbated by Eden’s neglect of this senior Civil Service policy group.846
 
  
Censorship may, by definition, involve suppressing material before publication but I 
contend that by selective use of intelligence released to the Cabinet and non-
consultation with Brook’s committee, Eden was in fact censoring information which 
should have been bought before his Egypt Committee, or War Cabinet, and the full 
Cabinet. A more informed Cabinet and Permanent Secretary’s Committee might 
have had the information to pressure the Prime Minister to bring it before 
Parliament where it would then have entered the public domain through media 
reporting Parliamentary affairs and publication in Hansard. In addition, better 
informed Cabinet members may have been able to give informal and non-
attributable briefings to the Parliamentary Lobby which, if reported, might have 
                                            
842 Konstantinidou, p.150. 
843 Cradock, p.117. 
844 Dorrill, pp.602-3. 
845 Adamthwaite, p.452. 
846 Shuckburgh, p366. 
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changed the views of key national newspaper editors and proprietors who had 
thrown their support behind Eden in the lead-up to the actual military invasion of 
Suez. Cohen refers to this in his study of relationships between the media and the 
UK Foreign Office (4.3.) and the practice of Cabinet ministers who disagree with 
collective Cabinet decisions giving “unattributable” briefings to the media in order to 
revive their own views and attempt to undermine, or change, Cabinet policy.847
 
 Yet 
in the case of Suez disaffected Cabinet ministers did not have the detailed 
information, the ammunition, to leak to the media since Eden was only allowing 
them to see selective intelligence. 
Certainly, Eden’s actions over selective use of intelligence were more a sin of 
omission rather than commission, in other words the deliberate holding back of 
information from Cabinet colleagues, Parliament and eventually the media and 
public. However, to continue the religious analogy his actions to attempt to censor 
the BBC were “sins of commission”, deliberate, planned and calculated to frighten 
the BBC into either toeing Eden’s line or, at least from a damage limitation point of 
view, not carrying material which opposed the Prime Minister’s policy. You will note 
it is referred to as “Eden’s line” and the “Prime Minister’s policy” and not the 
Government’s line and policy since, as noted above, Eden had withheld information 
from his Cabinet, information which might have forced a different policy of long-term 
isolation of Nasser rather than a military solution. This differed from Blair’s position 
where he had the support, apart from Foreign Secretary Robin Cook who resigned 
over the lack of a UNSCR, of his Cabinet and Parliament for military action against 
Iraq and had a Director of Communication, Alastair Campbell, who was at the 
centre of government agenda building and had his Prime Minister’s trust, unlike 
William Clark who was isolated by Eden and later resigned. 
 
Turning to direct attempts to censor the media Cockerell in his study of the 
relationships between British prime ministers and television highlights the severe 
differences which arose between Eden and what he called “these Communists at 
                                            
847 Cohen, p.72. 
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the BBC.” Eden was railing at the BBC over the demand of the Leader of the 
Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, to the right to reply to Prime Ministerial broadcasts 
given at key points during the Suez Crisis, a right that the public have come to 
expect in a democratic Britain.848  Seymour-Ure, writing on relationships between 
British prime ministers and the media, reveals Eden’s autocratic attitude at 
expecting to address the nation at will during the Suez Crisis when the rules stated 
that strictly he had to be invited to make a ministerial broadcast, and that broadcast 
was likely to involve the offer of a “right to reply to the Leader of the Opposition”.849
 
  
Indeed, this was bought up by Labour M.P Willie Hamilton in a debate in the House 
on 25 October 1956, following Sir Anthony Eden’s statement that he had made, up 
until then, apart from news interviews, “one broadcast on the Suez Canal 
situation.”850 Mr Hamilton replied, as Hansard records: “Can the right hon. 
Gentleman say with whom the initiative lies in effecting these broadcasts? 
Secondly, will these talks count as party political broadcasts, because there is—
[HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."]—indeed there-is—a feeling in the country that they have 
been used for that end. Is he aware that if this abuse of the B.B.C. continues the 
Government are playing with fire?”851
 
 Hamilton was referring to Eden’s attempt to 
deny Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell the right of reply (as outlined in the Suez 
chapter) to what was, in effect, a party political broadcast and Eden’s attempt to 
“censor” Gaitskell. 
Censorship certainly took place when the invasion force set out for Egypt on 
November 3rd 1956 when Eden broadcast to the nation and the broadcast was 
relayed to the officers’ messes on the ships, but was not relayed to the troops on 
board.852
                                            
848 Cockerell, p.45. 
 Eden’s rifts with the BBC are clearly outlined in Section 4.2. No such 
censorship occurred with Blair who, to drum up media and public support, 
849 Seymour-Ure, Colin, Prime Ministers and the Media: /issues of Power and Control (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp.38-39. 
850 Hansard, House of Commons debate 25 October 1956 vol 558 cc826-7, p.826. 
851 Ibid. 
852 Cockerell, p.256. 
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constantly used newspapers, radio and TV interviews and briefings, although there 
were attempts by his Director of Communications Alastair Campbell to pressurize 
the BBC over the so-called “dodgy dossier”.                                                                                                                                                                              
 
The evidence of government censorship or attempted censorship in Suez 1956 is 
quite clear in both documentation placed in the National Archives and in academic 
research into the Suez Crisis. However, there may be even more substantial 
evidence yet to be found since government papers, Cabinet and other minutes, are 
still being held back from being deposited in the National Archives well beyond the 
30-Year Rule. This will be a fruitful source for further academic research when they 
are eventually released as will the hidden agenda-building policy of the Blair  
administration if, written evidence of this still exists and has not been destroyed as 
has happened to some of the Suez 1956  government documentation, including the 
Sèvres document.  
 
So, Eden was engaged in overt censorship during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Research 
for this study shows that in Iraq 2003 the UK government and military were 
engaged in a more subtle covert censorship, partly based around the availability of 
new technology. Magder makes the point that in 1999 these new technologies 
conspired to make the job of controlling press coverage even more difficult. The 
most noteworthy of these was media use of satellites and in 1999, Space Imaging, 
a Colorado-based company, launched Ikonos, the first civilian satellite capable of 
rendering clear images of human bodies on the ground. This would seem a real 
opportunity for the media to use it in the Afghanistan conflict in the same year 
except that as the war began the Pentagon bought up exclusive rights to all Ikonos 
pictures of Afghanistan, even though it had already six imaging satellites in orbit, 
four of them Keyhole satellites, capable of rendering images estimated to be six to 
ten times greater than Ikonos.853
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Although this was a US initiative, this again points out to a form of censorship by 
denying the media this satellite source and perhaps nudging them in the UK and 
USA towards the embed system where, on the face of it, they would get close-up 
images of the battle. Prime Minister Blair needed the support of the media in what 
was an unpopular war with substantial domestic opposition.854 In particular, as 
Blair’s Director of Communications Alastair Campbell noted, without the legitimacy 
conferred by a UNSCR the need to win that domestic support was even more vital 
and that Blair had said the UK had to get the USA to go down the UN route.855  
Here again is a similar situation to Suez 1956, a country split on the need for 
military action and regime change and two Prime Ministers, Eden and Blair, 
needing to win the agenda-building battle, secure media support and convince the 
public to support the government’s political and military aims. Greenslade 
underlines this need to win domestic support when he makes this comparison with 
the unpopularity of the Suez Crisis and postulates that Iraq 2003 was probably the 
most controversial UK military adventure since then.856 War reporter John Swain 
also remarks that this (Iraq 2003) was the first time the UK had sent troops into 
action without popular support since the Suez invasion.857 Greenslade also notes 
that the embedded journalist system had won the support of major newspaper 
proprietors Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black, who had backed military 
intervention in Iraq.858
 
 This was a willing bargain between both the UK 
political/military system and the media, but the question has to be asked what 
censorship was taking place by the political and military machine. Apart from the 
acceptance of the media that they could not publish or broadcast anything which 
endangered military operations and soldiers’ lives (a point editors had signed up to 
when accepting embedded reporter places), it seems on the surface that no military 
censorship was involved in Iraq 2003. 
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However, Mark Laity, a BBC defence correspondent in 1991 and a SHAPE 
spokesman in Iraq 2003, refers to censorship existing in the form of embedded 
reporters suffering from the Stockholm syndrome, too close an identification with 
the military unit with which they were embedded and affecting their objectivity.859 
BBC reporters Caroline Wyatt and Ben Brown also both referred to this in 
interviews, Wyatt adding that it was very hard to make sense of what was 
happening because the military people who were commanding the war were not at 
the front line embedded positions nor at the hubs (where Wyatt was) to process the 
material from the front and add her assessment.860
 
 Again, this points  to an 
intended or unintended form of censorship on the part of the UK authorities in the 
form of censorship by default, in other words by failing (either deliberately or 
inadvertently) to supply facilities and briefings which would have provided the 
media, and thus the public, with a greater strategic insight of the military action.  
The dominating media coverage in Iraq 2003 is of military action. This is key to 
government media agenda building for if the UK and U.S. governments were 
subject to media coverage of the “political violence” of civilians, especially women 
and children, being killed, that would be counter-productive to their political aims. 
Therefore, embedded reporting which showed only military conflict, would win more 
support and less opposition than showing civilian casualties. As Seib points out for 
political reasons, governments like to portray war as a Hollywood-type heroic 
exercise with civilian casualties not being allowed to infringe on the dominant 
“patriotic” story line.861 Hammond, as does Mark Laity, also criticises the Doha 
briefings of substituting presentation for the lack of detail and quotes articles in the 
Guardian and Independent attacking the UK and US governments for the way the 
war was being spun and reported.862
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In looking for evidence of a deliberate censorship in-built to the embedded reporter 
system and the briefings at Doha, one can reflect on the words of Dick Cheney, in 
2003 the US Vice President but in Iraq 1991 the US Defence Secretary. Sifry and 
Cerf quote Cheney in 1991 saying: “I do not look on the press as an asset. Frankly I 
looked on it as a problem to be managed”. In other words, censorship is involved, 
albeit a more subtle form in Iraq 2003 than in Iraq 1991 and with the strong element 
of media self-censorship, described by Robert Fisk as “complacent and supine.”863
 
 
In their study of war reporting in Iraq 2003, Sylvester and Huffman quote TV 
journalist Byron Harris admitting that the restrictions of the embedded process gave 
the military a tremendous opportunity to manage the news due to the media’s utter 
dependence on the military units which with they were embedded for food, 
transport, protection as well as briefing”864  Again, it is submitted, this is evidence of 
actual censorship at source, restriction of information to the media during news 
gathering rather than restriction of information by editing, censoring in other words, 
before publication or transmission. One can return again to Hamilton’s analogy of 
looking at an elephant through a straw “where you see only a small part of the large 
picture”.865
 
 To take his analogy further, the “straw” was the censorship implicit in the 
embedded reporter system. 
6.3. The media and official sources 
 
As the Suez Crisis dragged on through the summer and autumn of 1956 a 
breakdown in relationships came about between Sir Anthony Eden and his Press 
Secretary William Clark. Eden, rather than leaving Clark as the official No. 10 
source for briefing the media, made direct approaches to editors, such as Arthur 
Christiansen of the Daily Express and Iverach McDonald, foreign editor of the 
Times, as Thorpe, Eden’s own biographer with access to Eden’s private 
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correspondence points out.866 Certainly these senior media editors responded 
favourably to Eden’s approach and printed favourable articles on his determination 
to recover control of the Suez Canal, but as Turner and others show Eden at heart 
distrusted the media and felt that they should print what he said. There was no give 
and take in government media relations as Clark, a media professional would have 
carried out, while Eden expected that in a time of crisis the media should put a 
favourable slant on government actions.867 Seymour-Ure reflects that Eden was put 
in a quandary through the breakdown of relationships between himself and his 
press secretary. He needed Clark’s expertise to handle the media, remembering 
that it was media criticism which had brought down Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain early in the Second World War and led to Churchill becoming Prime 
Minister.868
 
 That expertise was lost and Clark’s usefulness as an official source for 
the media to rely on was nullified. 
Eden was left to carry out his own briefings, to add to the already heavy load he 
was carrying as both Prime Minister and as de facto Foreign Minister (he having 
side-lined the real office holder Selwyn Lloyd to a subordinate role, as Mathews, 
Cohen, and Selwyn Lloyd himself, have written).869  Eden needed to keep on side 
the main newspaper proprietors, autocratic press barons with a shared interest in 
maintaining the world status of Britain and her empire, and convince this powerful 
media group that he would act decisively.  For example, Eden carried this out with 
the Daily Express through personally briefing its editor Arthur Christiansen stressing 
that he would act to regain control of Suez but that the government needed time to 
prepare its plans and he needed that confidence respected. Christiansen passed 
this on to his proprietor Beaverbrook whose support was won.870
 
 
However, sections of the British Press, including the Daily Mirror and the Guardian 
still opposed Eden’s Suez policy but as Parmentier notes they lifted their doubts as 
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to supporting military action doubts as soon as military action was taken on October 
25th 1956.871  Shaw similarly highlights this dilemma faced by two of the 
newspapers most critical of Eden, the News Chronicle and the Daily Mirror. On 
October 31st , 1956, the day virtually all the newspapers carried news that British 
troops would be moving into Suez,  both newspapers, Shaw says, were 
“conspicuously non-committal and affected by indecision”.872 Clark, as a 
government spokesman, was essential to the media which, in many cases, 
becomes dependent upon such an “official source” but the media by then were well 
aware that he did not have Eden’s confidence.873
 
  
Eden may have been a successful “official source” for the bulk of the UK media in 
the lead-up to the actual invasion of Suez but as Negrine notes governments have 
to use carefully crafted communications strategies to ensure they get “good press” 
for their policies.874  Lord Hill, who conducted a review of government 
communications after the Suez debacle, was scathing about the lack of guidance 
given to government spokesmen by the Eden administration. His findings were 
particularly critical of the presentation of the UK Suez case overseas, but also of the 
lack of access by press office professionals to their ministers and the perception by 
permanent officials of press officers as a “necessary evil”.875
 
  
Eden may have lacked a firmly-founded media strategy but this was not the case 
with Tony Blair and embedded reporting was a key weapon in the UK government’s 
media agenda-building strategy. It became a very attractive proposition to the 
media in that it appeared to give them access to the front of battle, an access they 
were denied in the 1991 Iraq conflict.  
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Maltby refers to the “seductiveness of facilities such as “embedding” which may 
provide reporters with unprecedented access to front lines but which, in reality 
encourage them to identify with military goals and detracts attention from the wider 
political and moral context of the war.876 Maltby’s academic analysis is reinforced 
by the practical experience of Mark Laity. A NATO military spokesman in 2003, 
having switched from journalism, he is quite honest about the advantage of the 
embedded system to the military and political machine and points out that if you put 




Christiansen qualifies this relationship by commenting that good relationships were 
built up between UK military and media which, on the whole, showed support for 
the UK government political and military agenda.878 This does indicate an 
uncomfortable reliance on official sources although whether the media consciously 
realised this is debatable. The BBC’s Director of News  during the conflict, Richard 
Sambrook, may have touched on this when he admitted the difficulties of retaining 




When we reflect on the views of several journalists and analysts set out in this 
dissertation about the dominance of television images in reporting the war, images 
filed by embedded reporters relying solely on “official sources”, criticism about the 
lack of analysis of events emerges. On this Sambrook admits to the power of 
pictures but does raise a key point in that some of the BBC audience actually 
complained that there was “too much live coverage from the front for them to really 
understand what was happening”.880
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That, it is suggested, is exactly what the embedded reporter system was intended 
to achieve and in the close relationships that were built up, the embedded media 
may not have looked too hard at the end product of their endeavours, as Sylvester 
and Huffman conclude.  They quote TV journalist Byron Harris summing this up 
when he said that “the restrictions of the embedded process gave the military a 
tremendous opportunity to manage the news. We were tethered to them for 
transportation. We could not break away. If our unit was moving we had to move 
with them and could only rarely stop to talk to Iraqis.”881
 
  
Embedded reporting seemed free of obvious media manipulation by the military on 
the whole, apart from some crude attempts, which will be raised in the next section 
(Section 6.4.). However, it could be argued that the UK government had made 
embedded reporting arrangements, freely accepted by the media, as a great 
improvement on the pooled journalist system of the 1991 Iraq War. Yet here was an 
over reliance on official sources built in to a system perceived to be a fair 
partnership between the military and the media and this study  will return to that 
over-reliance and whether or not it was planned as a UK government media 
agenda-building strategy. It can be accepted that war reporting is generally 
weighted toward, and in favour of, the home nation since the media typically cover 
war from the point of view of the country in which they, and their major owners, 
viewers, listeners and readers are based, reflecting the point of view of that 
country’s government and its foreign policy. 
 
Therefore, in UK government’s offer of embedded media status, compared with the 
unsatisfactory arrangements (from the media’s point of view) in 1991, this bias 
would surely be enhanced, albeit unintentionally from the media’s point of view. The 
media thought they had won more freedom to report and were, on the whole, free 
from censorship but the reliance was still on official sources under the guise of 
press freedom of access. Hamilton cites the fact that embedded reporters bonded 
with the troops and felt “uncomfortable” in portraying their military colleagues in an 
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unfavourable light.882 The BBC’s Gavin Hewitt qualifies Hamilton’s view by saying 
that his military colleagues accepted that if something happened which put them in 
an unfavourable light he (Hewitt) would have to report it. Yet he adds that the 
picture-driven coverage also needed a correspondent who could accurately 
interpret it.883
 
 The Cardiff University report on official/media relationships in the 
2003 Iraq War also takes up Hewitt’s point on interpretation of the images filed by 
embedded reporters and concludes that analysis of these images was restricted in 
its strategic view. 
Newspaper photographer Joseph Giordano says the military got exactly what they 
wanted from the embedded system in terms of positive and admiring stories.884
 
  
Whether or not this bias was deliberately built in to the embedded system 
programme or whether it arose by accident (as Colonel Paul Brook says “cock-up 
rather than conspiracy”) will be returned to. However, it seems that evidence points 
to an element of “illusion” in the official offer of a military/media partnership which 
would on the face of it benefit both parties in terms of fair and objective reporting 
yet, in fact, benefitted one more than the other. 
Reliance on “official sources” through the embedded media in Iraq 2003 aided the 
UK government’s military and political agenda, it is contended, more than it did any 
truly objective coverage by the media. This is not only the conclusion of this 
dissertation but those of media and academic sources quoted here, including the 
BBC’s Director of News and Current Affairs during the 2003 conflict, Richard 
Sambrook. 
 
6.4. Media management and official disinformation 
 
As previously outlined relationships between Prime Minister Anthony Eden and his 
Press Secretary William Clark moved to a breakdown state as the Suez Crisis 
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escalated through the summer and autumn of 1956. This breakdown made it more 
difficult for Eden to structure a strategic media management policy. In addition, 
there was internal criticism from his Cabinet of which, through leaks, the Lobby 
correspondents were already aware. 
 
Opposition to his own views within the government made Eden even more stubborn 
and determined to pursue his own media management strategy, which in effect 
relied solely on his briefing editors, senior correspondents and proprietors, as 
outlined by his own biographer Thorpe, Turner, Seymour-Ure, Monckton and others 
as well as William Clark himself in his diaries kept at the time and subsequent other 
works on the Suez Crisis.885
 
 
No British newspaper would wish to be placed in the position of not supporting, and 
possibly endangering, British troops once they were in action. Former Permanent 
Secretary at the MoD, Sir Frank Cooper, later admitted that psychological 
operations and propaganda had been used.886 Mountbatten and Keightley, 
respectively the naval and military chiefs in Operation Musketeer, both took 
umbrage at government attempts after the withdrawal of the invading troops at 




Between Nasser’s takeover of the Suez Canal on July 27th, 1956, and Operation 
Musketeer in late October, black propaganda broadcasts were made to seek to split 
off Egypt from other Arab states with disinformation raw material supplied by the 
embassy in Cairo. This was aimed at international media to expose Nasser’s 
supposed ambitions to topple the old feudal states throughout the Middle East and 
take control of oil production for Egyptian ends and those of Egypt’s supposed ally 
the Soviet Union.888
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UK Cairo diplomat Ralph Murray, head of the Foreign Office’s innocuously-named 
Information Research Department (IRD).889 The IRD produced black propaganda 
designed to undermine Nasser by appealing for a return to constitutional rule.890 
Egyptian morale was targeted by the use of psychological and propaganda 
methods to attempt to separate Nasser and his government from the Egyptian 
population and this was an integral part of the military preparations for Operation 
Musketeer.891 The IRD prepared articles for insertion into newspapers, magazines 
and journals and even then editors were reluctant to take them because of the lack 
of journalistic and editorial appeal.892  Vaughan notes that the IRD then resorted to 
bribery to influence Middle East editors.893
 
  
Black propaganda may also have been used when the Foreign Office minister Tony 
Nutting resigned in protest at the Sèvres agreement. William Clark, in his diary, 
claims  that he was asked by the Conservative Chief Whip’s Office to give an 
unattributable briefing to the press to the effect that Nutting was “terribly under the 
influence of his American mistress and anyway was not quite himself nowadays”. 
Clark, as a civil servant, replied that this was “the sort of thing the party did, not 
me”.894
 
  It is, however, an unsubstantiated claim. 
What is substantiated, however, is the attempted censorship by Eden in 
contemplating taking over the BBC, a fact denied by his own biographer Thorpe.895
                                            
889 Chapman, p.214. Chapman describes the IRD at supplying Britain’s media, including the  BBC, 
with non-attributable material as part of a hearts and minds policy. In Iraq 2003 the  equally-
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Part of its remit was to research and write articles against the 
Saddam Hussein regime which were then placed in international and UK media, again 
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Yet this was substantiated from other sources such as William Clark who in a diary 
entry of August 16th 1956, noted that he had been at the Home Office for a meeting 
890 Kelly & Gorst, pp.20-21. 
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Staff’, in Kelly & Gorst, p.37. 
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on censorship of the press and added: “I was struck with the extent to which the 
BBC was regarded as completely under government control”.896  As Shaw points 
out, the BBC was vulnerable to political pressure, as it was funded by a licence fee 
decided by the government of the day.897 Further evidence of political pressure is 
evident from a meeting held on October 26th, 1956. The BBC’s chairman of 
governors Cadogan and his Director General Sir Ian Jacob had met Deputy Prime 
Minister R. A. Butler to protest at the Government’s threat to reduce the BBC’s 
External Services Budget from £5m to £4m.898  As Shaw states, and National 
Archives records examined in this dissertation clearly demonstrate, the timing of the 
proposed budget cut was intended to shock the BBC into following the 
government’s line. Indeed, after this meeting the BBC was obliged by Butler to 
accept a Foreign Office official, in effect a censor, to “advise the BBC on the 
content and direction of their overseas programmes”.899
 
   “To advise” here can 
certainly be interpreted as media management intended to channel the BBC into 
supporting the government’s political agenda. 
There was further Parliamentary media management pressure on the BBC, from 
Peter Rawlinson, on November 14th, 1956. Rawlinson, Conservative MP for Epsom  
and later Solicitor General and Attorney General in three successive Tory 
administrations, proposed a motion  which said there had been a “widespread 
impression” that the BBC had not maintained its standards of impartiality over the 
crisis in the Middle East.900
 
 This could be construed as government blackmail since 
the government had the budgetary control to hand in terms of dealing with the BBC, 
through setting the licence fee as well as the grant-in-aid given to BBC External 
Services.  
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In terms of media management techniques,  we can reflect on Eden’s ignoring 
advice from Cabinet colleagues, ignoring his own press adviser, ignoring advice 
from his own military chiefs and producing a government media handling agenda 
which may have at the start of the Suez Crisis won domestic media support.  
However, this support was won without the media being aware of all the facts, 
especially those surrounding the Sèvres agreement. In this, and the involvement of 
Israel, Eden lied to the media and the nation. The Times, which had supported 
Eden from Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, changed sides once 
hostilities had started. The newspaper felt it had been used by Eden all along 
through his confidential briefings of its editor Haley, and its foreign editor 
McDonald.901 Eden’s media management techniques, in other words, had short-
term success only; his media agenda-building was linked to a political policy which 




In 2003, media organisations opted for embedded status with the idea that it would 
give them an edge, providing facilities to get nearer the battlefront than they did in 
Iraq 1991. They may have thought that they could still preserve journalistic integrity 
but it can be argued that they were seduced by the hidden agenda of the UK 
government, an agenda that was founded on trying to make a case for an 
unpopular war, a case that differed from 1991 when the conflict had UN backing 
and was, ostensibly, to free an independent state, Kuwait, from foreign invasion. 
Indeed, in their study of media/military relationships Hess and Kalb underline that 
the embedded policy was adopted because the war was an unpopular one, 
compared to 1991, and that the public needed to see that information appeared to 
come independently through the media rather than official sources if public support 
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was to be won.903  American TV commentator Ted Koppel supports this contention 
that the war appeared to be “seen through the eyes of the journalists”.904
 
  
In retrospect, in an interview with him, and in his own autobiography, the BBC’s 
Middle East Editor Jeremy Bowen remarked that in the age of new, and 
instantaneous, transmission technology both government and media realised this 
fact but perhaps the media were more seduced by the siren song of apparently 
getting the battlefield access they were denied in 1991. From the government point 
of view, Bowen remarks that the best way the authorities could communicate with 
their supporters, and to win over new ones, was to get their version of what 
happened on to the airwaves, albeit through the mouths and cameras of the media 
since, from the government agenda building point of view, winning the information 
war was no longer incidental but was a top military priority”.905
 
  
The embedded reporter structure gave just that advantage to the politicians and, it 
is contended, the system was deliberately employed by the UK and US military as a 
positive media agenda building policy, not as one to give the media better access to 
the battlefront, the access they had been denied in the 1991 war. It was an 
apparently open offer to the media but was, in fact, a media management 
technique, the Faustian bargain to which has previously been referred to in this 
study. 
 
Still, there were moments of media management which were less than subtle, as 
the BBC’s Ben Brown recounts.  Brown clearly states that an Army briefer, Colonel 
Chris Vernon, had actually admitted that he wanted to try to use the media as a 
psychological weapon.  Caroline Wyatt and Hilary Andersson also refer to the fact 
that isolated behind the front lines they relied on official sources for their information 
with the additional pressure of strict deadlines which militated against reflective 
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analysis. Their BBC colleague Tim Franks makes it quite clear that his media 
“minder”, Lt. Col Sean Tully, wanted the journalists to be part of their “information 
operations”, that is to help the military deliver “a particular message to particular 
audiences”, both in the UK and Iraq. Franks adds: “We were in Tully’s words ‘a tool, 
a weapon, a battle-winning asset’.”906 Yet journalists fell into this trap  as the current 
BBC Defence  Correspondent Caroline Wyatt later said when she recollected 
unconsciously switching into “military speak”, during a live broadcast, referring to 
‘the RAF taking out targets’ which led to an article in the Independent criticising her 
for not referring to civilians being killed.907
 
  
This was an honest mistake, freely acknowledged by Wyatt. However, in media 
management terms the UK military used disinformation as a media management 
tool.  Reporter Peter Wilson gives the example of false information released to 
embedded journalists and broadcast - the story of a Shiite rising in Basra - which 
was praised on air by British deputy commander Major-General Peter Wall as “just 
the sort of encouraging indication we have been looking for”. “Coalition officials later 
conceded to me privately that the uprising claim was a deliberate lie aimed at 
encouraging the real thing,” Wilson said. 908 Other journalists criticised the 




What the embedded reporter system did was to put the excitement of instant TV 
into the main frame of 24-hour reporting of military action to the detriment of 
reporting on civilian casualties, the latter a fact which Chouliaraki refers to as the 
“politics of pity”. Embedded reporting ostensibly carried an air of objectivity and of 
impartial observation. However, as Chouliaraki points out, the difference between 
propaganda and the politics of pity is also a difference in the nature of the public 
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sphere that each mode of mediated communication appeals to.910 In other words, 
by not showing images of “public suffering” and seeing the conflict mainly through 
the eyes of soldiers, the UK government avoided the “politics of pity” and, it is 
submitted, ventured into the world of propaganda. The spectator did not have the 
variety of images to be moved by the suffering and, indeed was fed military images 
which justified the war. CNN’s Christiane Ammanpour remarked that the coalition 
troops wanted to be seen “as benefactors not just as bombers”.911
 
 
This was, in fact, propaganda, albeit in its “white” form since what embedded 
reporters observed, in the main, was factual. Jowett and O’Donnell make the point 
that there is a need to evaluate propaganda in a contemporary context, free from 
value-laden definitions and to analyse propaganda as part of the political system.912  
Ellul makes a similar point when he points to the great uncertainty about 
propaganda, adding that it is usually regarded as “evil” and the dissemination of 
information by means of lies.913
 
 We can surely then acknowledge that the concept 
of embedded media was a form of “white propaganda” if  we accept that what was 
written or transmitted by that media was in the main factual and true, albeit 
emerging from a restricted, and UK government and military controlled  system to 
forward the UK’s political and military aims. 
Embedded reporters were a part of this media management system; Robert Marett, 
with his 50 years of experience in media management, said it all when he remarked 
that the best way to employ propaganda was to “Get someone else to do it for you”.  
Jowett and O’Donnell make the same point in that identity concealment is often 
necessary for the propagandist to achieve desired objectives and goals.914
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the media to be a failed media handling strategy in 1991 into one which was 
accepted by them in 2003.  In reality it handed the UK, and US authorities, a potent 
propaganda tool. 
 
This was admitted by Air Marshal Burridge, commander of British forces in the Gulf, 
who later said that he felt ambiguous about the decision to attach journalists to the 
troops. “Experienced journalists see very localised action and it is a pinprick…what 
has gone wrong is that the television news programmes don’t have the ability to lay 
a strategic overview.”915 Seib concurs with this view when he noted that real-time 
media may also lend itself to disinformation – the purposeful dissemination for 
policy-related purposes, of information known to be false.916 Hammond adds that 
the coalition’s obvious intention to generate good PR simply confirmed that the 
war’s presentation was carefully calculated and manipulative.917
 
 
As Taleb points out, it was in fact the opposite of UK government agenda-building 
policy in the Kurdish humanitarian crisis of 1991 (and, one could contend, in the 
breakdown of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia) where the media framed the 
emphasis on human suffering and tragedy, prompting world leading countries to 
apply for (and support) military intervention.918  Here, the “politics of pity” worked 
against the perceived aggressors and in the Kurdish crisis it was Western TV 
pictures of Kurdish refugees fleeing from Iraqi persecution that led British Prime 
Minister John Major to suggest the creation of a “no-fly zone” to provide air cover to 
protect a safe haven for the refugees. As Moorcraft and Taylor reflect, this was an 
example of pictures prompting a policy decision.919
 
  
In this “politics of pity” context, General Sir Rupert Smith, then working on policy 
matters in the Ministry of Defence in 1993 as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff 
(ACDS), refers to the “persuasiveness of contextual reporting.” He admitted that his 
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personal analysis of media reports on the war situation in Bosnia and the effects on 
the civilian population helped to give him a coherent picture on which he could then 
offer military advice to the politician, prompting a “something must be done” state of 
mind.920 This was particularly important since the United Nations Protecting Force 
(UNPROFOR) was failing to achieve its stated purpose in providing safety for 
refugees and it was as a result of, what General Smith describes as “harrowing 
pictures on the TV screens” that there was growing pressure on politicians to take 
some more effective action.921
 
 That action resulted in NATO deciding to police the 
area by air in Operation Deny Flight, denying the Serbs air access and reducing 
their capacity to attack mainly Muslim civilian targets in Bosnia. 
So, the “politics of pity” had worked for the UK and its allies in the Kurdish and 
Bosnian crises and it may have led the UK political machinery to realise that in Iraq 
2003 it could not afford to have that same policy used against it, prompting the 
apparently more media friendly policy of embedded reporting but a policy which, in 
reality, gave more military and political control of media output.  
 
 
6.5.Media agenda building strategy: The lessons of Suez 
 
For Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden media agenda building to support his policy 
over Suez should not have been difficult since, in general and certainly in 1956, the 
British national newspaper system provided more support for right-of-centre 
politicians than it did for these in the centre and left. At the time of Suez, the 
Guardian and the Daily Mirror were among the few national newspapers on the left 
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Good advice can be a brake on bad judgement, especially in handling the media, 
but by this time Eden had lost faith in his Press Secretary William Clark who earlier 
in the crisis had played a shrewd hand in keeping the BBC and the new commercial 
Independent Television News (ITN) on side. On July 31, 1956, Clark had given 
confidential briefings to the BBC’s Sir Ian Jacob and ITN editor Geoffrey Cox, the 
latter reflecting that Clark had assured them the government meant business. Clark 
had used his own authority as press spokesman to make an unattributable 
statement to the two powerful media chiefs, convincing Cox that Eden was intent on 
action. This was reflected in ITN’s coverage which fulfilled Eden’s plan of making it 




Eden’s own biographer Thorpe admits that the prime minister’s approach to media 
agenda-building was more tactical than strategic; Eden was well aware that prime 
ministers could be toppled and that it was media pressure which eventually led to 
the resignation of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain early in the Second World 
War. It was this media pressure he (Eden) wished to avoid and which led him to put 
extraordinary pressure on the BBC to slavishly follow the government line over 
Suez, even to the extent that he was of a mind to nationalise the BBC, if we are to 
believe this allegation, contained in the diary of his press secretary William Clark. 
 
In his eagerness to force the support of the BBC, he did not recognise that the 
Corporation had a more strategic view of events then he himself did. It had a 
charter which expressly laid down its way of operating. Kenneth Lamb, Director of 
Public Affairs for the BBC during the Suez Crisis and a member of the BBC’s Board 
of Management, underlined the BBC External Service’s high reputation for 
objectivity, an objectivity Eden was attempting to modify, if not overturn.  
Commenting in the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the 
Overseas Information Services, April 1954, to which he gave evidence, Lamb 
stressed that this reputation had to be maintained at all costs and that the BBC 
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would deplore any attempt to use it for “direct propaganda of the most obvious 
kind”. He added that the “best and most effective propaganda to many countries 
consists of a factual presentation of the news and of British views concerning the 
news”.924
 
 This was not a view with which Eden acquiesced since he wanted the 
BBC as a government political organ in the way it had been during the Second 
World War, ignoring the fact that in this conflict the British nation was united in a 
“justified” war against an external aggressor and in defence of an international 
treaty protecting the independence of Poland. In Suez, the nation was deeply split 
over whether or not there should be military action to regain control of the Suez 
Canal; the role of the BBC in both these conflicts was entirely different with 
propaganda against Germany and her allies being regarded as a legitimate ploy, 
not a situation acceptable to the BBC over Suez. 
Within the Eden administration there was also opposition to propaganda over Suez. 
His First Sea Lord Earl Mountbatten took offence at government propaganda 
attempts not only during the crisis, but also after Eden had resigned, when the 
government attempted to put out a pamphlet justifying the actions over Suez. In a 
letter to General Keightley, Commander in Chief during Operation Musketeer and 
now at MoD, Mountbatten said that the pamphlet was “political instead of factual.” 
Keightley replied that the pamphlet had been withdrawn, mainly due to pressure by 
Dr Charles Hill, the new Postmaster General and minister in charge of government 
publicity.925
 
 Hill was to be the impetus in changing government media-handling 
policy and amending government agenda-building strategy.  
This needed amending since there was no real strategic media agenda building 
strategy in Eden’s plans, other than personal talks to editors and the use of 
propaganda. As Negrine notes in his treatise on political communication, 
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governments have to use carefully crafted communications strategies to ensure 
they get “good press” for their policies.926
 
  
In 1956, although Eden did not face the problem of dealing with the satellite and 
internet age and 24-hour reporting as the governments did during the Iraq 2003 
conflict, at least he recognised that something had to be done when in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis when he appointed Charles Hill as a cabinet 
minister, with the brief of revising the government’s information services.927 Hill was 
scathing about the lack of guidance given to government spokesmen by the Eden 
administration. He said that despite the lack of success in government media 
handling during Suez, in his restructuring of government communications he still 
found ministerial colleagues suspicious of anyone talking to the media.928
 
  
He was particularly critical of the presentation of the UK Suez case overseas. For 
example, a previous section has referred to the connection between the Daily 
Express and its foreign editor Sefton Delmer, who was seconded by the newspaper 
to Egypt to the UK government-funded Arab News Agency’s office in Cairo. This 
was in fact a propaganda front and, recognising this, the Egyptians threw Delmer 
out of the country in August 2006.  
 
However, as well as criticising the overseas presentation of the UK’s Suez case, 
Hill pointed to the lack of access by press office professionals to their ministers and 
the perception by permanent officials of press officers as a “necessary evil”.929  
Indeed, Seymour-Ure maintains that until the 1990s “British governments had a 
hostility towards a single media ministry or a single set of strategic national media 
goals” adding that previous to this UK government media policies were generally 
uncoordinated and reactive930
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revision of the government’s information services by Charles Hill was still meeting 
with internal opposition nearly forty years later. 
 
Suez showed that Britain could no longer engage in this scale of unilateral action 
against another sovereign country without seeking the support of the United 
States.931 William Clark, in his 1974 essay, put it succinctly when commenting on 
the lessons future Prime Ministers could learn from Suez: “One cannot successfully 
lead the country into a military adventure without preparing public opinion.”932 And 
to reach the public and mould public opinion, this does involve a successful media 
agenda building policy which brings the media on side. Foreign Office Minister 
Anthony Nutting, who resigned over Eden’s Suez policy, said that the affair had 
been ‘no end of a lesson’ for British policy-makers, not least in the realm of public 
persuasion where it exposed the dangers of allowing propaganda to outpace 
policy.933 In contrast, in Iraq 2003 the embedded reporter system, the concentration 
on military operations and not on civilian casualties had won not only internal UK 
support but, by 4 April 2003 when the Allied troops had taken 80 per cent of 
Baghdad airport, Middle East support through Abu Dhabi TV and the BBC World 
Service Arabic Service, Alastair Campbell noted.934 Also, in his entry for the day he 
noted that “we also had some good Iraqi exiles who were able to talk about the 
regime far more convincingly than we could.”935 This illustrates one of Robert 
Marett’s principles for propaganda that you can be more convincing it you get 
someone else to tell the story for you, a third party endorsement so to speak. Tony 
Blair, in his autobiography, refers obliquely, if not specifically, on the work of the 
Coalition Information Centre (CIC) in that a hard power strategy alone would not 
work in engaging the people out in the Middle East, in the Muslim world, and had to 
build alliances within that world.936
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diplomacy which showed the dark side of the Saddam regime and its persecution of 
those, such as Shia clerics and Kurds, who opposed the regime, in order to win 
hearts and minds in these key areas.937
 
 
However, if the Blair government had drawn internal and external support for 
military action, the same was not the case in Suez 1956. Even the most fervent 
media friends of a government may turn against that government if lied to. Eden 
lied to fellow government members, to Parliament, to the media and to the people 
over the Protocol of Sevres and the involvement of Israel in the secret agreement to 
invade Egypt. As a result, The Times, which had supported Eden from Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal, changed sides once hostilities had started. The 
newspaper felt it had been used by Eden all along through his confidential briefings 
of its editor Haley, and its foreign editor McDonald.938
 
 
Although much has been written about the 1956 Suez crisis, exposing the failures 
of Eden, there are still government records which remain classified and which, 
when examined by future researchers when they are eventually released, may 
shed an even greater light on the affair. Still, what is available at the National 
Archives, and from the personal papers of figures such as Monckton and 
Mountbatten, does give a deep insight into the internal malfunctions of the Eden 
administration. In the cases of the Iraq 1991 and 2003 conflicts no official papers, 
such as Cabinet documents, are as yet available and until they are researchers 
have to look elsewhere for information. 
 
Seib maintains that the lack of analysis in the coverage of the Iraq 2003 conflict was 
not the fault of journalists on the ground since they only had a tiny piece of the war 
on which to concentrate. He identifies the problem as belonging the upper ranks of 
the news organisations where producers and editors became so infatuated with the 
drama being delivered by the embeds that they overused that to the exclusion of 
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less gripping but more important stories.939  SHAPE chief spokesman Mark Laity, 
academic Philip Knightley, current BBC Defence Correspondent Caroline Wyatt 
and John Robertson, in his examination of Scottish newspapers’ coverage of the 
conflict and others all testify to the narrow focus of media reliance on embedded 
coverage to the detriment of analysis. Seib makes the pertinent point that combat is 
only part of war; the rest is politics, diplomacy, economics, and other dry 
sciences.940
 
 To take in all of these aspects in comprehensive and broad spectrum 
media coverage, the choice lay in the hands of the editors and other executives. 
In the lead-up to the actual outbreak of military action, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
used other methods to strengthen his political agenda and justify military action. 
This included the setting up of a unit nominally in his No. 10 office but physically 
situated in a basement in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the other side 
of Downing Street. This unit, the Coalition Information Centre (CIC), headed by 
Blair’s Director of Communications Alastair Campbell, researched any material 
which could discredit Saddam Hussein and produced articles which could be 




Also, the government did not neglect to use on-line news, not only from the 
websites of No.10, the Cabinet Office and the MoD, but also through press releases 
to try to influence favourable coverage on media websites, reaching domestic 
audiences and those abroad.  Best et al, in their examination of on-line news during 
the conflict with Iraq, point out that for the BBC news websites, more than 50 per 
cent of the on-line traffic originated from outside the United Kingdom.942
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Jowett and O’Donnell all note, comparing the American coverage of Fox as 
unashamedly one-sided. This may also reflect on a more professional and 
balanced output by the UK government’s news organisation and a realisation that 
to play the overtly “patriotic card” would not work in the UK as it would in the USA, 
particularly in the run-up to what was seen as an unpopular war. 
 
Also in the lead-up to the actual conflict the UK government did have a media 
agenda-building advantage with surveys showing that 51 per cent of newspaper 
readers in Britain read a newspaper which shares their political leanings.943 With a 
majority of the UK national newspapers showing support for the government’s 
possible military action against Saddam, that did ease pressures on the 
government’s attempts to seek positive supportive newspaper coverage. Even the 
Mirror, which opposed the war, was forced to tone down its attacks as readers 
turned away, according to Greenslade because “Mirror readers do not revel in 
criticism of the government in time of conflict”.944 In addition, Tulloch point outs out 
in his study how weak and marginal the press is in opposing the executive actions 
of a determined British prime minister, and the comparative effectiveness of the 
official news management strategy.945 This is an aspect also highlighted by Esser 
and Pfetsch in their work on political communication where they contrast the 
struggle between a government and the media for the news advantage They make 
the point that government efforts to orchestrate news coverage have become more 
sophisticated and successful, leaving journalists struggling to assert their 




In this struggle to dominate the news agenda in the 2003 Iraq conflict it is 
suggested that the UK government recognised the media pool system in the 1991 
war had created media anger and therefore introduced the embedded media 
                                            
943 Best et al, p.56. 
944 Greenslade, p.661. 
945 Tulloch, John, ‘The Daily Mirror and the invasions of Egypt (1956) and Iraq (2003), Journalism 
Studies ((Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007), p.46. 
946 Esser & Pfetsch, p.53. 
 255 
system to persuade the media that they (the government) were bowing to media 
pressure and were openly offering access to battle areas which was not the case in 
1991. This dissertation uses with caution “conspired to offer” since, we have no 
current access to any government records on the 2003 conflict under the 30-year 
rule. Future research when records are published may reveal that embedded 
reporting was, in fact, a government conspiracy to support the Blair government’s 
agenda of regime change. 
 
Switching to the actual media handling and military briefing operation in the conflict 
area, more than 100 media reservists were called up with secondary roles to act as 
media operators when needed.947
 
 A number of these were members of the Media 
Operations Group (V), Territorial Army media specialists whose civilian jobs were in 
newspapers, radio, television or public relations the idea  being that they knew and 
understood the journalistic trade and could, it was hoped, form productive links with 
the media covering the build-up to the actual conflict. These specialists were in 
uniform, which the media preferred. 
The key difference between Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003 was the sheer volume of 
action footage which, as many of the sources quoted here point out, left less room 
for studio analysis. For example, BBC World presenter Nik Gowing refers to this 
instantaneous action coverage as “the tyranny of real-time” which creates an 
immense political problem for the British government. Gowing, who made this 
statement in a lecture in May 2004, was referring to events reported post conflict in 
Iraq when there was much more time for media analysis and reflection, unlike 
during the actual conflict itself.948
 
 The fixed and unwittingly blinkered focus of 
embedded reporting (like looking at an elephant through a straw, as previously 
mentioned) gave some government control of that “tyranny” by showing favourable 
images of “our boys” doing their job for Queen and Country. 
                                            
947 Tumber & Palmer, p.65 
948 Gowing, Nik, Media, the Law and Peace-building: from Bosnia and Kosovo to Iraq’, The Alistair 
Berkley Memorial Lecture (London: London School of Economics, May, 2004). 
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Yet there was a section of the media which escaped the embrace of the controlled 
embedded journalist environment. For example, Defence Minister Geoff Hoon, 
quoted in the Times of 29 March, 2003, criticised the Middle East TV station al-
Jazeera, Hoon said had shown “unhelpful” television footage which could have 
involved civilian casualties or the degrading treatment of prisoners. The station 
claimed that these pictures showed the reality of war, leaving Hoon to retort that 
“instant pictures” could mislead” and fail to convey the “big picture”. He concluded: 




This was an unwise statement from a government media agenda-building point of 
view since, in effect, he was criticising his own government’s policy on embedded 
reporting. It was this embedded reporting which was producing these same “instant 
pictures” in order to boost UK agenda building and win support from the media (by 
its broadcast coverage) and from the public (who watched that output). Instant 
pictures of military action, and avoiding the “politics of pity” which come with the 
exposure of civilian casualties, was exactly what the UK government’s embedded 
media programme was all about having learned the lesson of the unpopular media 
poll system in 1991.  
 
The embedded media system suited the UK government because it gave that vital 
element of control without appearing to have the censorship grip which was implicit 
in the 1991 media pool system.  In 2003, the media fell into the real-time television 
trap which had boosted audience ratings although the BBC’s then Director of News 
and Current Affairs Richard Sambrook said that some of the BBC audience 
complained that there was “too much live coverage from the front for them to really 
understand what was happening”.950
                                            
949 Dickie, John, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (London: I.B Tauris, 2004), 
p.211.  
 Current BBC Political Editor Nick Robinson, 
reflecting on the Iraq 2003 conflict, reflected: “Looking back, I fear that TV had 
proved, as it so often does, to be the best medium to capture drama and release 
950 Sambrook, Richard, in Beck & Downing (eds), p.16. 
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emotion but not good enough at the marshalling of facts and cool analysis the build- 
up to war merited.”951
 
 
This lack of analysis extended to the actual outbreak of fighting and Sambrook’s 
point on too much live coverage is picked up by Paul and Kim on their analysis of 
the embedded reporter system when they stated that the public had a right to know 
and had a right to know in a timely fashion. However, the public service roles 
claimed by the press were not being well served by real-time coverage of events 
which provided what could be seem as picture-led entertainment or “infotainment” 
lacking sufficient analysis by the media,  which was certainly not in the public 
interest.952
 
  This is a crucial finding which can also be interpreted to mean that the 
real-time coverage provided a distraction in the guise of being a service to the 
public, thus covertly being used as a propaganda tool by a government without 
being perceived as such by the media or the public. 
In an interview with him, one of the key planners of the embedded reporter system 
Colonel Paul Brook said that this propaganda aspect was never discussed in the 
planning stage and the “propaganda” effect of the embedded reporter coverage, 
more action to the detriment of analysis, was more “cock-up than conspiracy”. This 
dissertation would dispute this view on the evidence collected, but the research 
here lacks the definitive proof which scrutiny of the minutes of contemporary 
government meetings would show. Again, this is an avenue future researchers will 
wish to explore when official documents outlining the planning process on the 
embedded reporting scheme become available. 
 
Nevertheless, evidence in this dissertation would suggest that the embedded 
journalist scheme worked more for the UK government and military since it actually 
made the journalists unwittingly, in most cases, subscribe to the political 
establishment.  The live action material sent back from the front line was motivating 
                                            
951 Robinson, p.287. 
952 Paul, Christopher & Kim, James J., ‘Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in 
a Historical Context (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2004). 
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the professional skills of the journalist at the battle front, exciting the creativity of the 
editors in the studio, attracting greater attention of the viewers at home, and 
satisfying the profit margins of the owners of the commercial media such as Sky 
and newspaper groups. Everybody appeared to benefit by this mutual partnership 
of military and media, in contrast to Iraq 1991 and, going further back to the 
Vietnam War where, as Hooper points out, the military bureaucracy failed to realise 
the importance of providing the media with facilities to follow the military situation 
and their regarding of the press as a necessary evil. Here, too, journalists were 
whisked into the battle area and then whisked out again with their material and 
many of them had no real conception of what war was really like for the troops. The 
bond was never made between military and media as it was in the embedded 




The UK government had learned from the 1991 experience and media 
dissatisfaction with it. Mark Laity, who has seen both sides, as a BBC reporter in 
1991 and at a NATO spokesman in 2003, admits that the embedded reporter 
system benefitted the politicians. He stated: “The grammar of TV, the grammar of 
journalism requires that the story comes from the place where the smoke is 
thickest.”954
 
 In other words, it was the whiz-bang action provided by the embedded 
reporters in the front line, which dominated the TV coverage at the expense of the 
bigger picture and a more detailed analysis. This more detailed exposure of the 
“bigger picture” probably would not have supported the government’s embedded 
reporter line which showed a scientific, military conflict mainly devoid of the civilian 
death and destruction. A constant media exposure of these latter grim aspects of 
war, the “politics of pity”, could well have prompted a change the views of UK TV 
and radio audiences and newspaper readers from support into opposition.  
                                            
953 Hooper, p.113. 
954 Campbell, J.T. Interview with Mark Laity 14, August 2007.. 
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Despite the long history of war reporting, questions continue to be raised about 
graphic reality and softened depictions, objectivity and patriotism, and many more 
issues that affect the quality of coverage. During the 2003 Iraq war the news media 
would find their work shaped by new technology, new procedures and, for many, a 
new relationship with the military, but they would still keep looking for answers to 
basic questions about what war journalism should be.955
 
 
On the whole, the embedded media system was of more benefit to the UK 
government than was the media pool system in 1991. Most of the action in 1991 
was conducted over the 42 days from the air, with journalists denied access to 
planes and the reality of the horror (of war) on the whole was kept secret. In 
contrast, during the 2003 conflict, journalists freely accepted access to the 
“frontlines” and those frontline images. Keeble notes that material from these 
journalists, who were clearly risking their lives, aimed to seduce the viewer/reader 
and capture their attention; yet beyond the view of the camera and the journalist 
eyewitness the essential nature of the conflict lay all the more subtly and effectively 
hidden.956 It was hidden because of the reliance on official sources by the media 
and media management as a hidden agenda by the military. In addition, the images 
produced by the embedded media system played into the hands of a UK 
government political and military structure which, as Maltby points out, needed to 
generate and sustain the vital support of the public through the perception 
management which the embedded system delivered.957
                                            
955 Seib, p.41. 
 The UK public perceived 
the war through the eyes of the embedded media as a military war between armed 
forces because that is what the images and lack of analysis showed. Certainly the 
growth of the Arab networks, such as al-Jazeera, and the internet showed the 
horrors of civilian casualties, as previously indicated in this study, but this was not 
the dominant picture put in front of the British public. Instead, the media coverage 
was, it is suggested, mainly perceived by the UK domestic audience to be free of 
956 Keeble, Richard, ‘Information warfare in an age of hyper-militarism’, in Allan & Zelizer (eds), 
pp.49.50. 
957 Maltby, p.3. 
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political control as seen through the eyes of the embedded media and without 
obvious political or military control, what Nye describes as “soft power”.  
 
Nye, in highlighting the importance of “soft power” in war, refers to the management 
of news to reduce unfavourable perceptions. Rigid censorship is not always the 
answer, he adds, and embedding reporters with forward military units limited 
Saddam Hussein’s ability to create international outrage by claiming that civilians 
were being deliberately killed. Unlike the first Gulf War, when CNN framed the 
issues, the diffusion of information technology and the rise of new outlets such as 
al-Jazeera needed a new strategy and that new strategy was through embedding 
reporters in the front line units.958
 
 It amended the UK’s media agenda-building 
strategy from one which created media opposition and dissent to one which was 
freely accepted and which gave a greater advantage to the government in the 
pursuance of its political and military aims. 
The “independent endorsement” within the Middle East and non-aligned nations 
was mainly absent in the case of the UK in both the Suez and the Iraq 2003 
conflicts. Faisal Bodi, speculating on the Iraq 2003 conflict, says the Arab media 
were possibly alone in depicting the war as an act devoid of international legal 
sanction”.959 On a broader point Seib states that in his analysis of war reporting he 
found “systemic flaws in how the news business works, particularly in terms of 
breadth and depth of coverage”.960 He goes on to highlight  controversy in the West 
when al-Jazeera showed Iraqi government-provided footage of dead and captured 
Coalition troops, a view defended by the station’s editor-in-chief Ibrahim Hilal as 
showing the reality of war and asking the viewer to “judge whether war is the most 
suitable way to solve problems”.961
                                            
958 Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), pp.49-50. 
 Tumber and Palmer refer to the difference 
between the traditional Arab language media being directly subordinate to the 
959 Bodi, Faisal, ‘Al Jazeera’s War’, in Miller, David (ed), Tell me lies: Propaganda and Media  
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political system of the country in which each individual media is based, an output 
dominated by “protocol news” coming directly from the Ministry of Information or 
official news agency of that country and stations such as al-Jazeera which do not 
accept “protocol news” in the same way as established Arab broadcasters.962
 
 
Independent endorsement from most Arab and non-aligned nations may have been 
lost in the 1956 and 2003 conflicts and this loss was key to UK government media 
agenda building. The start of any political party attempting to get into government is 
surely its principles; then the goals are outlined to bring these principles into 
operation and a strategy is planned to link the two. Agenda building encompasses 
all three to win friends and influence people and to secure more time – a second or 
third term in office which is the prime aim of any political party in power. Defending 
these themes above, and politics as a whole, Professor Sir Bernard Crick remarks 
that in contrast to tyranny and oligarchy the “political method of rule is to listen to 




As previously mentioned, Sir Robert Marett, who was involved in producing British 
government propaganda for over 50 years from World War 1, set out three rules for 
success: 
 
• Have the right friends in the right places 
• Provide services which fill a need 
• Whenever possible, do not conduct the propaganda yourself, but get a 
national of the country to do it for you.964
 
 
Replacing the word “propaganda”, which nowadays has a pejorative meaning, with 
“agenda building” or “public diplomacy”, it seems that Marett’s three rules had been 
                                            
962 Tumber, Howard & Palmer, Jerry, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis (London: Sage  Publications, 
2004), p.130. 
963 Crick, Bernard, In Defence of Politics (Chippenham: Anthony Rowe, 2005),p.4. 
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met in Iraq 2003 since embedded reporters on the whole admitted that they had 
become friendly with their military protectors. Secondly the military provided the 
services – protection, accessibility, film opportunities on a 24-hour a day basis the 
hungry media required. Thirdly, the agenda building to win public support came 
from the “independent” media and was not ostensibly produced by the military, 
independent endorsement in other words. Palmer, in his review of several 
publications analysing media reporting of the 2003 War, makes a point very similar 
to Marett’s when he says that there is a reorientation of “propaganda” away from 
the model where control over the entire communications chain means that the 
propagandist can dominate the news flow to the public. Instead, modern theories of 
propaganda concentrate on the ways in which governments influence the 
communications process by intervening in the relationship between the journalist 
and the event the journalist reports.965
 
   
Richard Sambrook the BBC’s Head of News in 2003, admitted that embedded 
reporting was only one part of reporting conflict in that it provided journalists with 
the access they wanted and that independent analysis was needed to balance the 
pictures. However, he added that stemming from an incident in the Kosovo conflict 
where NATO wanted one incident covered but the media had access to another 
incident and had the pictures to lead the news with that incident, NATO spokesman 
Jamie Shea concluded that if you controlled the pictures you controlled the 
narrative.966
 
 The picture-led aspect of embedded reporting was this intervention in 
the relationship between the journalist and the event the journalist reports that fits 
Palmer’s propaganda model. 
By amending its media agenda building strategy in the Iraq 2003 conflict to bring in 
embedded reporting the UK government had successfully made that intervention. In 
contrast, Eden failed both in Marett’s three rules and also in Palmer’s propaganda 
model. He certainly had the right friends in the right places in the media in the build-
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up to military action in Suez but ultimately he failed to hold on to that support when 
that supporting media realised that they had been lied to. Eden also failed to 
provide the services which filled the need for agenda building, primarily in 
dismissing the professional media advice from William Clark and taking on the role 
of briefing the media himself. In addition he had lost the internal support from key 
figures such as Lord Mountbatten, Harold Macmillan and Anthony Nutting. On 
Marett’s third point Eden certainly had the support of the bulk of the UK media in 
the lead up to military action in Suez and they held to the government line, call it 
propaganda, agenda-building or public diplomacy. Thereafter the support leaked 
away and there was little third-party endorsement for his regime-change policy 
 
As for Palmer’s view, the relationship between Eden and the media had broken 
down leaving Eden unable to intervene effectively in the relationships between the 
journalist and the events he reports. 
 
So, in comparing the agenda-building actions of Eden and Blair in their attempts to 
regime change, there was Eden who at the beginning of the Suez crisis had gained 
the support of most of the media, including the left-wing Daily Mirror, seeing that 
support leak away in the lead-up to military action. In contrast, you have Blair facing 
substantial media and public opposition to military action in Iraq but, through a 
sustained and effective government agenda-building policy gaining support for 
military action and, when that action took place with the invasion of Iraq, 
consolidating that support through an embedded reporter system which did his 
work for him, his propaganda conducted through a third and, apparently, objective 
media party. 
 
Marett’s third point had worked for Blair as had Palmer’s propaganda model. Blair 
had successfully got the media to, albeit unconsciously, adopt his agenda-building 
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